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ABSTRACT

Intended for media practitioners in developing nations, this manual summarizes theories, policies, and experiences pertaining to the role of communication in Third World societies. The nine major headings of the manual are as follows: (1) Explanation of Terms: Theoretical Considerations; (2) Developing-Country Research: From Cultural Arrogance to Ignorance; (3) Individualistic Modernization Theories; (4) Mass Communication and Interpersonal Communication; (5) Structure-Functionalistic Theories; (6) Change of Paradigms in Developing-Country Research; Dependency Theory and World-Systems Theory; (7) The Discussion of Cultural and Communications Imperialism; (8) The Position of Developing Countries in the International Flow of News; and (9) Conclusion: Consequences of Media Policy; the Outlook for the International Flow of Data. (HTH)

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communication manual

Michael Kunczik

Communication and Social Change

A Summary of Theories, Policies and Experiences for Media Practitioners in the Third World

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1. Explanation of Terms; Theoretical Considerations

1.1. Explanation of Terms; Interpersonal Communication and Mass Communication

The significance of communication for human life cannot – this sounds like a truism, yet is profoundly true – be overestimated. Without communication no society can exist, much less develop and survive. For the existence as well as the organization of every society, communication is a fundamental and vital process. For every joint action by individuals is based on meanings that, having been transmitted by communication, become shared. (After all, *communicatio* means not only transmission, but also community; participation.) The term "communication" has no uniform definition in the literature. To the contrary, "communication" is found in a confusing variety of renditions. Many of the definitions overlap other terms, like, for example, "reaction," "activity," "interaction," or "behavior." On the following pages a term for "communication" will be used that reflects a distinction made by Max Weber (1964, 1) between two kinds of human behavior: "We shall call 'action' *(Handeln)* any human attitude or activity *(Verhalten)* (no matter whether involving external or internal acts, failure to act or passive acquiescence) if and in so far as the actor or actors associate a subjective meaning *(Sinn)* with it. Social action is such action as, according to its subjective meaning to the actor or actors, involves the attitudes and actions of others and is oriented to them in its course."

Not every behavior – for example, not sleep-walking or involuntary kicking while watching the teams in a football game, or a performance under hypnosis – is an "action" in this sense, for such involuntary behavior lacks a subjective meaning in the mind of the performing individual. Nor is every action – such as, for example, a number of people simultaneously opening up umbrellas during a sudden rain – social behavior, if it isn't oriented towards others, as when you offer to share your umbrella with someone. Interaction and communication are defined as kinds of social action. Interaction, the more comprehensive of the two terms, is used as a synonym for social action, and *communication is defined as interaction by means of symbols.* The interplay between communicating partners will be called the communication process. Thus communication is an action that from the perspective of the communicator has as its goal a transmission of messages to one or more other persons by means of symbols.[1])

[1]) The intention implied in this definition represents, however, a certain danger in our formulation. For the intention of communicating something is an antecedent

The following three characteristics of a communication concept so defined deserve mentioning:

1. At least one individual must seek to communicate with another individual. Intrapersonal "communication," such as talking with oneself, or meditation, does not represent communication, for here there is no social activity.

2. The use of symbols must be intended. Purely reactive activity (for example, crying out from shock, or blushing) or unintended passing of information (for instance, through being overheard, or by losing a letter) represent, although they are (or can be) interpreted by a recipient as informative symbols, no communication.

3. The "correct" reception of the message by the recipient or recipients is not determinant for the existence of communication; determinant is the intention of the communicator. A border case would be a pure emission if the partner cannot be reached. But even this "emission" is communication, as long as from the viewpoint of the communicator the message is intended for someone else. (From the perspective of the communicator there is no non-informing emission of symbols, even if the intended recipient cannot decode a message.)

"The intention of conveying something is considered a prerequisite for the existence of communication."

Speech is beyound doubt the most important vehicle of human communication; but communication can also occur non-verbally. Facial expression, eye contact or gestures as well as vocal but non-verbal aspects of the spoken language – hesitation, clearing one's throat, volume, tempo, and so on – are examples. Birdwhistell (1968) reasons that although it is true that every society has a language, it cannot be concluded therefore that in its essence communication is verbal. For Birdwhistell the communication process is a behavioral flow. In it, the author says, words are used occasionally, but it is not a chain of verbal exchanges that is occasionally interrupted by actions.

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determinant of communicative activity that has first to be derived from precisely this activity. In the case of a purposeful action, the goal is regarded both as stimulus toward which the action is directed and as source of motivation for the action. Since motives are both derived from purposeful activity and are also used as explanation of purposeful activity, there is always – and indeed also in the use of the definition proposed above – the danger of circular reasoning.

Interpersonal communication is a process that goes on simultaneously and overlappingly in various channels. Verbal and non-verbal communication are (usually) interdependent infra-communication systems. In the case of non-verbal communication (cf. Ekman and Friesen 1969), too, the intention of conveying something is considered a prerequisite for the existence of communication. Communications channels can be defined in terms of the sense – sight, hearing, etc. – with which the recipient registers information. We can distinguish (cf. Scherer 1974) the following six channels:

1. the auditive or vocal channel (spoken language, i.e. verbal and paralinguistic communication);

2. the visual channel (facial expression, exchange of glances, gestures and body movements, habitus, interpersonal distance and/or making use of space to communicate distancing or approach);

3. the tactile channel (for example, touching, stroking);

4. the olefactory channel (perception of body odors);

5. the thermal channel (sensing another person's bodily warmth);

6. the gustatory channel (sense of taste).

"To reach another person,
you have to know
what codes he or she understands."

If interpersonal communication is understood as occurring simultaneously in different channels then every form of *mass communication, considered from the aspect of the number of communication channels used, is limited communication.* Illustration 1.1 represents a model of dyadic interpersonal communication. Thus a social situation exists when one or more individuals find themselves in the direct presence of one or more other individuals (cf. Goffman 1964), and one actor becomes an object of visual and cognitive attention from another actor and vice versa. The use of speech is determined in the respective socio-cultural environment by the situation. Communicative competence is characterized by the ability to tailor one's diction in a specific situation to the perceived circumstances – that is, corresponding to the expectations of the intended recipients of the message. For mastering speech, it is not enough to be able to formulate messages meaningfully. You must also know what codes, channels and expressions can be used in which situations vis-à-vis which persons. (You must also know, for example, when the situation calls for silence; since silence does not mean that data is not being communicated.) An individual has to know the "ethnography of communication" of a given society in order to know what sort of messages, in

Illustration 1.1: Diadic Interpersonal Communication



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which form, in which situation, vis-à-vis which individuals can be communicated adequately to the situation.

A communicator (c) "selects," in line with his definition of the situation and his intentions, a theme (message) to be communicated. The encoding requires a choice of code or codes, and accordingly the choice of channel or channels to be used for communicating (verbally or non-verbally) the message.

In the use of several channels problems of synchronization can arise, if via different channels, either equivalent or asynchronous, diverging information is to be transmitted. The latter could be the case, if, for instance, an actor would like to signal his personal distance from the role he is playing; that is, if he wants to indicate that he does not identify with the role he is to represent. (An example of this would be if someone passing on to others a seemingly senseless regulation on the job were while doing so to blink his eyes.) Moreover, the encoding involves selecting a form adequate to the situation. This requirement, in turn, presupposes communicative competence (in the verbal sphere involving, perhaps, knowing when and how to choose between, say, Queen's English and dialect; idiomatic language and poetic prose; or whether to resort to insinuations, or anecdotes, fables or analogies: so-called Aesopian communication, etc.).

"Assume in advance that your audience will pay only 'selective attention to certain aspects' of what you want to communicate."

The encoded message is transmitted through the respective channel or channels, and under some circumstances disturbed. The reception signals are registered by the sense organs of the recipients. Here the possibility arises of distortion through selective perception of the message, or selective attention to certain aspects of it. Then too, it could be that because of "defects" the information relayed via one channel is not received, or received only in distorted form (for instance, because of a recipient's hearing problem). In addition, the disturbances in one channel of communication could be so intense that a decoding is no longer possible. One prerequisite for an adequate decoding is adequate reception of the signals that makes it possible to get the sense of perhaps disturbed transmission. Another prerequisite is agreement as to the codes (verbal and/or non-verbal) being used. Given these pre-conditions, nevertheless misunderstanding can still result if the recipient interprets the decoded message in the light of another definition of the situation. In a communication process, the fewer are the distortions the more a common experience is shared by the communications partners, so they can resort to the same code or codes and so they will be more likely to have similar definitions of the given situation.

Mass communication and interpersonal communication are occasionally regarded as identical processes. That is the case with the American communications scientist Wilbur Schramm (1960, 229), whose ideas have influenced many media-policy decisions, not least in developing countries. (Cf. Ch. 3.5). Schramm observes, referring to the common elements (transmitter, message, receiver) of both communication modes, that the mass-communication process, while it is, to be sure, somewhat more complicated than interpersonal communication, it is, so he maintains, in principle the same. Such statements as Schramm's reason away, as it were, the asymmetrical relationship between mass-communicator and recipients, in which the recipients in reality have only a minimal prospect of making contact with the communicating "partner." To equate mass communication with

"To equate mass communication and interpersonal communication is to support a fiction."

interpersonal communication can, notably in the political sphere, support the fiction that here we have a rational process of consensus-building by equal "partners." This version of mass communication attributes to the mass media, at most, a kind of catalyzing function – but no potential for manipulation.

The notion of a symmetrical, partnerlike relation between mass-communicator and recipient also underlies the "transaction model" of Bauer (1964). In it, "transaction" is to denote the exchange of values among two or more parties. According to this model, mass communication is a mutual exerting of influence by communicator and public; while it is true that the public has to choose among the proffered communications, the offerings, the reasoning continues, are already oriented toward the public. In other words, the public allegedly has an influence on what the communicator offers before the mass recipients even hear or see what the communicator presents (Bauer 1973, 142). *If such interpretations of mass communication and interpersonal communication as being structurally equivalent also gain acceptance among makers of public policy, then there can be considerable consequences for media policy.* The resultant reasoning of policy-makers would be: Incursions into the sphere of the media, such as, perhaps, curbs on monopolization in the private media sector, are not only superfluous; they are harmful (so the anticipated reasoning would go), for the public after all always gets the media content that it wants. To avoid such false reasoning, one needs to prevent the error of equating two-directional interpersonal communication with largely one-directional mass-media communication.

Below let us transfer the concept of communication from the level of the individual to that of a complex organization, the mass-communicator. As we do this, there is an implicit assumption about the "communicator". That is, the individuals participating in the production of mass-media material in large,

structured organizations must be in a position to perform socially significant action. True; yet this does not mean that the mass-media organization is to be regarded, in the sense of a reification, as equipped with a "will" of its own. It is not "the organization" (or, as is often said and written, "the society," or "the system") that takes actions of social consequence; it is individuals in influential positions. To be sure, the mass-communication process is not reciprocal between communicator and recipient, as is the interpersonal-communications process. But mass communication is intentionally directed toward other individuals (the recipients), if not also directed toward influencing their actions.

In the mass-communication process, (1) material that primarily is for short-range consumption (e.g. news, entertainment) (2) is produced within formal organizations by means of highly developed technologies and (3) with the aid of various media techniques (4) at least potentially is made available simultaneously to a large number of persons (a dispersed public), recipients who for the mass-communicator are anonymous, (5) publicly, that is, without restriction on access, in (6) a one-directional way, that is, communicator and recipient cannot exchange places; the relationship between them is asymmetrical in favor of the communicator and (7) is indirect in fashion

"Nine characteristics shared by, among other mass media, television, the press, radio and film."

(without direct feedback) along with (8) a certain periodicity of production and (9) the material is offered continually. By virtue of these nine criteria, mass-communications media would include television, the newspaper and periodical press, radio and film. This is a purely pragmatic delimitation and logically not unconditionally definitive inasmuch as circulars, records, cassettes, posters and other products can fully meet these criteria. For the new media this definition is inadequate, because for example the tests of simultaneity of distribution of standardized material, one-directional nature, etc., do not apply.

An analytically exact distinction between mass communication and interpersonal communication is not possible. That is, it's not possible unless you limit the mass-communication process to the emission of messages, and exclude the recipients. Mass communication, it is true, is inseparably linked with interpersonal communication, but, as has been indicated, the two are by no means identical: Considerable differences delineate them. Whereas interpersonal communication (usually) occurs in social situations, the relationship between mass-communicator and recipient can at most be para-social. That is, under certain conditions (when, for example, a protagonist directly addresses a television audience) a para-social relationship can be established. It is one-directional. And from the side of the recipient, because

of the absence of any obligation, the contact can be interrupted at any time. Such a relationship could conceivably substitute for a lack of social contacts. If a goal of interpersonal communication is to achieve a change of attitude, to this end interpersonal communication, as a rule, is more effective than mass communication. The interpersonal communicator can react more flexibly: He is in more of a position to be able to check, through direct feedback, on the potential effect of a message, and thus to use the time more purposefully.

There is another important aspect of interpersonal communication that represents an advantage over mass communication: The interpersonal communicator can resort to more channels (cf. illustration 1.1), and thus make better use of the non-verbal communication potential. Still another consideration with interpersonal communication is the possibility of social pressure, which is less available to the mass-communicator. Further, as we have seen, it is obviously simpler to break off contact with mass media than with an interpersonal communicator.

Then there is the factor of participation. In the mass-communication process the active participation of the recipients is comparatively slight. (This is, however, dependent on the material being presented, the situation and context, and the personality of the individual recipient.) The recipient of a mass-communication message does not need to express his opinion in regard to a possibly controversial theme presented by the mass-communicator.

On the other hand, mass communication also has its clear assets. Its great advantage over interpersonal communication is in mass communication's multiplier factor in circulating messages and information. This advantage, large-scale proliferation of the communication, is, however, restricted: The communicator in the mass-communication process is reaching out to an unascertainable, non-surveyable number of people. He hasn't an opportunity to take into account the differing situations of the individuals he is addressing.

1.2 Early Theories of Mass Communication, Primitive Media Analysis, and Consequences for Media Policy

The first approaches to the theoretical comprehension of mass communication are closely intertwined with doctrines of mass psychology. The early analyses assume that there is an all-powerful medium that can influence the defenseless, socially isolated recipients at will. The "society" – understood here as contrasting with the "community" in the sense of Tönnies (cf. Chapter 2.3) – is seen as a mass of isolated individuals without social links. Imitation is considered to be the basic social process making possible

the forming and the maintenance of a society (e.g. Tarde 1901). The "masses" themselves were regarded as being highly suggestible, subjected to the "law of the psychic unity of the masses" (Le Bon 1895), and only still able to function ideomotorically. This conception of "the masses" had an expressly negative connotation. The mass individuals in the "atomized society" were allegedly manipulable at will (cf. ill. 1.2). The belief was that from the content one could infer, directly and linearly, the identical effect on all recipients. For this thesis, adequate for the stage of knowledge and the state of the science at that time, it was though that there was documentation enough:

- World War I had furnished a first example of massively employed propaganda.
- Especially in the United States, mass-media advertising had made its début.
- The world also had the example of the adroit use of propaganda techniques by successful totalitarian movements (Bolshevist, Fascist, National Socialist) in Europe.

This former interpretation of what happens in mass communication was derived from the context of the simple stimulus-reaction model. The mass media, because of the presumed existence in "the masses" of an instinct-anchored motivation to imitate, were credited with the ability of bringing entire societies into line. Thus Lasswell (1927, 221), for example, thought of the mass media as the "new hammer and anvil of social solidarity."

Illustration 1.2: Stimulus-Reaction Model of Mass Communication


mass-media-distributed contents
cause
identical reactions by individual recipients along lines intended by the communicator

This stimulus-reaction model, embodying a deterministic and pessimistic view of human culture and civilization, did not stand alone. At this same time there were authors, devoted to a faith in progress, who also extremely over-valued the potential effect of mass media, while entertaining hopes of results opposite to those (manipulation of "the masses") foreseen by the advocates of the stimulus-reaction model of communication theory. These optimists foresaw an ending of isolation, alienation, and related psychological/social conditions. In place of loneliness, they predicted the restoration of an allegedly earlier existent "community" with the help of the new media which, in this sanguine view, would proliferate enlightening ideas. Cooley (1909), for instance, compared the mass media with the dawn that awakens and illuminates the world.

The first empirical investigations of mass-media effects led to scientific refutation of the concept based on the stimulus-reaction model. Instead, individual differences in regard to people's personality structures (for example, varying motivations, learning capacities, degrees of attentiveness, perception, and so on) were now taken into account. The effects of mass communication – in part because of the development of behaviorism and the results of experiments on the classical conditioning – were no longer seen strictly deterministically. For now the personality structure of the individual recipients came to be understood as a "filter" that modifies the communication's influence.

But the orientation of the effect research within the framework of this "S-O-R (for stimulus-organism-reaction) model" (cf. ill. 1.3) is still one-sided in the sense of being a one-directional or "transport" way of looking at mass communication. The place of the notion of an instinctive, inborn drive to imitate is taken by the attitudinal concept – that is, the view that the intervention which modifies the effect is due to learning, not to inborn traits. It is recognized that people's personality structures vary greatly, and that these variations can lead to differing perceptions of a given mass-media content. Concepts like selective attention and selective perception now receive particular consideration.

Illustration 1.3: S-O-R Model of Mass Communication



At this point the more psychologically oriented research is supplemented with an important sociological concept. This reasoning proposes that relatively stable attitudes and structures of perception which are acquired stem from the given socio-cultural milieu. Accordingly, as a sociological variation of the S-O-R model, a "social category theory" (DeFleur 1970, 122 ff.) emerges. This theory is developed from the assumption that the interrelationship with mass media is determined by social-category indications. Regardless of the heterogeneity of societies as wholes, according to this concept, individuals of certain subgroups characterize themselves by identical or similar bahavior vis-à-vis the media; the subgroups being social categories defined by age, sex, class, and so on.

This "social category theory" can definitely be integrated within a broader context of sociological doctrine. The theory is in the tradition of Emile Durkheim. He points out and emphasizes that within societies based on

division of work, subcultures that are identifiable according to social category come into existence. These subcultures, he finds, develop their own models of conduct and norms. The thought that identical media content is perceived differently by different recipients, depending on the social category they belong to, underlies the first comprehensive investigation of the effects of mass media, the so-called Payne Fund Studies (resumé, Charters 1933); although Lazarsfeld (1949) in his research proceeds from the same premise. A modification of the S-O-R model is seen in the two-step flow-of-communication model, a concept worked out by Lazarsfeld and others (1944). According to this approach, the messages distributed by mass media first reach so-called opinion leaders, who transmit them to the less active elements of the population (cf. Chapter 4.2).

Here, an anticipatory observation about mass-media practices and effects in industrialized countries and in the developing Third World: The findings of media-effect research that are made in highly developed, technologically based societies are not necessarily applicable to developing countries. For

"Findings made in highly developed, technologically based societies are not necessarily applicable to developing countries."

identical content can be perceived and made use of completely differently by different recipients. Every perceiver selects from the variety of phenomena in his or her environment only a few (selective perception). And, drawing from his own life-experience, he selects particularly those phenomena that fit into his familiar world-view. Here is an example of how that can work. Doob (1961, 289) reports that: "Some Congo soldiers during World War II, meeting Donald Duck for the first time, threw stones at the screen because they thought they were being ridiculed. 'Animals don't talk,' they shouted. 'Whoever saw a duck in uniform?'" Another example of how mass-media technique can have vastly different influences in different cultures is provided by Holmberg (1960): He describes the effects of "an impressive film on typhus which filled the screen with pictures of lice, only to have the audience shrug their shoulders and say that they had never seen large animals like that; their lice were tiny little things, and, therefore, probably not dangerous."

Still a third anecdote illuminates selective perception: A native of the interior of Malakka was taken to Singapore, so as to observe his reactions to life in an modern metropolis. The one thing in the midst of the bustling scene that caught his attention was a man with a hand-cart. The Malakkan said he hadn't thought it possible that you could transport so many bananas at once.

Individuals tend to cognitive selectivity: You select certain objects from the physical and social environment and integrate them within your own

cognition. What is more, regarding the objects selected, you perceive only certain characteristics. This selectivity can result in distortions, in order to correspond to the wishes, motives, emotions of yourself or another perceiver. Such cognitive selectivity is dependent both on the characteristics of the stimulus and on the personality characteristics of the perceiving individual. As Walter Lippmann described this process in 1922 in his book "Public Opinion": "For the most part we do not see first; we define first, and then we see." The anecdotes above illustrate that one cannot correctly make direct, linear conclusions from content to effect. Instead one needs to take into consideration the psychic and social circumstances of the recipients.

In the past, as we have seen, mass-communication research was onesidedly directed toward the investigation of effect. More recently, the production of mass-media content was not an object of research; at most researchers studied the planning of the format for maximum impact. These earlier media researchers were interested only in the effects that the media content, as they saw it, "caused." Today, still, this approach remains the dominating one-directional orientation of mass-communication research. This concept of communication has been expressed in its most sharply defined form in the Lasswell Formula (1948, 37), which had many predecessors: "Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect?" What is not asked in this

"Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect."

formulation is the "why." The Lasswell Formula, that is, ignores the aspect of the production of mass-media contents (the sociology of the communicator).

Both of the previously discussed paradigms of mass communication are characteristic of the time up until about the end of the Second World War. The Lasswell Formula in particular was co-responsible for the orientation, typical even later, of research into media effects, and the accompanying neglect of research into the sociology of the communicator.

The two long-held conceptions of the functioning of mass media presented up to this point meanwhile have been empirically just as clearly refuted as has the notion of the existence of a mass society whose members are totally isolated and who are subjected to their drive to imitate. Regardless of that, extensive parts of the literature of mass communication are characterized by a high resistance to scientific progress toward understanding the true nature of the relationship between mass-communicator and recipient. In line with this resistance, the pessimistic sociological view which stems from assuming that mass communication involves only a direct content-effect relationship seems ineradicable. This pessimistic and limiting interpretation is being applied especially to the supposed effect of portrayals of violence on television; and to the alleged creation of a passive TV hermit. In this connection, the Indian

author Nirad C. Chaudhari (Time magazine, July 19, 1976) tells of supposed mass-media-induced imitative states of particular delicacy: Since made-in-India films, he observes, are full of sexual scenes, the effect on the recipient public would be aphrodisiac, and a cause of the population explosion.

Such false notions of the effects of mass media – for example, the attributing to mass communication of omnipotence – are, because of their naiveté, all too easily laughed off, and receive no further attention from social scientists, even though they could have quite considerable consequences for media policy. The serious consequences of such erroneous ideas about mass communications could occur particularly if decision-makers in media-policy-making adhere to them. And this is, as the literature on the effects on elections that are conducted in a mass-media environment shows, often the case. Moreover, this "omnipotence model" as an explanation of the ways of mass communication – as said, one that has long since been refuted empirically – is readily resorted to as justification of a demand for the censorship of mass media; and not only them, for it can be observed that censorship always tends to proliferate.

Consider "the constant imminency of censorship."

As an illustration of the constant imminency of censorship, it may be noted that even "classical" authors are being censored, up to this very day. For example, the Iranian Ministry for Art and Culture had banned "Macbeth" and "Hamlet" because of fear of imitative deeds – namely, regicide (Tehranian 1982). The publics of North America and Western Europe are experiencing widespread collective anxiety over the supposed effects of television on children and young people. In fact, in the wake of this assertedly vast influence of television, the model of the all-powerful mass media just now is enjoying an undreamed-of wave of acceptance.

It is precisely in conjunction with scientifically primitive theses about mass communication that the borders between scientific approach and essayists' speculation become fluid. Take, for example, the demand (1932, 32) of Bertolt Brecht: He called for a re-functioning of the radio. "The radio," he wrote, "is to be transformed from an apparatus of distribution to an apparatus of communication." Under the new arrangement, the listener would not only listen, but speak as well. This Brechtian contribution to what is called the "critical theory of the media" is still quite significant to many authors. This is so even though the vision of the public, decentralized radio medium, in which everyone is simultaneously recipient and communicator, is, because of the realities of social structure, not realizable. Brecht's idea that the radio shouldn't isolate the listener, but instead "organize him as a supplier," has been taken up by Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1970). It has also been introduced in translation into the Anglo-American language area. In English, regardless of the concept's normative character, and its essentially unrealistic

nature, it has been offered (MacQuail 1972) to a broad readership as "sociology of mass communication."

The idea that the then new mass media guaranteed contacts among the citizenry as a whole, and could bring about everyone's participation in political life, at one time held a considerable fascination. For example,

"About the idea that the mass media guarantee contacts among the citizenry as a whole, and could bring about everyone's participation in political life."

Charles Horton Cooley (1909) believed that through the new mass media a return to the ideal democratic state would be possible, because a free flow of ideas would facilitate the participation of all in political decision-making. Similarly optimistic is Ithiel de Sola Pool (1963, 166). In the increasing density of television he sees the possibility that in case of need all essential questions will be dealt with as in a town assembly, with the whole country joining in. Such expectations of mass media are just as naive as the model of the all-powerful media. For they go too far in the other direction: The optimistic anticipations overlook the possibility of media-managed manipulation or alienation.

As the authors whose ideas we have been discussing show, it is not only persons like Brecht or Enzensberger, laymen as far as media science goes, who come to premature condemnation, or (rarer) glorification, of the mass media. Some experts do this too. It is apparently, even with a scientifically trained audience in mind, more promising to make pronouncements about the media that are unproven and based only on commonplaces than it is to subject the media to scientific analysis. Typical of the infiltration of lay notions into the "scientific" discussion is, for example, the line taken by von Andreski (1974, 15). He tilts swords with "the sorcerers of the social sciences" and takes sharp critical issue with what he calls their methodical manipulations. But then he himself falls into platitudinous "decline-of-our-civilization" formulations: He writes of the "advanced state of cretinism into which our civilization, under the influence of the mass media, has regressed."

1.3 The Relation between Theory and Empirical Research

The science of communication has no uniform paradigm as Kuhn (1962) speaks of one. That is, there is no set of operating instructions (rules and methods) recognized by the representatives of this social science as a common basis for a professional, scientific approach to problems. Paradigms also contain assumptions about research strategies and/or methodologies, which, in turn, delineate the area of a social science. Below we proceed from the premise that theory and empirical research represent different states of the process of research. In the ideal case, the development of a theory and empirical research ought to represent successive stages of a research process. In no event ought theorizing and empirical investigation to be considered opposites. Empirical research without a theoretical basis is, according to this conception, just as pointless as theoretical speculation that shies away from empirical examination. In the end, science is only possible as empirical research – that is, examination of the facts.

"Empirical research without a theoretical basis is as pointless as theoretical speculation that shies away from empirical examination."

The goal of scientific activity is the working-out of systems of proofs or evidences based on actual empirical findings. That is to say, we shall consider theory as always being subjected to control through experience. From such a view of science, the science of communication is an empirical discipline. For its mission is the empirically based explanation of the processes of communication and mass communication. And its goal is progress in knowledge. The term theory is being used in a relatively liberal sense. That is in part because the literature gives us no common denominator of agreement on the use and/or the definition of "theory."

Below, too, we shall be regarding as a hypothesis the positing of a supposed conjunction between two or more variables (phenomena). A theory can then be regarded as a system of hypotheses entwined with each other and, in themselves, internally consistent; free of contradiction. Such a theory should permit a systematic survey of individual phenomena within the field of survey. Through the specifiying of relationships between the individual phenomena it should be possible logically to derive these individual phenomena and to predict their occurrence.

The theories that stem from a system of nomological hypotheses serve, along with the systematizing of the existing knowledge, the working out of hypotheses that must be checked and that to be investigated have to be operationalized. Thus techniques must be provided that can help to attain a

sought factual content. Therefore theories consist of a number of statements that require continual examination. The empirical content of a theory is the higher the broader the class of falsificators (of proofs, based on examination, that aspects of the theory do not concur with the now-investigated facts) is. That is, the degree of verification of a theory rises with the frequency of empirical examinations that yield positive results (cf. Popper 1935, 68). However, we shall not, with a claim of absolute truth, champion a position of methodological rigorousness, according to which only critical rationalism could regulate the research process. It is wiser to adhere to methodological pragmatism. We can proceed from the assumption that empirical research always represents a compromise, in which the rigorous demands of methodology must be brought into accord with the necessities of research operations. (Here one thinks of: funds, political circumstances, accessibility of the object of research, and so on.)

The science of communication as a branch of the social sciences has resort, also and particularly, to the techniques of empirical research. Central importance is attached to the empirical methods. This fact does not, however, imply a claim of infallibility, and does not seek to criticize the qualitative method as unscientific. But we do assume that the precision and the factual content of sociological statements, given an appropriate quantification, are greater than when the work is done with qualitative methods alone. Quantification means here that certain objects or occurrences are to be co-ordinated, according to specific rules, with corresponding statistics. Measuring implies the possibility of verifiability and the carrying out of certain statistical procedures. But we certainly are not suggesting that communication science ought to slip into a fully unjustified overestimation of research techniques, with the neglecting of theoretical preparations. We are not eager

"Let us avoid having a craftsman mentality dominate the science of communication."

to have a craftsman mentality dominate the science of communication. The other way around, we should, however, like to see a stop to the trend toward detouring around the unified demands of theory and empirical research into pure speculation. For there are a goodly number of proven research techniques that, with application of the familiar qualifications, ought to be made use of wherever possible.

At this point we encounter pronounced differences between the European – particularly the German – science of communication and the American mass-communication research. Within this conjunction, Robert K. Merton (1957, 439 ff.) poses the question: Will American mass-communications research ever be able to become independent of its commercial origins, which stem from contract research? Merton, comparing the European discipline sociology of knowledge with American mass-communication research, comes

to this conclusion: Mass-communication research collects commercially and politically quickly usable, methodically unexceptionably obtained facts, without reflecting further on them. The result is a cornucopia of individual findings gained with the aid of sophisticated research instrument; findings that, because of the absence of a comprehensive theoretical framework, cannot be integrated. This is a diagnosis that, as, for example, the work of Klapper (1960) documents, certainly was valid up into the 1960s. Merton reasons further that the analysis of mass communication mainly limits itself to discovering short-range, quick and dependably identifiable effects; the consideration that the mass media are part of an over-all social framework is completely ignored. The approach deals simply with the reactions of isolated individuals or groups to specific communications. This characterization of the American approach, as once again the work of Klapper (1960) documents exemplarily, is doubtless right as a description of American communications research into the decade of the 1960s. A supplementary aspect of this American scene is that the quantitatively large number of university graduates intensifies the pressure to "publish or perish." Such a situation encourages the conducting of miniature surveys of little experiments that are quickly, routinely evaluable and usable whether for publication or for practical purposes. Such a socialization of scientists certainly favors an "atomistic" perspective that does not take into consideration the over-all social aspects. An absolute majority of the plethora of American miniature studies investigate, with generally minor variations in the research format, the reaction of individuals or groups to this or that communication. Here there

"Signs of a 'blinkers mentality'."

are clear signs of a "blinkers mentality." For the question of how the research results are to contribute to progress in this social science, or how they can be integrated within a comprehensive theoretical framework, is generally not asked.

The development within the German science of communication took another course. The German emphasis was on mass communication's over-all social implications. For example, as early as in 1910 Max Weber emphasized the most important problems in regard to a private-enterprise press, and he demanded that there should be empirical researching of these problems. Particular emphasis was placed on the problems of increasing press concentration, brought on by a growing need for capital. At the same time Weber urges investigation of the question: Where does the press get the material it supplies to the public? Press concentration and sources of the news are issues that the American communications research, with its origins in advertising and/or market research, recognizes only 40 years later. The observation of over-all social concerns – including problems of manipulation and the possible creation of a false state of public consciousness – were at the center of German publicistic science. To paraphrase a formulation by Robert

K. Merton: The American communications research inquired as to the validity of ideas, but not about their origin, something that for the German communication science always was a central subject of investigation.

What is behind this trans-Atlantic differentiation? One of the explanations of the divergence is surely the differing institutional patterns of the American and the German communications science. In America communications science carried on primarily practice-oriented journalistic training in journalism schools. That was never so in Germany, with the communications branch of the social sciences taught and learned in universities. In Germany, the student must learn the practice of journalism outside the university.

The science of communication is subjected, as are all the social sciences, to considerable scepticism in public and political life. This critical attitude is due to the prevalence among the public of popularized "scientific" notions. As early as in school years, people tend to trust the natural sciences uncritically. While it wouldn't occur to anyone to ask an astronomer or a physicist to express his results in every-day language, communications science has to be

"Anyone who has anything to do with the mass media is apt to consider himself an expert."

measured against lay concepts. Anyone who has anything to do with the mass media is apt to consider himself an expert. Look, for example, at the discussion of the effects of the media's proliferation of violence; this ongoing public dialogue is primarily a political controversy. Again: If the results of communications-science research more or less reflect what laymen had been supposing, then the public takes this concurrence as evidence that the science of communication has nothing new to offer. But if research results don't meet lay expectations, then the public is reluctant to accept and use them.

1.4 Mass Communication as a Social Subsystem

What follows is a brief for communication science's using the system theory. It is an approach that possibly can overcome the separation between micro- and macro-analysis. A system consists of interrelated elements with certain characteristics. The determination of a certain system is made in accordance with the given research goal. That is, there should be no reification. ("Reification" means to falsely attribute to an analytical construct – for instance, to a system – a substantiality; that is, an ability to take autonomous, purposeful action on its own.) *Mass communication is regarded as a social subsystem that has exchange relationships with other subsystems or society.* The

concept of effect is then no longer to be understood in individual terms; that is, solely related to the recipient. This individualistic concept of effect includes all the processes that take place in the individual as the result of his resorting to mass media, during or after his "consumption" of the media message. But there are not only effects on individuals and groups. In addition, mass communication, as a social subsystem, also influences other subsystems (for instance, politics, education, economy, religion, etc.) and influences society as a whole.

"Mass communication influences society as a whole."

These macro effects up to now have received too little attention in the research. An example of this effect, important from a sociological perspective, would be an alteration of an election campaign and/or of the selection of candidates as a result of the introduction of television into the campaign. An instance would be the telecasting of a "show" instead of doing political work at the grass-roots level. It would also be an incisive effect of television on the subsystem politics if a majority of the public were to come believe as a result of the TV reportage that political decisions are not influenceable by the people, but instead are handed down from "up there." A further example of this inter-subsystem relationship would be the effects of mass-media advertising on the business world, or the establishment of media education as a science and/or a teaching subject. Within the context of research into media effects, these influences, as for instance media-induced processes of social change, the altering of dominant value-structures, or the stabilization of the political subsystem, need more attention. Effects of mass media are defined below as intersubjectively ascertainable characteristics of and/or changes in individual behavior, social systems and social processes that can be explained, with consideration of the social context, through the content, the forms and the organization of the media (cf. Lüscher 1982, 545).

The relationship between mass communication and interpersonal communication is also to a major extent determined by the environment of the mass-communication subsystem. Totalitarian states aim at sealing off their dictatorial systems from the influence of the outside world by screening the incoming information from abroad and by exercising domestic censorship so as to prevent the proliferation of information considered to be politically inopportune. In general, the media in totalitarian states seem to have only a relatively slight credibility.

The recipients are usually not in a situation to decide which information is false and which not. The consequences of an only slight credibility of your country's media are, for one, attempts to obtain information in interpersonal ways; so it is that rumors take on a quite other status in totalitarian systems

than they have in democracies. Another consequence is the resort to foreign media (especially radio broadcasts, which the totalitarian states cope with via various "jamming" measures) so as to determine the degree of truthfulness of individual pieces of "information" offered domestically, and/or to get additional information.

Mass communication is, as another study (Kunczik 1984) points out, treated by many authors as if the mass media were more or less outside of society. Despite such an approach, these same authors seek to regard communication processes as a central structural characteristic of society. In the analysis of societies, as a rule concepts like structural differentiation, rationalization, division of work, or bureaucratization are resorted to. There is rarely attention to developments in the media sector. By contrast, on the following pages the reasoning will proceed from the assumption that *the mass media and their effects cannot be regarded in isolation from the social context within which they are integrated.* Beyond doubt, the mass media represent an important variable in processes of social change. But they are, certainly, only a variable alongside many others; and precisely this aspect we are about to take into consideration within the framework of a systemic theoretical approach.

"The notion 'Just introduce freedom of the press and society will evolve adequately' cannot be endorsed."

Simple, mono-causal ways of operating, for instance according to the notion "Just introduce freedom of the press and society will evolve adequately," cannot be advocated from a system-theoretical point of view. Instead, this work proceeds from the assumption that social systems display counter-intuitive behavior. They do this because usually the dynamic processes of complex systems lead to miscalculations. For the structure of complex social systems is based on the processes' running their course under feedback control. A specific process whose genesis because of its multiple causality is not mono-causally explainable accordingly is linked, with its effects, with the dominating conditions. In turn, the changed conditions become the causes of further changes – and so on. (cf. Kunczik 1984, 143 ff.)

2. Developing-Country Research: From Cultural Arrogance to Ignorance?

2.1 Mass Media and Social Change in Countries of the Third World: On the Situation of Research

At the outset, without any prettifying, it has to be stated that the researching of the effects of mass media on the processes of social change in countries of the Third World is in an acutely difficult situation. One indication of this crisis is the fact that in the most recent article on the sociology of mass communication in "Annual Review of Sociology," Holz and Wright (1979) devote, in all, eight-and-one-half lines to the theme "Mass Communication and National Development." With those few lines, in which at any rate the authors represent the current state of research, they recommend as an introduction to this matter the reading of a long-existent publication by Lerner and Schramm: "Communication and Change in the Developing Countries" (Honolulu, 1967). Now without needing to have perfected the art of reading between the lines, we can conclude from the above that here we are dealing with an area of research in which during the last one-and-a-half decades no important progress in knowledge has been made. The theme of mass communication and social change in developing countries has recently occasioned only very limited interest. This research gap leads many authors to take speculatively arrived-at concepts of the effects of mass media, which still require empirical examination, as proven.

Yet the initial circumstances for the sector "communication and development research" were almost ideal. Sociologists, including specialists in the science of communication, such as Joseph T. Klapper, Harold D. Lasswell, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Leo Löwenthal – all authors whose scientific reputation today continues to be uncontested – were co-authors of the 4th issue for 1952/53 of the "Public Opinion Quarterly." In it the field of "international communication research" first saw the light of day. The political climate was quite favorable for this young branch of the social sciences. For in the United States there was a sense of obligation – especially after the Second World War with the defeat of the Hitler dictatorship past, yet the Communist threat emerging quite clearly in Europe and most especially in Korea – to proliferate the American ideals of freedom and democracy throughout the world.

Wilhelm Mühlmann (1964, 353) characterizes the ideas behind the American aid program for developing countries, permeated with faith in progress, as a compounding of secularized civilizing missionary zeal with global economic and foreign-policy interests. The motive in wanting to help the rest of the world catch up with oneself is evident particularly in Point 4 of President Harry S. Truman's ten-point program of 1948: "Fourth. We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of unterdeveloped areas." Within this conjunction, communications research

"America's motive of wanting to help the rest of the world catch up with America . . ."

had an important role in the propaganda battle between the Soviet and the non-Soviet forces for the allegiance of the peoples of the non-industrial world (cf. Smith 1952/32, 527). Lasswell (1952/53, 500) argues: "By continuing to build a non-Soviet network of specialists in international communications research, it is possible to contribute to a common frame of world attention. This frame of attention will clarify the identity of genuine allies and enemies in the actual and potential alignments that arise in the process of building a united body of policy for the free world." American political leaders often assumed that the Soviet citizenry would generally be opposed to the Soviet Government, and as such constituted millions of secret allies of the United States. According to Holsti (1967, 34), then U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles "never rejected his long-standing theory that the Soviet regime was wholly without support by the Russian people." (For a general discussion of "The Pro-Us Illusion" and "The Black-Top Image," see White 1972).

One aim of the American foreign policy was the holding in check of Communism. Toward this end were also counted preventive measures in developing countries in the form of development aid. From this perspective, U.S. development aid was regarded as an investment in world peace, through which the development of the respective political systems into democracies was to be ensured (cf. Olson 1963, 529). Preference went to giving development aid to countries that were categorized as being in the phase of "take-off" from primarily agricultural economies to the beginnings of industrialization.

This was the logic behind the development aid: It was believed that through the introduction of modernizing institutions (for example, schools, mass media), one could develop modern personalities in countries of the Third World, individuals who for their part were to be in a position adequately to play professional roles in modern institutions (e.g. factories). This process, the reasoning continued, would make possible economic growth – that is, a breaking out of the vicious circle of poverty. Economic growth, finally, so the argumentation went on, would lead to greater political stability, with the development of a democratic system.

Graphically, the logic of this approach to development-aid policy can be shown as follows:

modernizing institutions	→	**modern personalities**	→	**modern institutions**	→	**economic growth**	→	**political stability (democracy)**

The determinant weak points in this chain of argumentation in favor of using development aid for politico-cultural (educative and democratizing) purposes are these:

- the assumption that the development of modern personalities will positively influence economic growth in developing countries;

- the assertion that economic growth brings greater political stability in developing countries;

- the proposition that for reaching economic growth modern "Western" personalities are needed – a thesis no longer unquestioningly accepted.

These three theses are no longer taken, generally, as sociological doctrine. For instance, M. Singer (1972: "When a Great Tradition Modernizes. An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization." New York 1972) points out that Max Weber in his analysis of Hinduism indeed used methods that measured up to the standard of science at that time; but that do not meet the requirements of modern anthropological research. Singer continues: Along with the analysis of documents, there must be data that take into account the interpretation and employment of religious concepts in every-day life. Singer regrets (1972, 276 f.) that most of the authors influenced by Weber "convert his historical analysis into a contemporary policy and program for ecomomic development. The resulting stereotypes of India as a backward medieval society are so apt to flatter the ethnocentric conceits of Europeans and Americans that policy prescriptions flowing from these diagnoses seem to be very sensible ways of Westernizing and modernizing Asian societies." Further, Singer argues (1972, 357) that the Indian social structure and the religious ideas are in no sense necessarily disadvantageous for a modernization. (For instance, the large family in India is not automatically broken up by a moving to the city.) The other way around, a modernization would by no means automatically destroy the traditional Indian culture. Other authors, too, are able to show that a marked economic development can take place within traditional societies. Besides Japan, in particular the economic success of some Islamic sects and brotherhoods deserves attention (cf. e.g. Gellner, E. 1973). There are, to put it cautiously, at least some indicative evidences that a modern economic system is also reconcilable with other than

European-North American value and social structures. As Hermassi (1978, 244) observes, based on an analysis of the literature, there are "many studies whose results are suggesting that modern economic systems may be compatible with a wide range of non-economic cultural patterns and social structures."

The development-aid policies of the donor countries proceeded from the assumption that the developing countries by themselves were not in a position to break out of the vicious circle of poverty; that because of low productivity, a sufficient accumulation of capital to make possible an increase in the low productivity of labor would not be possible. Hans W. Singer (1949, 5) writes: "An underdeveloped country is poor because it has no industry; and it has no industry because it is poor." The situation of a developing country is put this way: The increasing of the per-capita income requires the raising of production, which for its part is dependent on capital accumulation, and consequently on the production of more goods than are required for consumption. Yet the surplus is slight because the per-capita income is low. This mechanism condemns the backward economies to practically a stillstand. And from this status quo there can hardly be a breaking out, not only because the surplus of production over the essential consumption is very small, but also because the surplus usually goes for consumption by the property-owning classes.



Illustration 2.1: Vicious Circle of Poverty
(taken from: Informationen zur politischen Bildung, 196, Der Nord-Süd-Konflikt, Bonn 1982)

So the central problem of a developing country is its inadequate rate of accumulation. In most cases, possible progress in productivity is cancelled out by the – despite all efforts – uninterruptedly continuing population explosion. Thus from mid-1982 to mid-1983 the largest increase in the world's population that has ever been reported was registered: 82 million people more. With some 4,700 million persons, by the middle of 1983 around 1,000 million more people were on the earth than in 1970 – and this even though the most intensive efforts have been taken to check the population explosion. The countries with the largest proportions of the pupulation explosion were India, China, Indonesia, Brazil and Bangladesh. (Source: U.S. Bureau of Statistics.)

To what extent can one apply to the developing countries the well-known growth formula $g = s/r$? [It states that the percentagewise yearly growth of the gross national product (g) equals the share of saving income (s) divided by the relationship (ratio) of capital to yearly income (r).] The answer would seem to be: It isn't particularly relevant to apply this formula within the frame of national economic plans, since the majority of the populations of developing countries are living below the minimum standard for existence. Joan Robinson (1968, 141 f.) argues that the problem is clear and simple: Care must be taken to increase essential consumption and to reduce superflous consumption. This point involves the problem of distribution of income, which as a rule is not considered within the frame of development-aid measures.

The development-aid policy of the United States that got underway in 1949 proceeded from the assumption that political behavior and political institutions would be determined by more fundamental processes. Reinhard Bendix (1967, 325) points out that the modernization theories that indeed are the main guidelines for development-aid policy are based on the notion that social change originates in the division of labor, and that government and the state are products of the social structure. Coleman (1968, 398) affirms a "pronounced economic determinism in America's post-World War II foreign-aid policy, conditioned as it has been by the presumably successful

"The American development-aid policy ironically corresponds exactly to a thought developed by Karl Marx."

democratization of West Germany and Japan." *The American development-aid policy implicitly involves the convergence-theroretical idea that ultimately industrialization, independently of the respective socio-cultural circumstances, always and everywhere will have identical effects.* This policy, also aiming at keeping Communism in check, ironically corresponds exactly to the thought developed by Karl Marx in the introduction to "Capital": "The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its

own future." (Cf. Ch. 6.) While you can defend Marx on the ground that he developed his theory at a time when the economic factor seemed to dominate the rest of the social development, still precisely the modernization process in developing countries is decisively determined by politics. Although for Europe and North America one can uphold the thesis that economic development preceded change, in developing countries modern political institutions are taken over without there being a corresponding economic infrastructure.

In the attainment of the goals of economic growth and subsequent political stability, a significant role is attributed to, among other instances, the social sciences. This fact is further evidence of the thesis that the social sciences are to be regarded as an integral component of their surrounding civilization (Robert S. Lynd 1939, IX): "Social science is not a scholarly arcanum, but an organized part of the culture which exists to help man in continually unterstanding and rebuilding his culture." For the character of a culture as well as that culture's inherent problems, Lynd observes, largely determine the field of investigation for the social scientist. In other words, social research is

"Social research is not independent of the value system of the surrounding society."

not independent of the value system of the surrounding society. Political interest groups that play a dominant role in the society have then also, as Gunnar Myrdal (1969, 51) observed, ordinarily provided the initiative for new orientations of social-science research. Myrdal also refers to the suddenly rising flood of publications on developing countries after the end of the colonial era. To be sure, the economic and social circumstances had not changed; but the political interest in the developing areas had dramatically risen.

Paul F. Lazarsfeld (1952/53, 490) writes in the above-mentioned issue of "Public Opinion Quarterly": ". . . the relationship between practical policy and social science should be a two-way relationship. It is not only that we should contribute to the policy-making of the United States. We should expect the policy-makers also to make sure that their work contributes to the social sciences." However, it is abstruse from such a pronouncement to impute to the so-called "bourgeois social scientist" Lazarsfeld the following (Luyken 1980, 111): "Such an advance position of partisanship for one's own state implies, first, putting less emphasis on objective findings than on the circumstances governing the research activity. And, second, the position means in the end that the concern with communication and information in peripheral countries always has as its purpose the strengthening of one's own nation." Actually, Lazarsfeld was solely concerned with the possibility of – also through the results of social-science research – making it possible for

people to live a life in freedom and dignity. This basic attitude is evident, too, in Wilbur Schramm, whose book "Mass Media and National Development. The Role of Information in the Developing Countries" (Stanford, Cal., 1964, 35) remarks:

- "knowledge is better than ignorance;
- health is better than disease;
- to eat is better than to be hungry;
- a comfortable standard of living is better than poverty;
- to participate actively in one's nation is better than to be isolated from it."

Within this statement of purpose, and with the thesis, to be discussed in more detail, that the mass media function to a certain extent automatically as fosterers of social progress, research and publication proceeded during the 1950s and 1960s. Most of the studies were made, that is to say, in a period in which the industrialized countries were knowing uninterrupted economic growth. Whether the research results obtained at that time are still valid today, in view of changed economic and global political situations, is doubtful.

In the mid-1960s the wave of publications on the theme of mass media and developing countries reached a high tide, and then ebbed (cf. Mowlana 1973). This receding of the tide accompanied the recognition that development aid, and especially the economic growth it stimulated, by no means automatically touched off a peaceful development culminating in democracy. It became

"Development aid . . . by no means automatically touched off a peaceful development culminating in democracy."

evident, rather, that there is no causal link between economic growth, on the one hand, and political stability on the other hand (cf. e.g. Olson 1963). The high financial outlays for development aid had not had the desired effects. Economic growth, to the contrary, created a large number of *nouveaux pauvres* in the Third World. Even in societies within which the average income rose, the absolute total of newly poor in some countries also rose dramatically. The gains of the new rich, seen statistically, compensated the losses of the new poor. Expressed statistically in other terms: A rise in the average income occurred along with a simultaneous lowering of the median income.

This state of affairs can be illuminated and illustrated by some examples for Latin America. Portes and Carnak (1981) distinguish four characteristic trends of the 1960s and 1970s:

- There was a general acceleration of economic growth underway (particularly in the industrial development).
- This development in the economic sector accompanied an increase in the social and/or economic inequality. In particular the poor were becoming more "visible," because they were concentrating on the fringes of the big cities (cf. Peattie and Aldrete-Hass 1981). Thus Daniel Lerner (1968, 360), who indeed at first represented a very optimistic modernization theory (cf. Ch. 3.3), feels called on to concede that the cause of overurbanization lies "in our failure to develop a comprehensive theory and practice of modernization."
- The Latin American economies became internationalized, as expressed, among other phenomena, by the presence of multinational corporations.
- In many countries the political system evolved into a military-supported bureaucratic and authoritarian state.

Between 1950 and 1976, the gross national product (GNP) for Latin America rose fourfold. Because of the simultaneous population explosion, the GNP increased per capita, however, by only some 190%, from 336 to 605 U.S. dollars (at their value of 1970). Portes and Carnak (1981, 230) offer the following table, breaking down the situation country by country:

Table 1: GNP and per capita GNP for Latin American countries, 1950–1976 (in millions, constant dollars of 1970)*

	GNP		Per Capita GNP	
	1950	1976	1950	1976
Argentina	12,870	31,312	753	1,197
Bolivia	540	1,401	189	257
Brazil	10,000	59,160	187	525
Chile	3,400	7,743	561	736
Colombia	2,540	9,472	224	370
Costa Rica	276	1,229	318	598
Dominican Republic	536	2,631	252	529
Ecuador	594	2,478	184	335
El Salvador	403	1,354	218	327
Guatemala	761	2,639	271	400
Haiti	333	519	97	106
Honduras	276	859	190	266
Mexico	9,950	44,203	362	718
Nicaragua	264	1,118	249	490
Panama	285	1,280	358	779
Paraguay	284	831	203	298
Peru	2,219	8,279	278	500
Uruguay	1,691	2,479	770	809
Venezuela	2,407	12,621	485	1,032
Latin America	51,769	190,958	336	605

* Source: Adapted from Statistical Abstract of Latin America Vol. 19, 1978, Tables 2200 and 2201

The fruits of growth have in no sense been distributed equally. A study by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) shows that in six Latin American countries that represent around 70% of the population of Latin America the per-capita income rose by 26% between 1960 and 1970. A mere 10% of the growth benefited the poor. The 20% of the "rich" absorbed fully 60% of the growth. Expressed otherwise, for the 40% of the populace in the lower economic class in these countries, between 1960 and 1975 the per-capita income rose by only 20 U.S. dollars (cf. Portes and Carnak 1981, 231). The traditional gap between Latin America's rich and poor has widened. Access to economic growth is excluded for those who need it most. Social-security programs often reach only small sectors of the population. For example, in Peru some 88% of the populace is without social-security coverage; in Mexico, about 77%; and in Argentina, some 60% (cf. Portes and Carnak 1981, 232). The table below shows the unequal distribution of income (Portes and Carnak 1981, 232):

Table 2: Inequality of income distribution – Latin America and the United States

Country	Year	Gini Index[c]	Kuznets Index[c]
Argentina	1961	.47	.36
Brazil	1970	.63	.50
Chile	1968	.50	.39
Colombia	1971	.44	.34
Ecuador	1970	.67	.57
El Salvador	1969	.46	.36
Honduras	1968	.62	.51
Mexico	1969	.55	.42
Panama	1969	.55	.42
Peru	1970	.58	.44
Uruguay	1967	.49	.38
Venezuela	1971	.60	.47
United States	1966	.40	.29

[a] Source: Adapted from Statistical Abstract of Latin America. Vol. 19, 1978, Table 1406
[b] Definition of the population varies from country to country
[c] 0 = perfect equality; 1 = perfect inequality

It is noteworthy that not only the new poor, but also the *nouveaux riches* can work as a destabilizing factor. This is probably always the case when the new rich use their newly gained economic power to influence the social and/or political structure in their interests. Economic growth often results in a worsening of the social situation of the impoverished masses not only in a relative but also in an absolute sense. Adelman et alii (1976, 562) write: "The major recipients of the rewards of economic development are consistently the middle-and higher-income groups."

In support of this thesis, some data is offered from the agrarian sector. One example: If innovations are introduced, then as a rule there is selection for the

role of innovators of those farmers who are not adverse to the corresponding changes. In other words, it is highly probable that the selection of persons to function as "change agents" will be farmers who are already "progressive." Those who do the selecting assume that the individuals chosen as the agents of change will serve as an example and will inspire emulation. This approach to achieving planned social change Wertheim (1968, 498) calls "betting on the strong." It was this policy of "betting on the strong" that in practice resulted in the rich's getting ever richer, the poor constantly poorer. The policy was one element of the Dutch colonial philosophy in Indonesia. Here is an illustration of the way that policy worked out in Java, based on a survey conducted in the 1950s: In a village in West Java, the investigation revealed, the Government representatives had made contact with only the big land-owners, who comprised a mere 1.5% of the village population. These 1.5% of the farmers profited most from the aid measures (synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, etc.). The large majority of small farmers, field hands and so on, got no benefit from the measures. Comparable results are reported from India. (Cf. Dube, S.C., "India's Changing Villages: Human Factors in Community Development"; London 1958). Dube (1958, 821) tells us: "A closer analysis of the agricultural extension work itself reveals that nearly 70 percent of its benefit went to the elite group and the more affluent and influential agriculturists . . ." The reasons for this disadvantaging of the small farmers lay, for one thing, in their distrust of the Indian Government officials; for another thing, however, and this seems perhaps still more important, modern methods could not be emulated by the small-scale farmers because they lacked the necessary extent of land and capital.

"The social sciences up to now have made no practicable suggestion in regard to the problem of unequal development."

The social sciences up to now have made no practicable suggestion in regard to the problem of unequal development. Thus Adelman and others (1976) argue that a promising program to combat poverty must either include a change in the value structure of the dominant elite in the direction of more egalitarian values, or must foresee the centralization of power in a kind of political avant-garde, a group that then would be able to break the resistance of the established rich. The first proposal strikes a very idealistic note, and in this conjunction it is to be observed that the concept of "equality" is a typical product of European thinking. It is by no means alien to non-European thinkers to conceive of the human being as kind of "homo hierarchicus." As for the second suggestion – to equip a kind of Leninistic avant-garde with power – Adelman and his co-authors themselves have to concede that the main problem is how later its power can be reduced again.

It was the German sociologist Robert Michels who in his "Soziologie des Parteiwesens" (Sociology of the Party System) (1925) first took up this problem. He developed his "iron law of oligarchy," which incidentally is one of the empirically best backed-up laws of the sociology of organization. Is it the destiny of all organizations to develop a hierarchical structure? Absolutely, according to the "iron law." On the basis of Michels' investigation of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which emphasized the values of equality and fraternity, he arrives at the formulation of the famous iron law of oligarchy: "Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy. In every organization, whether it be a political party, a professional union, or any other association of the kind, the aristocratic tendency manifests itself very clearly. The mechanism of the organization, while conferring a solidarity of structure, induces serious changes in the organized mass, completely inverting the respective position of the leaders and the led. As a result of organization, every party or professional union becomes divided into a minority of directors and a majority of directed."

By "oligarchy" Michels doesn't mean domination by the rich. He means domination by the few. This clique of a few individuals is formed of necessity in large organizations. It forms because – so Michels' investigation of the SPD indicates – only a minority takes active part in party life; and because the large number of party members makes inter-communication among all of them impossible. So strategic cadres must be created – small nuclei within the big organization, a few persons who collect information and pass it on. The holders of these strategic positions have a tendency to come to regard themselves as benefices. These strategically favored staff members turn into career officials who have the possibility to manipulate information and to engage the entire bureaucratic communication system against potential competitors. That is one side of the picture. On the other side, these functionaries attain know-how and political skill that ultimately makes them indispensable to the organization. On the basis of the analysis of the German Social Democrats Michels came to the finding that while it is true that the party statutes emphasize democratic procedures, in practice, however, the

"If even within the political parties democracy is impossible, isn't it certainly out for society as a whole?"

power is in the hands of a few party officials. Michels took the view that if even within the political parties democracy is impossible, it is certainly out for society as a whole. For himself personally, he drew the consequences by changing from convinced Social Democrat to enthusiastic adherent of the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.

Not that domination by the few necessarily means the oppression of the many. For the few after all can only be led by the interests of the many. This argument, too, is considered by Michels. He observes that leaders who take power themselves become part of the elite, whose main interest is in staying in power. (On diversity of attitudes among rank and file, and on the discrepancy between the beliefs of the leaders of a movement and the beliefs of the followers, see e.g. Marx and Wood 1975, 383 f.). At the same time, in Michels' view, the personality of the leader undergoes a psychical metamorphosis: Ultimately the leader himself thinks of himself as a unique and splendid person – one that the organization is there to serve. It doesn't matter under which slogan a revolutionary party comes to power: The organization always ends in domination by a few. Always, as the British author George Orwell was to formulate it later, some are more equal than others. Even before the Russian Revolution, Michels predicted that in the end a new oligarchy would take over in Russia in place of the old.

Democratic movements are characterized as successive waves which break ever on the same shore and which are ever renewed. Democratic movements and ideals are robbed of their revolutionary purity at the moment at which the revolution is successful and the revolutionaries take over the positions of the old oligarchy. At the same time, the new dominating group will try to disguise true motivation – the wish to dominate out of self-interest – and will develop an ideology by which the rulers can be presented as self-sacrificing fighters for the people's interest. Every political elite needs, according to Gaetano Mosca (1950, 68), an ideology in order to fashion legitimacy. The idea is that the people ought to obey decisions, not out of fear of negative sanctions, but from conviction that these decisions are morally right. Simultaneously the process of resistance to the oligarchy begins anew. Michels interprets history as, so to say, a cyclical process from a Machiavellian perspective. Within this process, in the overthrowal of established structures determinant significance is attached to charismatic leaders (cf. Ch. 7.4).

"Optimistic notions about a kind of quasi-automatic development of countries of the Third World in the direction of industrialized democracies of Western stamp have largely been abandoned."

Michels' observations are of considerable current value in view of a revival, particularly in politics, of Machiavellian thinking. Optimistic notions about a kind of quasi-automatic development of countries of the Third World in the direction of industrialized democracies of Western stamp have largely been abandoned. In their place, a sort of social Darwinistic thinking is occasionally evident. It argues that in view of the enormous population explosion, it is

unavoidable for Third World countries to match up their population figures with the natural resources that are available. Such reasoning can easily lead to a rationalizing of reduced development aid from the industrialized countries. Another approach is the proposal of a pragmatic proceeding, in the sense of a Triage solution. "Triage" refers to a procedure practiced in the field hospitals during the First World War: The wounded were divided, according to the severity of their wounds, into three categories; the medical help was concentrated on those that had the best chances for survival. Beyond doubt, the carrying over of such logic to development aid would mean that millions would starve.

At the same time at which the recognition of the extensive failure of development-aid policy caught on, a scientific crisis, too, in regard to the sociological analysis of processes of social change in the developing countries became evident.

A bane of the Third World: the "data exporter" or "safari" scholar who leaves nothing of value to the country.

Thus Hermassi (1978, 239), in an article on the status of sociological research in the Third World, sums up: ". . . the study of the new nations has reached a state of acute crisis." Similarly, Portes (1976, 80) states: "One thing seems certain – the almost complete exhaustion of earlier modernization theorizing as a source of insight into the situation of underdeveloped nations or of significant questions for research." Alex S. Edelstein (1982, 40) quotes some of the categories to which various types of development communication researchers have been consigned:

(1) the "data exporter" or "safari" scholar who left nothing of value to the country;
(2) the "theory-builder" who tried to study as many cultures as possible to derive generalizations;
(3) the "penny collaborator" in "co-operative" projects who provided the money while someone did the study;
(4) the "professional overseas researcher" who lived from one grant to another as a way of life;
(5) the "instant expert" doing his first study in an unknown area.

The two above-mentioned factors – a change in the general political climate in regard to the sense of development aid, and a crisis in the sociology of social change – bear major responsibility for the cutback in research activity. Something else, too: In the industrialized countries of Western profile it has become an intellectual fashion to criticize a country's own Western civilization, with its assumed emphasis on material values, as being

"bad." The critique continues: Let us protect the developing countries from this aspect of civilization – which leads to things like, for example, the pollution of our natural environment. (It is appropriate to observe here that the problem of environmental pollution is at least as acute in the Third World as it is in the Western world.)

Such argumentation is advanced, in particular, by the opponents of free international flows of communication. Currently they see a sort of cultural aggression going on, in the course of which the weaker societies allegedly would be absorbed, culturally speaking, into the capitalistic modern global system. Empirical social research these critics like to disqualify as bourgeois

"Opponents of free international flows of communication see a sort of cultural aggression going on."

nit-picking – a petty procedure that isn't capable, so these authors, of understanding the broader contexts. And the demand has been made that communication science must, in the "late-capitalistic alienated society," be partisan; this so the science can push forward from the superficial appearances to their deeper contexts. Empirically oriented sociological analysis has been replaced by a solely ideological discussion, critical of the Western system and seeing in capitalism generally, as well as in the United States specifically, the devilish foe.

The effects of this intellectual climate on sociological analysis of the influences of mass media on developing countries amounted, and still amount, to a crippling of the scientific activity. The social sciences are so paralyzed that historically unique research opportunities are being passed up. It suffices to point, by way of example, to the recent introduction of television in Sri Lanka. No accompanying investigation was made to examine the possible effects. Such a situation is most unsatisfactory. For the present time surely represents one of the most determinant phases of human history. This era is characterized simultaneously by, for one, a process of nation-building in the Third World; and, also, a revolution in the communications sector. Research in the communications branch of sociology up until about 1965 was characterized by an ethnocentristic perspective. One can describe it, somewhat exaggeratedly, as a kind of perspective of cultural arrogance. Since about 1965, little has been done. Developments have proceeded from cultural arrogance to almost total ignorance.

What does this lamentable state of affairs mean in political practice? For one thing, it means that if statesmen of the Third World are wondering, for example, whether a given country should or shouldn't introduce a new mass media, they can be offered no help, in the form of research involving empirical findings, in reaching their decision. Besides, most politicians prefer

stategies that put priority on the reaching of short-range goals. That is, the politicians eschew striving toward purposes that are realizable in the long run (economic strategy) in favour of the prospect of quickly attained successes which possibly over a larger time span can have negative consequences, but that for now seem likely to assure the politicians of the loyalty of the masses. Moreover, it can be assumed that most of the political decision-makers lean toward a cause-and-effect mode of thinking, and do not correctly evaluate social systems involving counterintuitive bahavior. Yet the structure of complex social systems is based on all processes' running their course within the feeding-back, circular schema. This means that the dynamic mechanics of such systems usually are evaluated wrong. A certain process (for example, a centrally planned operation like the introduction of television, or a comparable measure) has varied effects that, in turn, are the causes of further changes that are not monocausally explainable. In other words, centrally planned operations involve, as a rule, a considerable number of unforeseen results.

2.2 Ethnocentrism and Cultural Relativism

Today the majority of social scientists proceed from the premise of the theoretically equal valuation for differing cultures. These sociologists seek (more or less successfully) to avoid taking an ethnocentric perspective. Ethnocentrism is a term used by William Graham Sumner in 1907 in "Folkways." The word refers to the assumption that one's own culture's value system is superior to other systems of values; with this subjective approach then used as a frame of reference in evaluating other cultures. That is, the customs and norms of one's own culture are used as a standard for evaluating other civilizations. Edward B. Taylor (1873, 1) gives this definition of Culture: Culture is "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, laws, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." From this point of view culture denotes the complete social heritage of a society. This "social heritage" – that is, everything that one as a member of a certain society must acquire as knowledge, norms and capabilities – differs from society to society. Accordingly, culture is here defined as a "distinctive way of life of a group of people, their complete design for living" (Kluckhohn 1951, 86).

"Culture," then, is understood as the entirety of notions, conceptions, values and norms that are shared by the members of a society. Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952, 181) give the following definition: "Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior, acquired and transmitted

by symbols constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of future action."

Cultural relativism is the study of other cultures against their respective cultural backgrounds – a study which reveals that for many cultures there is no notion of modernization as a central value. The assumption of such a relativistic perspective has also led to efforts to rewrite European history. For the typical history of civilization from the European-North American perspective is the history of a civilization that, emerging from the eastern Mediterranean, reached its first zenith in ancient Greece, and then, by way of Rome, influenced the rest of Europe. In this Eurocentric reading of history, China, Japan, India, Central and South America – to name only some examples – play little or no role. From the new perspective that assumes equal values for varying cultures, countries of the Third World are in general no longer denoted by historians as being backward, in the sense that they actually "belong back in the Middle Ages," or a period even further removed in time from today. The new approach assumes, rather, that these countries

"It is legitimate to ask whether certain basic human needs are better or worse satisfied by one or another cultural system."

are an integral component of the contemporary world system (cf. Ch. 5). The culturally relativistic approach is not, however, necessarily adequate for "technological" problems. For the question of the degree of life-expectancy or of child mortality can definitely be approached by criteria outside a particular culture. So can the questions of whether certain basic human needs are better or worse satisfied by one or another cultural system. The question whether a specific traditional god is or is not the true God can, on the other hand, hardly be answered by criteria located outside the specific culture (cf. Awa 1979). Mühlmann (1964, 355) reasons that in some objective aspects the superiority of the West, and/or of its prospects for further evolution, are incontestable: "They (these objective aspects) include rational technique, rational organization of work, raising of the living standard, the reducing of the mortality rate, education, political basic rights. They do *not* include the moral perfecting of the human being . . . but they indeed do include . . . education toward social consciousness."

But even when one proceeds from the assumption of a theoretically equal valuation of different cultures, still there is always the tendency to evaluate discovered differences on a vertical scale. Again, in a comparison of different

cultures "spatial metaphors" like "high" and "low" and "over" and "below" are resorted to in characterizing these or those social differences. Such usages seem to impute to what is in itself generally a completely value-free classification a hierarchical evaluation, in the sense that what is "over" or "high" is superior to or more valuable than what is "below" or "low." (Typical, for example, is the distinction between "high culture" and "low culture"; cf, e.g. Kluckhohn 1951a, 419; Ossowski 1957, 169; Schwartz 1981.)

Precisely in the analysis of foreign cultures, research has frequently fallen into an ethnocentric perspective. Thus Awa (1979, 263) states: "There are few areas, academic or otherwise, in which ethnocentricism has found as much expression as in the area of development approach." In the article on "Changing Patterns in Research on the Third World" Hermassi (1978) faults what he calls the tendency of many researchers to judge development processes in the Third World by forcing them into the Procrustean bed of European experience. Often, too, the problem of "nature versus nurture"

The tendency of many researchers to judge development processes in the Third World by forcing them into the Procrustean bed of European experience.

enters into the discussion. Below we shall proceed from the assumption that culture in no event is directly linked with race. Quoting Margaret Mead (1958, 481): "Extensive effort to demonstrate the genetic superiority of one racial group of men over another has so far failed, so that the present working assumption is that, as far as their capacity to learn, maintain, transmit and transform culture is concerned, different groups of Homo sapiens must be regarded as equally competent."

But this doesn't say that discussion of, for instance, the genetically caused differences in intelligence among different races has been concluded. This controversy, which has gone on now for almost a century, is continuing at a great rate, as least within the discipline of psychology. (Cf. e.g. the "Review Essay" by Bruce K. Eckland: "Does IQ Mean Anything Anymore?" in: Contemporary Sociology, 12 (No. 1), 1983.)

Then too, the thesis that climate influences the thinking ability of people, and accordingly the *niveau* of cultures, is still being advanced – if not in the sciences, certainly in journalism. Thus Heinz Panzram writes in one of the leading German daily newspapers. Die Welt, of February 20, 1982:

"It is surely no coincidence that the cultural and civilizing peak achievements of recent times have been made in the so-called moderate latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere. In these regions there is no need, as in the far North, to use a large part of human energy in the struggle for bare survival, nor do, as in the South, too-high temperatures and humid air cripple human activity. What is determinant in this conjunction is not, however, only the temperatures. At the same time, the area between, roughly, the 40th and 50th degress of north latitude is squarely in the path of cyclones. These "disturbances" that account for the changeability of our weather apparently produce a kind of bracing climate that stimulates peak cultural and civilizatory performance. It is precisely the constant change between polar and subtropical, maritime and continental air masses and climatic influences that is, surely, an extraordinary intellectual and physical stimulating factor. This stimulus is largely lacking in the regions farther to the North and South, with their very much more uniform climates. Moreover, indirectly the climate can foster the development of specific ethnic characters. As late as in the first decades of this century, many tropical and subtropical regions were so to speak lands of the lotus, in that the daily bread, which people farther to the North had to work hard for, came the way of these more southerly people without much effort. Supplement this constantly laden table with a corresponding intellectual attitude and high temperatures that reduce human activity; and in whole tribes a mentality can easily develop that sees life at its best in *dolce far niente.*"

So much the comment by the German newspaper writer. What he maintains is nothing else than a re-formulation of the long-discarded theory of the geographer Ellsworth Huntington (1915). One of Huntington's contentions was that to develop mental vigor, an average temperature of 50° to 60° Fahrenheit was more favorable than an average temperature of over 70°, like that which prevails in the tropics. The economist Douglas Lee (1957, 99) makes a similar assertion: "Some loss of mental initiative is probably the most important single direct result of exposure to tropical environment." Such a statement surely reflects Lee's subjective difficulties with the tropical climate, rather than scientifically based findings.

Precisely in regard to the assumed or imputed national characters of other populations, irrelevant generalizations are frequently encountered. Thus, for instance, Luca in Pye (1962) asserts that Burma had not been in a position to develop a stable political system because the Burmese were lacking certain normative personality traits (like, for example, a pronounced sense of their identity; or a feeling for order), which are, so Pye, prerequisites for the functioning of a modern political structure. Pye particularly emphasizes the relationship between the ambivalent Burmese mother and a simultaneous need for power and for subjection. The argumentation by Pye is introduced here because in fact for some time now Burma has been known for its political stability, and has managed a relatively succesful uncoupling from the global economy.

The generalizing disqualification of entire races and/or populaces as – measured by European-North American standards – inferior possesses a long tradition. Examples of the persistence of old race doctrine, whose effects on political activity are sufficiently well-known, are found, for example, in the widely circulated Fischer-Lexicon "Anthropologie" (Heberer u.a. 1970, 251 f.). This work asserts that the most significant contribution of the negro to American culture is in music (jazz). This stereotype of the, yes, musically, but otherwise not very intelligent "Uncle Tom" is provided with the following "scientific" argumentation: "The psychosomatic correlations, ascertained by constitution research, may also be significant for psychic racial differences; for the races do differ both in bodily structure and in the degree of androgynous morphology and the other hormonal constellations." Here the supposedly higher musicality of the American negro is a classic example of the process known as the self-fulfilling prophecy. For the blacks were not given the possibility to train for other careers. Starting from the prejudice that blacks are solely musical, the following circularly dynamic process ensues. First: Blacks are solely musical. Second: That being so, we don't need to have them train in other spheres. Third (later): You see, the negro record shows that he only distinguishes himself in the musical world. So it is that prejudices can become an integral component of social situations themselves, and thereby influence later developments in the sense of a self-fulfilling prophecy (Robert K. Merton). To quote the famous Thomas – theorem of the American

"Prejudices can . . .
influence later developments . . ."

sociologist William Thomas: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." (Thomas and Thomas 1928, 572.) The process of circular causation involving the "white prejudice" and the "low standard of living" of the negro population is treated clearly by Gunnar Myrdal in "An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy" (New York 1944). The low living standard of the American black is kept down via the discrimination exercised by the whites. At the same time, however, the prejudices of whites against negroes are intensified through the blacks' poverty, ignorance, superstitiousness, slum dwellings, poor state of health, dirty appearance, unpleasant smell, bad behavior, disorderly family relationships, and negro criminality.

A comparable example of the self-fulfilling prophecy is absolutely conceivable, as well, on a global scale. When political decision-makers in industrialized countries adhere, for instance, to the thesis that the poverty in one developing country (or all developing countries) is self-incurred, because the people living there are lazy and/or otherwise incapable – then development aid comes to seem identical with the squandering of money. Omitted, or too scanty, development aid leads, however, to constantly worse poverty – which again "proves" that these people are incapable. Similar processes can also run their course in the case of decisions about economic

matters. If a certain country is, because of constantly negative reporting, termed a crisis area, then investments are possibly withheld – a development that in turn fosters the emergence of crises. Complaints along these lines have been heard from Malaysia, and also not long ago (October 1983) from the Philippines: The constant negative reporting from those countries resulted in – here the elements of another self-fulfilling prophecy – a falling-off in investments, with its consequence worsened economic conditions – and a still more urgent need for the withheld investments.

"If a certain country is, because of constantly negative reporting, termed a crisis area, then investments are possibly withheld – a development that in turn fosters the emergence of crises."

The typical perspective from abroad of foreign cultures is called "etic approach." (Cf. for the origins of the concepts "etic" and "emic" e.g. de Vos and Wippler 1969, 337; Jones 1979.) With the "etic approach," preconceived categories are taken as a basis for the observation; that is, standards developed externally to a culture are applied, with the research concentrating its primary interest of the general cultural aspects of the civilization that is being investigated. Systematic, objective observation which uses inter-subjective reliability and reproducibility as criteria for validity is understood as the method adequate to the "etic approach" (cf. Jones 1979).

By contrast, the "emic approach" concentrates on discovering how a system looks "from inside." The categories of observation are developed from the perspective of the participating observer. The "emic approach" signifies discovering through participatory observation the dominating categories in a certain culture, categories that are being used to transmit and to interpret messages. De Vos and Wippler (1969, 337) write: "The emic approach focuses on content and inherent meaning as experienced by the participants in the culture, whereas the etic approach is more concerned with general structural patterns to be found in the culture." Participatory observation has also been used for the researching of at the time still unexamined larger social units, such as communities or also entire cultures. However, this method corresponding to the "emic approach" has certain inherent dangers. Thus it is possible that even in the case of scientifically planned participatory observations – systematically planned toward a research purpose, put in writing, and checked on – systemic erroneous interpretations will be made. Such errors could occur because the researcher does not completely understand the language, or because the intention of the partner in a conversation is misinterpreted because the researcher is unfamiliar with the ethnography of communication (cf. Ch. 1.1). Regarding the difficulties, and

the errors that may result: The researcher needs to know – and to know this during exploratory studies in new territory is practically impossible – what messages, in what form, in which situations, can be transmitted, adequately to the situation, to which individuals. Then there is a further problem area in participatory observation: What might be called the "viewpoint" of the researcher is likely to change, the more familiar he becomes with a foreign culture. Finally, the would-be participatory observer has to be at the right place at the right time so as to be able to observe the object of research adequately, with a minimum of disturbance, as participant.

The fact that even classical works of cultural anthropology under some circumstances can lead to decades-long misinterpretations – or at least controversial interpretations – of alien cultures is indicated by a recent challenge by an anthropologist to the correctness of Margaret Mead's "Coming of Age in Samoa" (1928). Only decades after that, in 1982, was a work "Margaret Mead and Samoa. The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth" (Harvard University Press) published by Derek Freeman. His book contests Mead's characterization of the Samoan culture as free of repression and aggression. Nor did Freeman, he writes, find the alleged sexual permissiveness that Mead reports leads to a crisis- and aggression-free childhood and youth on Samoa. By contrast, Freeman sees Samoan young people as being under the pressure of a strict, authoritarian culture. He characterizes the Samoans as competitive, touchy, jealous and violent. Murder, manslaughter and rape occur relatively often. There is no free love. Instead, there is a puritanical virginity cult. Freeman says Mead's totally opposite evaluation of this culture stems from her informants' having deliberately led her astray. Girls who sought Mead out in her residence, an American medical outpost, played a prank on her, says Freeman, with "counterfeit tales of casual love unter the palm trees." Such deceptions are everyday practice in Samoa, he continues, since the custom "greatly appeals to the Samoans as a respite from the severities of their authoritarian society." Mead, Freeman goes on, not only had not mastered the language sufficiently; she had also failed to make contact with adequate representatives of roles important for the Samoan society (for example, male groups). Accordingly Mead is said to have underestimated the complexity of the Samoan culture while overestimating Samoan friendliness. It is relevant to observe that Margaret Mead herself was quite aware of the inadequacy of her methods (cf. e.g. her autobiography). Aside from this, it is by no means certain that Freeman's picturization of Samoa is correct.

The articulating, and thereby also cognitive,
systems of 'advanced' cultures
are by no means further developed
than are those of 'primitive' cultures
– Wilhelm von Humboldt.

The concept of cultural relativism has a long tradition in linguistics. Important to a discussion of this concept is the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis of linguistic relativity. The idea behind it was first explicitly formulated by Wilhelm von Humboldt. This line of thinking starts from the premise that the articulating, and thereby also cognitive, systems of "advanced" cultures are by no means further developed than are those of "primitive" cultures. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1820, 123) writes: "Thinking is not only dependent on language generally, but to a certain extent also on every individual one." In Humboldt's treatise "Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluß auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts" (On the Variety of Human Linguistic Constructions and Their Influence on Human Intellectual Development), in the first volume of his "Über die Kawi-Sprache auf der Insel Java" (On the Kawi Language in Java), this approach is spelled out further, and the position of cultural relativism expressed particularly clearly (1907, VII, 60): "Learning a foreign language ought to . . . be the gaining of a new standpoint in one's previous world-view; and to an certain extent, learning a new language is that. For every language contains the entire network of concepts and the way of thought of a part of humanity. Only because one always carries over to a foreign language, to a greater or less extent, one's own linguistic perspective – this success is not felt to be pure and complete." For Humboldt, then, speech is not only a tool to express intellectual content (Ergon), a content that is conceived independently of language; language is also its own autonomously functioning reality (Energeia).

Humboldt's line of thought is taken up in more or less radical formulation by various authors; for example, by Frank Boas (1911) in the introduction to "Handbook of the American Indian Languages." For Edward Sapir (1937, 112) linguistic forms determine in advance the way certain things are seen and interpreted – and thus a certain language, so Sapir, determines the way a certain people will interpret a situation. Language and experience permeate

Are any two languages ever sufficiently similar "to be considered to represent the same social reality"?

one another. In the words of Sapir (1949, 162): "No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered to represent the same social reality." Benjamin Lee Whorf (1963, 20) argues that people who use languages with very different grammars are led by these grammatical structures to typically differing observations and differing evaluations of externally similar observations. Therefore they are not as observers' equivalent to one another; they arrive at somehow differing views of the world.

Within the context of this Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity, language is regarded as an objective reality, with the help of which people

structure the world. The linguistic system (the grammar) is not, this hypothesis runs, a purely reproductive instrument for expressing thoughts; instead, language itself shapes the thoughts. Language is a pattern for and an introduction to the individual's intellectual activity. Whorf (1963, 12) characterizes the linguistic relativity principle by reasoning that not all observers are led through the same physical content to the same world-view; not unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or in some way can be brought to a common denominator. However, Whorf only analyzes linguistic material, and not the cognitive processes in those who use a language. The logical structure of Whorf's approach in essence brings into the reasoning as evidence what first has to be proven. Thus, for example, the thought structures of the Apache Indians, based on Whorf's unfalsifiable intimate acquaintance with the Apache socio-cultural milieu, are first "found" in the Apache language and in the end rediscovered in the language. Osgood (1963) says this reasoning won't do. He accuses Whorf of calling "evidence" material that is really only anecdotal, not scientific proof. He adds that Whorf's examples would be dependent on a literal translation from the largely Indian languages. This argumentation, says Osgood, is somewhat as if a hypothetical Hopi linguist were to translate "breakfast" literally as "termination of religious abstinence"; and then "would be able to conclude that for Anglo-

What if a hypothetical Hopi linguist were to translate "breakfast" literally as "termination of religious abstinence"?

Americans the nocturnal sleep is a religious experience, since each breakfast has the purpose of interrupting this religious fast."

According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis different language codes (with its remaining unclear how dialects are to be distinguished from distinct languages; on this, cf. e.g. Smith 1973, 72 ff.) contain differing thought patterns, and thereby raise barriers to communication. Were the Whorf Hypothesis to be granted validity, then, because of a lack of dimensional identity, a comparison of different languages, practically speaking, would be impossible. Osgood (1967) has, however, with the help of the semantic differential (on this, Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci 1957) carried out several language comparisons and has distinguished three dominant factor dimensions:

1. "evaluative" factor (good – bad, positive – negative)

2. "potency" factor (strong – weak, heavy – light)

3. "activity" factor (active – passive, fast – slow).

This "evaluative-potency-activity" system, which has been shown to apply to the most differing languages – English, Navajo, Japanese, to take only three examples – for Oswood (1967, 112) is evidence that people everywhere, without regard to their language and culture, organize their experiences according to similar symbolic dimensions.

The thesis of linguistic relativity consists of two separate hypotheses: that of interlingual relativity and the hypothesis of intralingual linguistic determinism. The latter hypothesis, intralingual linguistic determinism, was expressed in a popular form by George Orwell in his "1984." (Cf. Appendix: The Principles of Newspeak.) Newspeak ultimately makes it impossible to think rebellious thoughts (Orwell, G., "Nineteen-Eighty-Four," Harmondsworth 1961; 1st ed. 1949). The linguistic relativity principle asserts lastly that logic is always relative to a certain linguistic background. From this viewpoint Wilhelm von Humboldt's negative attitude toward a world language is to be understood: The world language would only lead to a narrowing or an impoverishing of the thought pattern. Von Humboldt's is an argument that is also found, in slightly modified form, with Claude Lévi Strauss (1983). He observes a current cultural homogenization by mass media, and anticipates a worldwide prostration of the various cultures. Below we start from a modified variation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. According to it, because of language differences, an undistorted intercultural communication is hard to achieve, since every cognitive process is influenced at least indirectly by the linguistic code. (In its extreme form, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is empirically untenable. Cf. i.a. Schaff 1970, 47 ff.; Wallace 1958, also Hoijer 1954; Luckmann 1969, 1058 f.; Miller and McNeill 1969, 732 ff.; on interlingual code differentiation e.g. Christian and Christian 1964; Grimshaw 1973; Hoijer 1953. On experimental examination of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, cf. Brown and Lenneberg 1954; Carroll and Cassagrande 1958.)

A graphic presentation of the possible interrelationships among language, culture and reality, a portrayal that corresponds with the just-outlined position, is offered by Christian and Christian (1966, 300):



While in linguistics the thesis of cultural relativity possesses a long tradition, in anthropology the situation is the opposite. This the discussion of the supposed oppositeness of "primitive" and "modern" thought makes clear: It includes the thesis that between two ways of thinking there are pronounced qualitative differences. This idea also occurs, in a less pronounced way, in the personality typology of Lerner (cf. Ch. 3.3). (On the change in the thesis of the dualism of primitive and modern mentality, cf. Gugler 1961, 47 ff.) In particular Lévy-Bruhl (1910, 1927) posits a pronounced qualitative contrast between mystic, primitive and modern, civilized mentality. He argues that the primitive person is a participator, without individuality.

The qualitative leap between primitive and modern mentality apparently already occurs at the moment in which individuality emerges. Lévy-Bruhl (1930, 189) argues: "The primitives have hardly a conception of the individual as such. The individual being exists for them only to the extent it is a part of the group or species." From this viewpoint, the frequently encountered use of the label "primitive mentality" to characterize the people of developing countries is entirely uncalled-for.

Primitive thinking, according to Lévy-Bruhl, knows no chance and is pre-logical; that is, it is not, like our thinking, obliged to abstain from contradictions. This mode of thought, instead, obeys the "Law of Participation," the mystic communality of heterogeneous things. The attitude of the primitives, says Lévy-Bruhl, is static. The in part exact knowledge that the primitive man possesses and uses is not broadened and deepened: "He contents himself with handing on what he himself has received." (Lévy-Bruhl 1930, 6 f.)

Lévi-Strauss argues in his book "La Pensée sauvage" (The Savage Mind) against the thesis that the thought of the primitive is non-logical or pre-logical. Modern cultures, for Lévi-Strauss, enjoy no privileges vis-à-vis the "primitive" cultures. All cultures are regarded as theoretically of equal value. The supposed differences between "primitive" and "modern" that is alleged to be found in qualitative distinctions between the two kinds of thought is contested: "The kind of logic which is used by mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and the difference lies not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of the things to which it is applied."

"Magic and science are not opposites, but two parallel intellectual processes."

(Lévi-Strauss 1955, 444; cf. also Leach 1971, 91 ff.) In other words, magic and science are not opposites, but two parallel kinds of cognition. True, in view of their theoretical and practical results they are unequal, but not in regard to the kind of mental process that is the prerequisite for both. (Cf. Lévi-Strauss 1962, 25.) A determinant difference between "the savage mind" and "the

domesticated mind," however, Lévi-Strauss, too, sees: the non-historicity of "savage thinking," the lack of historical knowledge of the diachronic perspective. (Leach 1971, 15, Ch. 24.) History is not past. It is, all according to the historical situation, a modified component of the present.

2.3 Developing Country vs. Modern Society: The Dichotomous Tradition

In their investigation of possible relationships between mass media and social change, many authors proceed from simple pairs of opposites (dichotomous classifications), which are taken to mean ideal-typical opposed pairs, or the end-point of a continuum of development from traditional to modern. Within this conjunction, it can be stated in advance that such a theme as "Mass Media and Social Change in the Countries of the Third World" actually is formulated too generally. For this statement there are several reasons. For one, considerable differences exist among the various mass media: television, radio, the motion picture, the newspaper, and the others. Again, for another reason the formulation is too general: The countries of the Third World do not constitute a homogeneous category; they represent a conglomerate of very different states. Some countries were never (for example, Thailand and until recently Afghanistan) or for only a short time (e.g. Ethiopia) colonies. Latin America is hardly, in either an economic or a cultural sense, to be put on a level with black Africa. In regard to the kind of government, there are major variations from country to country.

As for the communications sector, even between culturally and geographically "close" countries like Sri Lanka and India there are sharp differences. Thus Sri Lanka has the highest – aside from Japan – literacy rate in Asia (cf. Amunugama 1981, 263). By contrast, in India, where some 30% of the population can read or write one of the 15 languages, it is true that less than 2% of the population can read or write English; the circulations of the English dailies and weeklies are, however, higher than the editions of those published in the regional languages. (Singh 1980/61.) Then there are also extreme geographical differences. Thus while Sri Lanka's geological structure (a mountain range in the center of the island, falling off in all directions, makes television transmission effective and comparatively inexpensive), is ideal for the introduction of television, on the Fiji Islands even radio communication poses major difficulties. (Cf. Keune 1981, 229 f.)

In the explanation of modernization processes different variables are emphasized, such as change in the modal personality structure, significance of elites, industrialization, urbanization, the importance of the military as

standard-bearer of modernity, or the significance of mass media. This latter aspect is at the core of more detailed treatment of the theme. The text that follows will also take into consideration the influence of mass media on those social and cultural processes that can be important in attaining greater economic productivity, or in hindering it. The theses regarding the potential relations between mass communication and social change that are to be found in the literature can be put into three categories:

1. The mass media are credited with being able to speed up the modernization process; whether as educational instruments or as new "mobility multiplier," which conveys new experiences and that effects an expansion of the world-view, increases psychic mobility, and fosters readiness to innovate.

2. The mass media are regarded as the result of an economic development, and as having no further significance in the process of modernization. Typical of these theories, which are not further dealt with here, are economic growth models that accord no influence to the media.

3. The mass media are seen as contributing neither to education nor to modernization, but, rather, as being a hindrance, because they are said to offer "false" models and to lift the level of economic demands to an unrealistically high level.

Let it be said that in particular the very influential American theoreticians of modernization (cf. Ch. 3) have been convinced of the might of the media.

"In particular the American theoreticians of modernization have been convinced of the might of the media."

For example, for Daniel Lerner (1963, 348) the modernization process begins with "new public communication – the diffusion of new ideas and new information which stimulate people to want to behave in new ways."

Max F. Millikan (1967, 3) holds that "of all the technological changes which have been sweeping through the traditional societies of the underdeveloped world the most fundamental and pervasive in their effects on human society have been the changes in communication."

From its beginnings, sociology has been, if one considers Saint-Simon and Comte as founding fathers, determinantly characterized by the efforts to discover universally valid laws. Sociology has been seeking laws of which one could assume that they determine processes of social change. (Cf. e.g. Baldus

1981; Wolff 1968.) With the aid of these laws, is should then be possible at the same time to predict future processes of social change. This universal-law principle led, as Baldus (1981, 207) observed, to an marked reductionism in investigations of social change. Thus Auguste Comte (as did Saint-Simon) postulated three stages of human history:

- The theological stage. In it the processes of nature and of society were regarded as determined by supernatural forces.

- The metaphysical stage. Now it is no longer supernatural forces, but abstract secular forces or principles (for example, reason; self-interest) that have come to be regarded as determining the course of world history.

- The positive scientific stage. In it, positive reason determines the social processes.

Similar laws about stages are found in, for example, Herbert Spencer (primitive, military and industrial societies); Karl Marx (early communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, communism); Emile Durkheim ("mechanical solidarity" of folk societies, based upon likeness rather than difference vs. "organic solidarity" of highly differentiated societies with a specialized division of labor); Henry Maine (societies based on status and societies based on contract); Robert Redfield (primitive, folk and urban societies); Talcott Parsons (primitive, advanced primitive, archaic, advanced intermediate, and modern societies; 1965); and many other authors. (On this, cf. Baldus 1981; Bendix 1967; Bühl 1969; Coleman 1968; Giddens 1976; Portes 1976.) These writings as a rule make the implicit assumption that the growth or the genesis of a culture proceeds in such a way as to indicate that something higher or better is going to be certainly attained, whether through human insight or via the laws of history. But in the end this optimism about progress is based on wishful thinking; you could have the same certainty in predicting an apocalypse in the sense of the atomic self-destruction of humanity.

"Community" and "society"

Returning to our discussion of pairs of opposites: Doubtless the most influential adducing of a pair of opposites to describe social development comes from Ferdinand Tönnies, who drew a distinction between "community" and "society". For a long time his work "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft" (Community and Society), which appeared for the first time in 1887, attracted little attention. Only after the end of the First World War did it find a wider readership – no doubt because of a widespread yearning for shelter and security; for a "feeling" community. Tönnies laid one of the cornerstones for the negative evaluation of the modern urban society – often pejoratively denounced as "mass" society. This viewpoint later found

expression, too, in the negative attitude of American urban community sociology vis-à-vis city. Community is the quintessence of those social life-forms in which the inner, emotional fraternity of the members creates the essential situation. There is agreement on the basic feeling about things – as there was in village life, regulated by usage and custom, and also in city life. Such values for community life remained valid as long as people were kept together through religious ties. Society is characterized by the rational, purposeful life-style of the industrialized society. Society according to Tönnies (1935, 125) is related to community "as an artificial apparatus or a machine, manufactured for specific purposes, is related to the organ system and individual organs of a living body." As Tönnies sees it, within society the members are connected by deliberate contacts, and thus left to their greed and their power drive. Tönnies (1953, 53) regards the relationship of all to all, before and also outside the sphere of convention, as the potential hostility of a latent war. The people of the society are like the people of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), for whom the human being is a wolf among his fellows – explicitly characterized by Tönnies as the enemy by nature. Society is, if the "social contract" fails to hold firm, a situation of conflicts among individuals, a condition of "war of all against all."

Precisely because of the inexactitude of the terms, the pair of opposites community and society offer a broad frame for interpretation. For example, in this sense community can be understood in three ways:

- as stage of historical development,

- as structuring element of the present,

- as social utopia (cf. Bülow 1969).

The typical community forms are family life, village life, and city (more precisely, small-town, religiously dominated) life. Typically societal forms, on the other hand, are urban (i.e. big-city) life, national life (political affairs), and cosmopolitan living (public opinion). The dichotomy between community and society emerges, particularly in the form of the "pattern variables" of Talcott Parsons, in modern sociology in new dress. These "pattern variables," whose significance for the development of post-World War II sociology can hardly be overestimated, can easily be reformulated as the pair of opposites community – society (cf. e.g. König 1967, 96):

Community	Society
affectivity	affective neutrality
particularism	universalism
ascription	achievement
diffuseness	specificity

Parsons (1960, 180 ff.) uses the pair of opposites universalism – particularism and ascription – achievement in defining four societal types. The pattern of particularistic – ascriptive as well as universalistic – achievement represents the ideal-typical end-points of a societal typology that, as is explicitly expressed in the "working papers," has a very close affinity to the community – society dichotomy. (Parsons e.a. 1953, 207 f.) Parsons (1966, 182) also asserts: ". . . the present approach serves to accent lines of fundamental structural differentiation which are in some sense of 'evolutionary' significance."

The dichotomy ascription vs. achievement means for the fulfillment of economic roles that these are allotted in societies in which ascription is the norm (for example, in a caste society) on the basis of who a certain person is, and not according to what this person can achieve. Universalism vs. particularism refers to whether a certain norm is applied to everyone, or is only valid for certain categories of persons (for instance, women, untouchables, members of a minority, etc.). The equality norm, still to be discussed, is an example of universalism. The distinction between diffuse and specific orientation is closely linked with the pair of opposites achievement – ascription. In societies in which the achievement principle dominates, the roles in the economic sector have to be very specific, that is, clearly delineated. A typical example of functional diffuseness is that of a farmer in a developing country who not only cultivates the land, but also builds his house, produces his clothing, and consumes his products.

The deliberations of Tönnies and other authors thus have by no means passed out of sociology. On the contrary, the theories that Tönnies worked out in the 19th century continue to have key significance up to today in the sociology of social change. Thus, for example, Hoselitz (1977) uses the "pattern variables" to analyze processes of economic growth; that is, the transition from underdeveloped, traditional societies, in which roles are ascripted, functionally diffuse, and oriented toward narrow particularistic purposes, toward modern, developed societies with clearly delineated regulations for roles that have been acquired through achievement and are oriented toward universal norms.

A variety of objections can be made to the use of pattern variables as constitutive characteristics of traditional and/or modern societies, as well as objections to the other mentioned steps or phases theories of development

(cf. e.g. Bendix 1967; Coleman 1968; Gusfield 1967). The most important of these objections is that many authors (especially Anglo-Americans) have a misconception of the essence of "ideal types," which do not represent a generalization of empirical findings, as for example, the application of "pattern variables" lets one assume. According to Max Weber (1964, 264), ideal types have the character of a utopia. They are obtained by the conceptual upgrading of certain elements of reality. In its conceptual purity an ideal type, in which certain relationships and processes of historical life are being united to form a cosmos of imaginary connections that is in itself free of contradictions, can in reality – empirically – nowhere be found. For historical research, then, Max Weber (1964, 235) writes, this task ensues: ". . . in each single case to determine how near or how far reality is from that ideal picture . . ." Within the context of ideal-typical analysis, Weber refers particularly to the uncertainties of the analysis of processes of social change: Ideal-typical constructs, he tells us, have to be clearly distinguished from actual processes of social change. Weber (1964, 268) adds: This distinction is extremely difficult to maintain. "Developmental sequences . . . can be constructed into ideal types, and these constructs can have quite considerable heuristic value. But this quite particularly gives rise to the danger that the ideal type and reality will be confused with one another."

"Wouldn't research on developing countries have taken another course if . . .?"

In view of this argumentation, the question arises: Wouldn't the research on developing countries have taken another course if there had been a better reception of Weber in Anglo-American social sciences? One of the main reasons for the misunderstanding of the concept of ideal type by Anglo-American sociologists seems to be that "ideal" has the "connotation of excellence" (c.f. Miner 1968, 174).

For the following reasoning also is to be found in Weber (1964): "The series of types which results from the selected conceptual criteria appears then as a historical sequence unrolling with the necessity of a law. The logical classification of analytical concepts on the one hand and the empirical arrangements of the events thus conceptualized in space, time, and causal relationship, on the other, appear to be so bound up together that there is an almost irresistible temptation to do violence to reality in order to prove the real validity of the construct." This argument, which also pertinently categorizes the evolutionary universals of Parsons, is illuminated almost paradigmatically in a work by Lerner (cf. Ch. 3.3) that has been very influential in its consequences for media policy. Lerner (1967, 114 f.) argues that "the Western model exhibits certain components and sequences whose relevance is global. The Western model is considered to be a general developmental model which is virtually an inevitable baseline for

development planning because there is no other model which can serve this purpose." Lerner also undertakes a dichotomizing: traditional and modern society. So doing in a book, he suggests even in its title, "The Passing of Traditional Society," the inevitability of a historical process. But when development follows, so to speak, natural laws, then it only makes sense for policy to adjust to these natural laws. For there is no point in moving against the tide of such globally proceeding developments.

Modernization for Lerner (1968, 368) is thus merely a new name for an old process: ". . . the process of social change whereby less-developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies." In this connection, the progress in the economic sphere is especially striking in that in this sector the greatest extent of accord is to be observed, and a categorization of countries according to a scale of economic achievement is possible. Lerner (1968, 387) accordingly offers this definition: "Modernization . . . is the process of social change in which development is the economic component. Modernization produces a societal environment in which rising output per head is effectively incorporated. For effective incorporation, the heads that produce (and consume) rising output must understand and accept the new rules of the game deeply enough to improve their own productive behavior and diffuse it throughout their society." Underlying this thesis is a convergence theory in the sense that the model of the – at least in the

"It has been said that through acculturation – the taking over of a foreign culture or some of its elements – a kind of universal standardization of the human being would result."

economic realm – rationally acting human being is proliferated over the entire globe. The proliferation of industrialization accordingly means the diffusion of specific cultural traits (cf. Hoselitz 1977, 281). Through acculturation – the taking over of a foreign culture or some of its elements – a kind of universal standardization of the human being would result.

The thesis that modernization is a worldwide process is also championed by Parsons. In "Systems of Modern Societies," Parsons (1971) argues: "The trend toward modernization has become worldwide. In particular, the elites of most non-modern societies accept crucial aspects of the values of modernity, especially economic development, education, political independence, and some form of 'democracy'." The quotation above clearly illustrates the teleological factors in Parsons' thought. The end-situation of social evolution for this author is apparently a democracy of American stamp. (One hundred years before Parsons, Herbert Spencer saw in Victorian England the end-point of social evolution.) This leaning is especially clear, too, in the

evolutionary universals of the author, the "last" of which is asserted to be the developments of "democratic associations." (Parsons 1964.) The theoreticians of modernization believe as a rule in a linear course of history. Thinking in historical cycles or circles within this context is very rare indeed. (Cf. Ch. 3.)

The development of a society is, according to this approach, equivalent to the extension of the culture of the elites to the backwoods or "provinces." In this sense, modernization refers to the proliferation of modern ideas from the world centers to the centers of the periphery, and further, into the peripheral fringe areas. It is to be noted, however, that this concept of modernization is no longer held even by its original proponents (cf. e.g. Rogers 1976; Schramm and Lerner 1976). Meanwhile alternative conceptions of social change have prevailed. This has happened since there has been increasing recognition that the causes of underdevelopment are not solely to be looked for in the underdeveloped country itself (for example, in that country's backward structure of values or in social structures that put a brake on progress). The newer concepts recognize that factors outside the country can also be important (cf. Ch. 6) in explaining underdevelopment (for instance, the country's position in the global economic system). Since these newer theories

"Factors outside a country can be important in explaining its underdevelopment."

have gained ground, alternative concepts of social change, emphasizing "self-development," have established themselves. Rogers (1978, 68) defines "development as a widely participatory process of social change in a society intended to bring about both social and material advancement (including greater equality, freedom, and other valued qualities) for the majority of the people through their gaining greater control over their environment."

It is to be noted that development policy via state or quasi-state institutions remains primarily modernization policy, although the modernization concept, through the discussion within developing-country research, has been considered superseded for some time now. But – and this is a general problem for the social sciences' theoretical work – up to now no other paradigm, including even the dependency theory, has been able to take over the function of providing operational instruction for politics. While the Industrial Revolution represented a process stretching over a long period, currently the modern technologies, and therefore also the modern mass media, have been more or less abruptly grafted – without advance preparation – on non-industrialized societies, with the emergence of extraordinarily serious problems of adjustment. A policy of Westernization that is being or would be pursued by many political leaders who regard their own country's culture as hopelessly backward, and who see in adjustment to the West the only chance – such a policy often brings about ambivalent situations. On the one hand,

there is a seeking of Western-style affluence. On the other hand there is rejection of the West. Along these lines, Lerner (1958) reports finding in the Middle East an ethnocentric anticolonial nationalism, which was linked with "a deep desire to emulate the West and set up rival nations." The significance of hatred of everything Western for national liberation struggles in former colonies is beyond any doubting. Incontestably, it is also true that the Western industrialized nations seem to serve worldwide as reference societies. These societies are referred to in evaluating a country's own situation, a phenomenon that surely is a result of the global proliferation of the mass media. (Cf. Ch. 5.4)

"The Western industrialized nations seem to serve worldwide as reference societies."

It should be noted that also in cases of mass media that are under state control, fundamental conflicts between the carrying out of modernization measures and the shaping of national identities can make themselves felt. In the first phase, the function can fall to the mass media to proliferate symbols and information supportive of a sense of national identity. In a second phase, in which modernization processes are introduced, this stage can endanger integrative progress that has meanwhile been achieved, so that new potentialities of conflict come into existence (new elites, and so on). Thus in a third phase the function of national integration can again receive priority for the mass media. An element in this developing situation is definitely the manufacture of an artificial image of "the enemy." For a threat increases a readiness to be subjected to authoritarian leadership and to consign domestic conflicts to the background.

Modernization is a vague concept. It is meant to indicate a currently universally proceeding process of complex social change, which is taken to be linked with an increasing rationalization of the society and the individual. Modernization denotes a cluster of social processes such as the taking over of scientifically based technologies, the proliferation of a state-sponsored system of education, urbanization, secularization, increasing interdependence within the society, an increase in political rights, and the introduction of mass media. Within this conjunction, a problematic aspect is, in particular, that modernization processes can proceed variously in different sectors (e.g. the political, economic and informational sectors), a fact that makes operations within the research frame considerably more difficult. These difficulties Lange (1984) has in mind as he offers the adroit formulation: "Development is like a giraffe; difficult to describe, but easy to recognize." Then he spells out these aspects of the three just-named sectors:

1. Political development (multi-party democracy, tutelary demoracy, dictatorship).
2. Economic development (gross domestic product per capita).

3. Informational development (number of newspapers per 1,000 people and/or pieces of mail entering country per 1,000 people and/or number of telephones per 1,000 persons).

Social change in developing countries will be conceived of below along the lines of the thinking of Karl W. Deutsch (1961, 330), as a process of social mobilization. During its course, major clusters of old economic, social and thereby also psychic ties are destroyed, and the public is opened up for new forms of societal life.

Within the context of the stages theory of social change or historical development, in which the triad tradition – development or transition – modernity appears, generally an oversimplified picture of societies that are characterized as traditional emerges; with these societies being described as "not" or "not yet industrialized" societies (cf. Bühl 1969, 165). The concept of a traditional society has almost congealed into a dogma, "and has encouraged the view that the total past experience of mankind is irrelevant and, on all important matters, homogeneous." (Schwartz 1972, 72.) Non-industrialized societies are, however, in no sense static, homogeneous within themselves, and internally consistent in the cultural sphere. The stages theory creates the impression, furthermore, that what is going on is an irreversible, linear process of system differentiation, which is proceeding without "breakdowns of modernization" (Eisenstadt 1964a). Negative developments are not considered within the context of these theories. Bühl (1969, 164) writes: "Regardless of which initial forms, which development mechanism and course curves are used as a basis in the end there is sure to be the perfectly integrated and transparent, the rational-homogeneous society". Eisenstadt (1976) observes that the disruption of traditional settings often led to disorganization, delinquency and chaos, rather than to a viable modern order.

Whereas tradition is usually unjustly represented in the literature as being the equivalent of static, development and modernity are dynamic terms. They imply the theory that modernity is characterized by immanent and continuingly proceeding social change. An ethnocentric component of the opposites tradition and modern society is pointed out by Reinhard Bendix (1967, 327). He argues that this dichotomy simply is the result of an undue generalization from a short phase of European history. The Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution, both of which can be regarded as culmination points of specific European developments, have brought about, Bendix continues, the impression of the existence of two basically contrary societies with, in each case, different equilibriums. The uncritical application of the concept traditional culture is also faulted in particular by the

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anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1945, 2): "The figment of the 'uncontaminated' native has to be dropped from research in field and study.

The cogent reason for this is that the uncontaminated native does not exist anywhere. The man of science has to study what is, and not what might have been." But as late as in 1978, Hermassi still feels called on to offer the following expression in regard to the stereotyped notion of "traditional societies" within the social sciences: ". . . the invocation of primitive and tribal imagery when dealing with societies often possessed with historical depth and world connections, and endowed with many evolutionary universals such as stratification, money and markets, and centralized bureaucracy, is a form of ethnocentric indulgence particularly abhorrent to Third World intellectuals."

The terms tradition and modernity are in no way "value-free", i.e. neutral. Instead, they are, precisely because of their imprecision, suited to assume more emotive character. For Shils (1972, 31 f.), who posits the existence of a "tradition of antitraditionalism," tradition has become a "term of polemic": "Since the French Revolution the acceptance of the legitimacy of revolution and the iniquity of tradition has become one of the strongest traditions of intellectuals." Moreover, historical dichotomies are often used so as, with the help of supposed scientific terms, either to glorify the Western industrialized society, or, via the synthesizing of a theoretical pre-literate paradise, to condemn it. Kurt H. Wolff (1968, 156) states: "The existential element of these dichotomies consists of a mixture of faith in liberalism, growing rationalization and reasonableness, and increasing progress on one side, and, on the other side, doubt about whether this is really so."

The inadequacy of the stages theories in explaining modernization processes is also indicated by the fact that however the transition phase is defined, for each country it represents a unique new situation. In the course of a modernization the communications structures between and within countries are improved, too. This means the proliferation of new techniques and ideas of political, cultural or religious nature, and thereby the constant creation of new transitional situations. Thus, for example, the proliferation of television has resulted in many people's being confronted for the first time with information on the possibilities of a better way of living in industrialized societies (cf. Ch. 5.4). The introduction of a specific new technology may

"Television has confronted many people for the first time with the possibilities of a better way of living in industrialized societies."

bring about, in each case according to the social and cultural circumstances, differing processes of social change from country to country. Even industrialization is no process proceeding one-dimensionally and similarly in all countries. Thus Brandt (1972) emphasizes the singularity of historical

development processes. He calls attention to the many possible paths to industrialization. The acceptance of the single goal "industrialization," Brandt reasons, has an ironic consequence: "The individual paths are only discussed and evaluated from the perspective of the goal common to them all. *Ipso facto,* the over-all conditions, which elude the evaluating process, can also only be discussed in regard to whether and to what degree they warrant the resolution of the economic development process."

The stages theories of social change are based on the evolutionary-theoretical conception that societies become constantly more complex through progressive differentiation. Development signifies that social structures undergo a process of simultaneously occurring increasing differentiation and increasing integration. In the terminology of Herbert Spencer, what takes place is a transformation of the non-interrelated homogeneous to the interdependent heterogeneous. The application of evolutionary-theoretical thought to a relatively short period of time – perhaps a few centuries – is accordingly a definitely dubious practice. Even Herbert Spencer, who often is regarded as representative of an extremely optimistic theory of evolution, considers the assumption of simple linear development trends to be inappropriate (cf. Kunczik 1983). Here Sahlins' distinction between specific evolution – the continuous adjustment of societies to their environment – and general evolution seems appropriate. The latter, general evolution, represents the all-encompassing, discontinuous development of social structures or forms of human organizations, as shown in the attainment of increased adaptability and higher forms of integration. Of the stages theory, Steward (1953, 324) writes: "Twentieth-century research has accumulated a mass of evidence which overwhelmingly supports the contention that particular cultures diverge significantly from one another and do not pass through unilinear stages. Since this basic fact of cultural history is no longer a matter of major controversy, those who have sought to keep the tradition of nineteenth-century evolution alive have been forced to shift their frame of reference from the particular to the general. . . . Their reconstruction of world culture history, therefore, is made in such general terms as to be quite acceptable to everyone. No one doubts that hunting and gathering preceded farming and herding and that the last two were preconditions of 'civilization,' which is broadly characterized by dense and stable populations, metallurgy, intellectual achievements, social heterogeneity and internal specialization and other features."

Despite all criticism of the stages theories, to the effect that they do not question the imputed goal, the proliferation of industrialization, it can be noted in defense of the stages concept that it calls attention to the decisive phase in the process of social change. Eisenstadt (1964, 386) writes: "The concepts of differentiation and of 'stages' are important guides for identifying the crucial breakthroughs at which different spheres of social and cultural activity are freed from various ascriptive frameworks, and the potential for crystallization of more differentiated social and symbolic systems is enhanced." The individual stages should not, however, be the end-point but,

rather, the starting point of further analysis, "because what is true of *all* traditional societies is by the same token not very illuminating about any one of them." (Bendix, 1967, 322.)

The modernization process can be understood as a sequence of systemic crises that have to be mastered (e.g. Coleman 1968, 400). These challenging occasions can be, for example, the shaping of a national identity; the legitimization of a new political system; the attainment of a "strong" state whose decisions can be carried out by central institutions; the participation of broad walks of the population in the political process; or the effective use of the state to satisfy "mass demands." Is modernization actually equivalent to an increasing Westernization of traditional societies? If so, then this means, among other things, that in developing countries broad sectors of the population experience an "alienation," which so to speak has to be taken as part of the bargain; a kind of loss through attrition as the price for the progress.

Modernization processes often began with "Western domination" which went hand-in-hand with "national humiliation" and the erosion of traditional cultures. The results were considered to be feelings of cultural inferiority linked with self-doubt, and self-hate as well. Tehranian (1982) cites Iran, in which a Westernization has brought about an uprooting of the social, economic, political, legal and educational institutions. Modernization in the sense of a "Westernization" and/or an industrialization means, too, that life patterns cease to be transparent (cf. Ch. 3.4 on functional rationality). Proceeding from the situational diagnosis that the individual in modern societies would become not only constantly more independent, more critical and self-reliant, but at the same time also lonely, isolated and afraid, Erich Fromm (1941) proclaims the "Escape From Freedom." Insecurity increases readiness to subordinate oneself. Security is sought even when the price in the surrender of freedom. That is why individuals, so Fromm argues, react positively to authoritarian or totalitarian appeals, which seem to offer authority, a sense of group belongingness and certainty. Going by this argumentation of Fromm, societies that are modernizing themselves cannot be democracies.

Although in essence every author portrays a different picture of the traditional society, nevertheless the literature provides us with the following portrait: Traditional societies are characterized as agricultural societies dominated in an authoritarian manner by land-owning elites, legitimized on a religious basis. There is little division of labor (mechanical solidarity). From birth onward, there is an ascripted, that is, an assigned, social status. There is only slight urbanization, a high rate of illiteracy, and, above all, little inclination toward change. By contrast, modern societies are characterized in the literature of sociology as – through the competitive struggle of rival elites for power – democratically ruled industrial societies. In them, a large part of the populace participates in the political process (mass democracy). Modern

societies are also characterized by a high division of labor (organic solidarity). Social status is acquired prevailingly by achievement. Urbanization is far-advanced. There is a high consumption of mass media, which also contribute to the proliferation of a secular-rational culture; as well as to an imminent tendency toward social change, which stems particularly from self-sustaining growth in the economic sector.

While at the level of the over-all society modernity, in the terminology of Parsons, signifies that achievement or status-earning predominates over ascription or role-assignment, it is otherwise with individuals. The terminology at the level of individual members of a society indicates a more or less consistent cluster of psychic characteristics, mostly gained through introspection. There is particular emphasis on mental flexibility in mastering new situations. Within this conjunction, Portes (1973, 36) writes of a "profoundly ethnocentric undercurrent in the characterization of modern man in underdeveloped countries" that doubtless has led to the markedly positive describing of this personality type – for there certainly exists a pronounced similarity "with the self-images and values of researchers."

As to the use of the term "developing country" in the literature, it is to be noted that a consensus can hardly be brought about. From study to study, according to which theory the respective author adheres to, a new term is used, representing a synthesis of different elements that are regarded as typical for developing countries. There is agreement only to the extent that every effort to explain the effects of mass media in the countries of the Third World must proceed from the assumption that these countries are primarily agricultural in structure – that they have populations which consist mainly of farmers. This rural populace can in no sense, as occasionally happens, be considered a structural equivalent of, for example, the "urban poor" in big cities in the United States. This rural population does not belong to an ethnic minority; it makes up the large majority of the populace. Smelser (1966,

Why the Third World's rural populaces cannot be compared to the "urban poor" in the United States.

111 f.) describes a developing country via an analogy: "A developing nation, if it could be depicted graphically, would resemble a large awkward animal lumbering forward by moving each of its parts, sometimes in partial coordination and sometimes in opposition to each other."

Characteristic of developing countries is their dual economy. On the one hand, you find a large, pre-modern work-intensive sphere in which food and other existence commodities are produced (agriculture, handicraft, small industry, trade, personal services). On the other hand, there is a progressive, capitalistic sphere: Within it, operations are capital-intensive (mostly in the industrial operations of medium-sized and large firms that are localized in the urban sector, but also within an extensive plantation economy). Thus

developing countries can be divided into a Western-oriented, urban sector and a large traditionally oriented agricultural sector. The latter, the peasant economy, is ruled largely by pre-capitalist social relationships. (The term "dual economy" comes from the Dutch economist J. H. Boeke, who argued in 1910 that for the then Dutch East India Colony, now Indonesia, the tenets of classical economic theory would not be applicable. For tropical colonies, he continued, development of a separate economic theory is called for [cf. Wertheim 1968].) Hoselitz (1960, 225 f.) remarks that the Western-educated modernizing elites of a developing country often are far removed in their thinking and action from the less secularized and frequently still profoundly tradition-oriented rural masses. This cultural difference causes the greatest divergence between city and country in Asia and Africa. In "The Wretched of the Earth," Franz Fanon considers the problem of the cultural bifurcation, according to which indigeneous capitalists are as far removed from the pre-capitalist peasant society as foreign ones. He argues: "The country people are suspicious of the townsman. The latter dresses like an European; he speaks the European's language, works with him, sometimes even lives within the same district; so he is considered by the peasants as a turncoat who has betrayed everything that goes to make up the national heritage." Julius K. Nyerere finally conceded in "Freedom and Socialism" (Oxford 1968) that "the emphasis on money and industries has made us concentrate on urban development." Nyerere warns: "If we are not careful we might get to the position where the real exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasant."

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The situation in the developing countries' agrarian sectors is by no means far-distanced from European experience. Karl Marx describes in "The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" the way of life of the rural masses in France of the 19th century; it is a relevant reflection of today's situation in developing countries. Marx begins with a description of the housing conditions: Sixteen million peasants (counting also the women and children) had their shelter in caves, of which a large part had one opening, others only two, while the most fortunately endowed cave shelters had three openings. Marx's description of an agrarian structure without benefit of division of labor can also be applied, without qualifications, to developing countries (1965, 117): "Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. The small holding, the

peasant and his family; alongside them another small holding, another peasant and another family." Within this conjunction, Marx comments on the significance of the bad communications structures: "The small peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions, but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another, instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. . . Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organization, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power, that protects them against the other classes and sends them the rain and the sunshine from above. The political influence of the small peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself."

An example of life in traditional agricultural societies is also provided by Thomas and Znaniecki (1918, 1924), who describe the living conditions of Polish farmers in the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century: "The peasant was adapted to the life of a permanent agricultural community settled for many hundreds of years in the same locality and changing so slowly that each generation adapted itself to the changes with very little effort or abstract reflection. . . The peasant was not accumstomed to expect unfamiliar happenings in the course of his life within his community, and if they came relied upon his group, which not only gave him assistance . . . but helped him regain his mental balance. . . The peasant drew all his social stimulations, checks and suggestions from direct social contact with his milieu. . . He was until quite recently a member of a politically and culturally passive class. . ."

The peasant as "a member of a politically and culturally passive class."

Individuals in such societies can go through life by orienting themselves toward their predecessors. Structural change brought about by modernization can, however, make the applicability of all role models seem no longer purposeful. Thus Olga Lang (1946) shows in a study carried out in 1935–1937 how the attitude toward the family changed in China under the influence of industrial work. There was a decrease in the authority traditionally conceded to the father, and in the honor shown to the male parent. Women who had factory jobs became more self-assured.

Rogers (1969, 19 ff.) identifies ten central elements of a subculture of peasantry:

1. Mutual distrust in interpersonal relations. 2. Perceived limited good – there is only so much to go around and the total supply cannot be increased. 3. Dependence on and hostility toward government authority. 4. Familism. 5. Lack of innovativeness. 6. Fatalism. 7. Limited aspiration. 8. Lack of deferred gratification. 9. Limited view of the world – little knowledge of the world beyond the confines of their village or neighborhood. 10. Low empathy – inability to imagine themselves in some other role. If we proceed from the existence of such a subculture of peasantry, then one of the main tasks of modernization policy is to alter the attitudes of the farmers in regard to work, to saving, to the taking over of innovations, and so on. Goldstone (1982, 202) argues: "If states that harbor largely traditional peasantries and traditional agriculture try to bypass the reform of agriculture, and enter international markets through emphasizing trade and state-led industrialization, the resulting clash of a modernizing state with traditional landlords and peasants may lead to just the kind of state/elite conflict and peasant grievances conducive to revolutions."

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The global economic interrelationships have generally led in the developing countries to the construction of fully other agrarian structures than those that prevailed in Europe. Thus in the Third World a decrease in domestic control over food production for mass consumption is to be observed, while at the same time export-oriented agricultural production (such as cattle, fruits, vegetables) is increasing. In addition, multinational enterprises have achieved a constantly greater control of production and distribution.

In general, the literature of the social sciences, with the vague term "tradition" and "modernity," delineates no internally consistent and mutually exclusive entities. "Old" traditions are by no means automatically replaced by modern values. Traditional values, moreover, do not need automatically to stand in opposition to modern values (cf. e.g. Gusfield 1967). Such a historicist position corresponds to the thesis that the developing countries' distinguishing variables which differentiate one country from another can be more significant (the evaluation of the significance depends on how the questions are asked) than are the structural characteristics exhibited in common. This can even be so when it is peasant societies that are involved. With Schwarz (1972, 72) we can point here to the "endemic nature of widespread peasant rebellions in China and their lack in India." The differences in the socio-political superstructure are apparently greater than the common facets of the agrarian substructure. Then too, individual developing countries and/or whole regions may have completely diverging

traditions. Thus while Latin America, from the perspective of its intellectual tradition, can be considered close to Europe, this is not the case with, for example, Southeast Asia, China or Africa. In particular Africa in recent centuries has been a victim of continuing plundering by Arabs and Europeans, a fact that has made the establishment of an African intellectual tradition enormously difficult. Edward A. Shils (1972, 33) writes: "The black African societies . . . differ from Latin American and Asian countries in their lack of a written indigenous intellectual tradition and in their smallness of scale and poverty, which in the past inhibited the formation of a substantial and differentiated intellectual stratum." All these differences notwithstanding, however, all developing countries have this in common: They have become intellectual provinces of the "Western intellectual metropolis."

In principle, no developing country can look on any other as its unlimitedly valid model, from which it can uncritically take over developmental strategies for mastering its own difficulties. Coleman (1968, 399) remarks on this aspect: "There presumably is no single universal process, no uniform sequential pattern or common structural arrangement." Such a historicist perspective attributes to singular historical situations a greater significance than it does to

"Modernization cannot be completed by countries of the Third World according to the Western model."

these or those evolutionary universals. Thus modernization cannot be completed by countries of the Third World according to the Western model. That is because in the developing world the starting positions of development processes are completely different from what they were in the West. So the application of previous politico-economic experiences is not, or is only to a very limited degree, possible.

One of the reasons given for this situation is that meanwhile multinationally operating firms have come on the scene. Another reason adduced is that the free-enterprise economic system is increasing existent international inequalities. Then, too, the industrialization of Europe and North America, in comparison with the current modernization efforts of the developing countries, was a largely endogenous, non-directed process (for another view: Bendix 1967, 223). By contrast, development in countries of the Third World includes an expressly teleological component: that is, relatively clearly outlined goals (for example, industrializing an economic sector, carrying out an irrigation project, and so on) are being pursued.

Below we shall be proceeding from the deliberately simplified assumption that elites in the developing countries are striving, generally, regardless of under which political signs they are making the effort (but cf. the discussion of the Iron Law of Oligarchy, Ch. 2.1), to attain national autonomy and a rise in

the level of material well-being, and/or to overcome their country's backwardness in relation to the industrialized countries.

Here we shall not go further into discussion of a strategy of total withdrawal from the world market to the potentialities of local resources and local creativity – as it is suggested by, for instance, Ivan Illich (1969) – because of its utopian character. The goal "attainment of the material level of industrialized countries" also is not a static goal. The extent of the currently proceeding social changes in industrialized countries surpasses, according to Wilbert E. Moore (1963), not least in regard to the speed of the process of change, everything up to now in the history of humanity. Nor is the possibility excluded that this process will accelerate still faster. The present is characterized by rapid social change also or especially in the industrialized countries. Many individuals in those countries are having major difficulties in overcoming the "future shock" (Tofler 1970; also cf. Mortimer and Simmons 1978, 727). But if the gap between the rich and the poor actually keeps widening, then a goal is being pursued that is becoming ever more distant and constantly more unattainable.

The striving toward the goal of catching up with the industrialized countries means, in the terminology of William F. Ogburn (1964, 26), the creation of a cultural lag: "A cultural lag occurs when one of two parts of culture which are correlated changes before, or in greater degree, than the other part does, thereby causing less adjustment between the two parts than existed previously." Here Ogburn proceeds from the assumption that different

"The goal of hurrying to catch up with the industrialized countries" and its price.

cultural subsystems, such as material culture, technology, economics, the law, social structure and religion, would always have each its own specific and different rate of acceleration within change. Technology and science are seen as the great prime movers of social change. Generally a cultural lag reflects a lack of social innovations to compensate tensions brought on by technological innovations. Every adjustment to innovations that takes place in the non-material sphere indicates such a cultural lag. Examples could be adjustment of the law to deal with on-the-job accidents caused by new machines; alteration of the position of women through woman's occupational activity; changing the norms that define familiar obligations. Ogburn observes an increase in the number of discoveries and investions, a trend that occurs in the shape of an exponential curve. He argues that this is causing lags: "Lags accumulate because of the great rapidity and volume of technological change." This situation leads in turn to an accumulation of emerging social problems. Developing countries that in some cases for centuries have proven their ability

to cope with internal tensions are now being confronted with lags that in so pronounced a form these countries have never had to face before.

Contact with modern technology also often develops a kind of "passion for technology," a phenomenon that can definitely be made political use of. Certain technologies at certain times enjoy such prestige that they actually possess more symbolic than immediately ascertainable economic value. Sufficient as an example here is the race to the moon. Somewhat comparable is perhaps an "airline effect": Nearly every country that is becoming independent "has" to possess its own airline – if possible, with jet planes – even if it would make more sense to use the outlay of capital, instead, for something like improving the infrastructure. To what extent such a "passion for technology" has played a role in the worldwide introduction of television cannot be documented statistically, and can only be supposed.

Precisely in conjunction with the taking over of modern technologies, occasionally the thesis of the "advantages of backwardness" emerges. This approach asserts that it is possible by introducing the most capital-intensive technologies to close the gap between industrialized and developing countries at maximum speed (cf. e.g. Bendix 1967, 331 ff.). The argument continues that developing countries would have the possibility of pursuing purposeful development policy, and of mobilizing the masses in support of this policy – this without needing to accept the many losses through one kind or another of attrition, disadvantages that the already industrialized countries have had to endure. A "demonstration effect" makes possible all the speedier a development the more backward a society is or the later its modernization process begins (cf. e.g. Feldman and Moore 1969). Let it be noted that this thesis of the advantages of backwardness was already espoused by Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716). Russia under Peter the Great was regarded as a sort of *tabula rasa:* It would have the chance to avoid many mistakes made in Europe and China, while taking over the best from each country or region (cf. Groh 1961, 36 f.).

Modernization includes, in the approach of many authors, along with technological progress democratization, as well, in the sense of a toppling of old social structures based on inherited positions and thus opening the way to political participation by the lower social classes. Development signifies more – with this the North-South Commission agrees – than the transition from poverty to riches. Development means not only the raising of the material standard of living; it also includes the concepts of more humane values, security, justice and equality. Especially the elimination of the more pronounced internal domestic inequalities is often regarded in the literature of sociology as constitutive for succesful development. Thus Coleman (1968, 397) argues: "Equality is the ethos of modernization; the quest for it and its realization are at the core of the politics of modernization." For Gunnar Myrdal (1970, 53), more equality, along with controlling the population explosion and reforms in the agricultural sector, is the determinant

prerequisite for a developing country's being able to emerge from its poverty. Unequal distribution of income means the concentration of the resources available for consumption or investment in the hands of a relatively small elite that generally has a preference for imported luxury goods. This "squandered" capital is no longer available for investment. A more equal distribution of income would mean not only a raising of the living standard of the masses of the poor, but at the same time would also bring an increase in demand for commodities produced in the country itself. In this way the chances for the beginning of a process of "self-sustained economic growth" would be improved. But modernization by no means signifies automatic elimination of poverty, as is shown by the existence of "Third World segments of industrialized societies" in, for example, the United States and Western Europe (cf. e.g. Roach and Roach 1972).

The appeal to egalitarian values was beyond doubt an important landmark in the success of nationalistic liberation movements. Moreover, one of the main reasons for the attractiveness of the goal of economic growth for political leaders in developing countries is the belief that it is possible to create the prerequisite for a more just, more egalitarian society through the redistribution of surplus production (for example, via progressive taxation). At least in the constitutions of developing countries the legitimacy of social inequality is contested: None other than the Constitution of India makes a plea for a "casteless and classless society." In practice, however, the "iron law of oligarchy" has very often prevailed (cf. Ch. 2.1). Thus Chaliand (1977) argues that many of the post-colonial regimes of Africa that pretend to strive for revolutionary goals are actually dominated by a conservative administrative bourgeoisie, each pursuing its own goals.

Between the national interests of developing countries, implying in some cases equality, and the interests of multinational enterprises, in part diametrically opposed interests can come into play. For in a country of low incomes, the goods produced by the multis can only be consumed by a small elite. Bornschier (1980, 42) writes: "This market is the more interesting for the multis the higher is the concentration of income. Thus a further concentration of income can often be more beneficial to multis than an even growth of income in the society as a whole. And in general it may be unfavorable for the multinational corporations if there is a distribution of income that transfers purchasing power from the hands of the present consumers to the hands of those who afterward still have too low an income level to buy the multis' products."

During the expressly normative discussion of equality and inequality, it is often overlooked that the implementation of egalitarian conceptions in countries in which there is not even enough food to rightly take care of the country's own population at best can be an equality of the poverty-stricken. The typical European/Western equality ideology has, aside from the just-mentioned negative consideration, possibly only slight magnetic attraction.

Thus the literature is fond of presenting Japan as a model example of a successful late modernization. Yet Japan is characterized by a culture in which everyone as "homo hierarchicus" has his or her fixed place in the society. But in European thought, too, philosophizing about inequality has a long tradition. Aristotle upheld the thesis that between masters and slaves there existed qualitative differences in personality. Some people, he argues, are by their nature suited to take command, but the majority are born to follow instructions. Precisely in conjunction with considerations of mass psychology, reference has been made to the differences between persons. The Italian Niceforo offhandedly considered the entire lower social level as being comprised of biologically inferior creatures. One need make only brief reference here once more to the terrible effects of racist-biological doctrine on more recent European history. (The murder of Jews was justified by the Nazis as a measure of "racial hygiene"; simultaneously Slavs were stated to be subhuman.)

But in the history of sociology, too, a discipline that likes to be considered as a revolutionary science, the inequality doctrine is firmly rooted. Thus Saint-Simon, one of sociology's founding fathers, drafts a model of a society based on merit, a conception that stands in deliberate opposition to the French Revolutions's propagated ideals of liberty and equality. Moreover, the

"In the history of sociology, a discipline that likes to be thought of as revolutionary, the inequality doctrine is firmly rooted."

intellectual elite of the Western societies came for the most part from the privileged social groups. This circumstance is reflected in the interpretation of Cooper and McGaugh (1963, 212) for one thing, by a pronounced interest in proving that between leaders and followers there are qualitative differences in personality structure. Not until 1947 was this variant of the thesis of the existence of a "homo hierarchicus" empirically refuted (cf. Stogdill 1947).

Even in societies in which "nominal equality" is the norm, unequal distribution of income is regarded as absolutely fair. Equality (complete leveling of wealth, prestige and ranks) and equity (distribution of rewards on the basis of the individual's contribution to society) need to be differentiated in discussion. McCord and McCord (1977, XXIV f.) distinguish three categories of philosophers of social stratification: First, conservatives, who regard inequality as the natural condition of mankind. The McCords categorize libertarianism, that is, the political belief that everyone should have the greatest liberty possible, as a conservative variant. Second, liberals, who also regard inequality as given by nature but focus on equity, i.e. on just

rewards. The aim is the restructuring of society so that the distribution of power and wealth corresponds with the talents and actual contributions of its members. Emphasis is on in particular the "equality of opportunity." Third, egalitarians, who strive for the complete leveling of social order.

Boulding (1962) postulates two principles, on which the popular distributive justice evaluations are based:

- The principle of disalienation states that no person or unit in a society shall be left without claim on resources; i.e. nobody should be alienated from society.

- The principle of desert states "that people should get what they deserve. In other words, inequality is regarded, within a certain range, as entirely justified." Homans (1966, 224) comments: "Justice is a curious mixture of equality within inequality."

The existing conflict between the two principles, "disalienation" and "desert," is usually resolved through the construction of the concept of a social minimum, that is, a level of resources below which no one may sink. Kenneth Boulding (1962, 83) writes: "Society lays a modest table at which all can sup and a high table at which the deserving can feast."

As studies particularly in the United States have shown (cf. e.g. Alves and Rossi 1978; Jasso and Rossi 1977; summary Kluegel and Smith 1981), many people are of the view, in the sense of a functionalistic stratification theory, that unequal income motivates people to accept career positions that benefit everyone; that is, the fulfillment of tasks important for the society is assured by unequal income.

Still to be illuminated empirically would be the question whether such functionalistic beliefs about stratification, which after all have been ascertained intra-societally, do not also prevail when applied to whole populaces. In particular, poverty is not – at least not in Western societies – attributed to societal-structural factors (structural violence), but is gladly laid to individual failure. (Cf. Kluegel and Smith 1981, 41.) Applied to the global system, this means that the lagging of developing countries would have to be attributed to their own failings. Then the world's status quo could be justified as "just."

The fact, however, that people accept the same general rule of distributive justice by no means signifies agreement as to how a final fair distribution is to look. "Even if people concede," George C. Homans (1966) argues in "Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms," "that reward should be proportional to investment and contribution, they may still differ in their views of what legitimately constitutes investment, contribution, and reward, and how persons and groups are to be ranked on these dimensions." Homans (1966,

246) summarizes his social-exchange theory this way: "We believe that men are alike in holding the notion of proportionality between investment and profit that lies at the heart of distributive justice. The trouble is that they differ in their ideas of what legitimately constitutes investment, reward, and cost, and how these things are to be ranked. They differ from society to society, from group to group, and from time to time in any society or group."

Beyond doubt the following is a determinant question for humanity: Is the thesis that any system of social inequality (or social stratification) tends to be self-perpetuating between generations – the thesis is offered by Moore (1963,

"Are there hereditarily poor countries that in the foreseeable future have no chance to break out of the vicious circle of poverty?"

13) with reference to the family – also valid on the level of the global system? That is, are there hereditarily poor countries that in the foreseable future have no chance to break out of the vicious circle of poverty?

"Underdeveloped" as used below will mean that a society is inferior to the Western industrialized countries in regard to economic capabilities and technological equipment, but is not inferior in regard to other cultural values. In that sense, oversimplified statements about the quality of life in different societies will be avoided. For "quality of life" usually is taken to mean "a sense of achievement in one's work, an appreciation of beauty in nature and the arts, a feeling of identification with one's community, a sense of fulfillment of one's potential." (Campbell i.a. 1976, 1) But in regard to economic capability, too, the term "underdeveloped" calls for only cautious use. Without here getting into detailed statistical problems, it must be stated that research instruments and models that are usable in industrial countries to explain social and/or economic processes are not necessarily transferable to developing countries. A catalogue of criteria that includes values such as increase in productivity, rise in living standard, social and economic equality, democracy, national consolidation and social discipline (cf. Myrdal 1970, 26), a set of goals developed for modern societies, is hardly applicable to societies that have just liberated themselves from colonial domination. In those countries, stable political relationships cannot be, to understate the case, built overnight. Economic development can hardly be attained with the help of the gross national product (GNP) when what matters is to obtain control of the formerly colonial economic system, and to reorganize it so as to satisfy the needs of a country's own population. This kind of progress in the economic sector will not become evident if a "dollars-and-cents yardstick" (Rogers 1976, 124) is used as the standard of measurement.

In cross-cultural studies in which, for instance, developing countries are compared with industrialized countries, a specific form of ethnocentric thinking is often encountered. Values and life-style of Western societies (especially of their middle classes) are used as points of reference to appraise the values and life-style in developing countries. If a study presupposes that development is equivalent to Westernization, then the researcher as a rule measures to what extent a certain society has approached the Western model. Among the frequently used indices are measures of literacy, educational opportunities, urbanization, wealth, availability of media, and so an.

Despite all criticism, the "gross national product per capita" is the most frequently used indicator. This is because with it differentiations as to the average productivity of the working force are most easily arrived at. The dividing line between development and underdevelopment is more or less arbitrarily drawn with the help of economic indices. (On the index problem, cf. Frey 1973; Heintz 1969; Hoselitz 1977.) Thus the United Nations Organization classifies a country as underdeveloped if it has per-capita income of less than 300 U.S. dollars a year. However, in calculating average income, goods and services that are not exchanged for money are not taken into account. In pronouncedly subsistence economies, in which a large part of the goods and services are provided and made use of within households or family circles, the amount of the social product and with it the economic potential are continually underestimated. The gross national product per capita, that is, the estimated GNP divided by the estimated total population, generally provides no conclusion as to which goods are produced privately and which by the public hand; nor does this formula tell us which goods go for consumption and which for the investment sector. Particularly problematic are international comparisons of the per-capita GNP in U.S. dollars, since the exchange rate used in the converting of dollars does not reflect the actual purchasing power. As reckonings by the World Bank show, the differences between the incomes in developing and in industrialized countries clearly lessen when calculations based on buying power are made. Since economic indicators are not under all circumstances revealing, in many cases other indicators are resorted to as well. Examples are found in public health (child mortality), education (literacy rate), industrialization (proportion of the population not employed in the agricultural sector) and in the communications sector (circulation of newspapers per 1,000 of the populace, number of telephones per 1,000 persons, radio receivers per 1,000). (Cf. Hoselitz 1977, 269.)

In principle the summative estimation of whole countries with the help of average values raises problems. For the range of internal variations can be very wide, and not infrequently is larger than the range of variations among different countries. Then too, in developing countries the differences between members of the elite and the lower classes, or between the urban and the rural population, are considerably more pronounced than in industrialized societies. Attempts to explain the effects of media in developing countries must, however, always proceed from the assumption that these countries are

primarily agricultural; that is, are characterized by a massive farming and/or rural population. Regarding the communications behavior of the rural populace in underdeveloped countries, there are only very few empirical studies. Frey (1973, 364) conjectures that "the rural areas of most developing societies may contain significant 'pockets of unreachables,' and the cultural bifurcation of the society may be exacerbated as the rest of the nation increases its communications contacts and bypasses these isolates."

Here it is clearly shown that in many cases it isn't appropriate to use statistical average values in seeking to illuminate the "situation" of a country. Thus Frey (1973, 361) offers the example of Turkey in the 1962/63 period to illustrate how average values conceal regional variations. For instance, in the Aegean region 84% of the residents were living in villages in communities with five and more radio sets, while this was the case in only 10% of the villages in the Southeast. But other countries, too, such as Brazil, for instance, are characterized by the side-by-side existence of modern industrial centers and rural sectors in which familial subsistence production prevails. In that connection, the Latin American "theory of marginality," too, regards Latin America as consisting of two segments: A Western-oriented elite is fully integrated within the system of the modern global economy and civilization; while the backward masses represent typical pre-Columbian situations and values (on this cf. Portes and Carnak 1981, 236 f.).

2.4 Stage Theories of Social Change in New Dress: Technological Determinism

The major breakthroughs in the history of the communication facilities that humanity disposes over, the so-called communications revolutions, are used by some authors as the point of departure for a variant of the stages theory of social development. Aside from the "invention" of language, as to the genesis of which there is still the most extensive uncertainty, a landmark that usually is regarded as the period of becoming human within the context of mankind's evolution, the following three events stand out:

- The development of writing. Relevant here is the fact that even today the majority of the people of the world cannot read and write.
- The invention of the printing press with movable metal type.
- The invention of the various electronic communications technologies.

In "Empire and Communication" (1950) and in "The Bias of Communication" (1951) the Canadian Harold A. Innis developed his media-technological deterministic theory, which later was taken over by Marshall McLuhan as the point of departure for some ponderings about the media on his own. According to Innis the most important dimensions of an empire ("empire" is a quite vague term that means simply "the institutionalization of a system of power") are space and time, whereby specific communications media are more suitable to one than the other. Depending on the given media, empires can either exist for a longer period or can encompass considerable space. Innis (1950, 7) argues that the concepts of time and space reflect the significance of media to civilization. Media that emphasize time are those which are of durable character, such as parchment, clay and stone. Media which emphasize space are apt to be less durable and of light character, such as papyrus and paper. The latter are suited to wide areas in administration and trade. Materials which emphasize time favor decentralization and hierarchical types of institutions, while those which emphasize space favor centralization and systems of government less hierarchical in character. Large-scale political organizations such as empires must, according to Innis, be considered from the standpoint of two dimensions, those of space and time, and persist by overcoming the bias of media which over-emphasize either dimension. Time-biased communication media are associated with traditional societies that emphasize custom, continuity, community, the historical, the sacred and the moral. Time-biased communication systems are found in societies with rich oral traditions or with sophisticated writing technologies where access is limited to a few. These traditional societies are according to Melody and others (1981, 6) characterized by stable, hierarchical social orders that tend to stifle individualism as a dynamic for change, but permit individualism in the rich expressiveness of language and the range of human emotion. Space-biased communication media have, on the contrary, an orientation toward the present and the future, the expansion of empires, the creation of secular institutions and the growth of science and technical knowledge. Empires have tended to flourish under conditions in which the bias of one medium toward decentralization is offset by the bias of another medium toward centralization. A missing equilibrium between those opposing forces is considered to be the principal dynamic of the rise and fall of empires.

Melody and others (1981, 61) argue that the rapid development of communication technologies such as satellites, computers and sophisticated communication terminals makes possible instantaneous communications throughout the world, and the extension of empires into space itself. Modern technology, since the modern media of print, telephone, radio and television are all space-biased, has introduced a powerful spatial bias into modern communication. Melody and others ask the following questions: "Does the space bias of modern communication technology point to the expansion of empires and the creation of instability in the future? If so, what can or should be done to restore the balance of time and space bias needed for stability?"

The arrival of writing beyond any doubt represents a determinant event in the development of human societies. Parsons (1966, 46 ff.) sees the existence of writing as the determining criterion for the transition from primitive to intermediate societies: The written language, he argues, is the core of the portentous development from the primitive, increases the fundamental differentiation between the social and cultural system, and considerably broadens the sphere and the power of the latter. Oral societies differentiate themselves clearly from those with writing, especially in regard to the mode of the transmission of the culture, as well as the understanding of history. Moreover, the written language, especially in the form of the documents it makes possible, serves the stabilization of a variety of social relationships (for example, contracts). Parsons continues: Through writing it is possible to endow the most important symbolic contents of a culture with forms that are independent of the specific contents of the interaction. Childe (1951, 35), like Morgan (cf. Morgan, Lewis H., "Ancient Society"; London 1877. Friedrich Engels [1964, 33] also regards writing as a criterion of the society's having arrived at the highest stage of barbarism, a development that begins with the smelting of iron ore, and evolves into civilization, via the invention of the alphabetic mode of writing and its use in the keeping of written records), considers writing the milestone for the arrival at the ultimate "ethnological period." He argues that writing is a suitable and easily recognizable index for a fully revolutionary alteration in the over-all interrelationships of the range, the economy and the social organization of a community. The invention of writing coincides for this author, arguing from the evolutionary theroretical perspective, with the accumulation of a societal surplus, and with a critical point in the progressive increase in the membership of a group unit.

In societies without writing, there is no separation of myth from history; the past is absorbed by the present. According to Goody (1968a) "history" in the strict sense begins only with the use of writing; for before that point – that is, in oral societies – the past has always been a projection backward of the

"Before writing,
the past was always a projection
backward of the present."

present. In this sense, Thucydides is the first historian who attempted a correct reportage. (The writing of history, too, often creates the impression, however, of a backward-oriented prophecy; it is sufficient to mention the rewriting of German history along the lines of a supposed historically based world mission by the National Socialists, and also the various rewritings of the history of the Soviet Union.)

In societies without writing, ideas and values involving the past cast their reflection on the problems of today. Halbwachs (1966; 1967) comments: The

society tends to strike everything out of its memory that could separate the individuals and damage the cohesion of groups. That is why in every epoch society shapes its memories in a way that will bring them into accord with the changed conditions of that society's equilibrium. A tendency to homeostasis, a relatively stable state of equilibrium, is attributed to societies without writing (Goody and Watt 1963); the aspects of the past that are no longer functional would no longer be considered, and fall into forgetfulness, or are modified. With such a mode or argumentation, however, one runs the risk that everything which has been forgotten is to be characterized as non-functional. In this situation, the mere fact of having been forgotten suffices to evidence in a circular conclusion, the dysfunctionality. This homeostatic aspect of oral societies Barnes (1947) calls "structural amnesia." In this sense Malinowski (1926) sees myths in oral societies as "maps" for currently existent social institutions and/or current social relationships, but not as "true" historical reports. Malinowski (1954, 84) argues: "The myth is not a dead product of past ages, merely surviving as an idle narrative. It is a living force, constantly producing new phenomena. . ." It is not the entire cultural heritage that is retained in memory. Instead, the social aspect of the remembering lies in the fact that individuals retain in their memory what is often of determinant importance (is functional) for societal living: namely, the most essential social relationships. In each generation the cultural heritage is modified in such a way that new elements are accommodated to, and old, no longer significant elements are forgotten. Myths evolve along patterns of reorganizing traditional components in consideration of new elements; or new components are adjusted to and integrated within the existing pattern of the society. Tylor (1871, 282) writes: ". . . myth may be more uniform than history."

Goody and Watt (1963) also provide a large number of empirical proofs of structural amnesia. Thus handed-down genealogical material, by assisting a society's collective memory, can have mnemonic functions for the system of social relationships. Among the Tiv (Nigeria), genealogies were under continuous discussion, in order in case of legal conflicts to dispose over an up-to-date system of mutual rights and obligations. So as to obtain an adequate frame for future administrative tasks, in 1912 the British colonial administration put the genealogies in writing. After 40 years, the lists were still being made use of – and were the cause of conflicts because the Tiv asserted that the genealogies were false. For their part, the bureaucrats had the record in black on white. Neither side in this situation was aware of the constant change of the genealogies. This modification of generation-to-generation history is evidenced in a second example, Gonja, a "state" of North Ghana, actually consists of several "chiefdoms." The first written records, from around the turn of the present century, disclose that the legendary founding father Japka appeared with seven sons (corresponding to the total of chiefdoms) on the River Niger, in a golden ship. In connection with the coming of the British, two chiefdoms vanished from the myth. One had made an alliance with the invaders; one was removed from the scene by

the British-drawn borderline. Accordingly, 60 years later the legendary Japka had only five sons.

Lévi-Strauss (1962) also confirms the non-historicity of "wild thinking." (Cf. Ch. 2.2.) What is lacking is historical facts, the diachronic perspective, the awareness of linguistic alterations over extended periods. To this extent Lévi-Strauss agrees with Lévy-Bruhl (1939, 6 f.), who calls the attitude of the primitive static: The primitive contents himself with handing on the partially exact knowledge that he possesses and uses, as it has been handed on to him. Goody (1977) argues that illiterate communications systems are closed – that is, bound to specific occasions. By contrast, cultures with writing make possible abstract, "depersonalized" thought, which occurs independently of specific occasions. There is also a clear difference between the storage

"Cultures with writing make possible abstract, 'depersonalized' thought."

capacity of illiterate and literate societies. Goody and Watt (1963, 331) argue that writing establishes a different kind of relationship between the word and its referent, a relationship that is more general and more abtract, and less closely connected with the particularities of person, place and time, than obtains in oral communication. This process favors individualization: "Writing, by objectifying words, and by making them and their meaning available for much more prolonged and intensive scrutiny than is possible orally, encourages private thought. . . " (1963, 346). At the same time writing makes a part of a culture independent of persons, that is, the access to certain "storable" parts of the culture becomes potentially independent of being interpreted by and possibly blocked off by culture-transmitting individuals. Only writing makes possible the critical, verifiable discourse that for its part, in turn, favors "critical" activity, skepticism, rationality and logical thinking (cf. Goody 1977.)

Parsons (1966, 47) distinguishes three types of writing-possessing societies: 1) Societies in which only a small circle of persons can write; 2) Societies in which the men of the upper class can write; 3) Modern societies, in which the aim is to attain universal ability to write. Thus Stinchcombe (1968, 327) sees in the capacity to write a determinant class-establishing characteristic for developing countries. With Childe (1951, 35), he looks on language as a "tool," that is, as a component of technology. According to Childe, writing led to the development of calendaring, astronomy, predicative arithmetic and geometry. Luckmann (1969, 1065) argues: "In the old high cultures systems of writing, stemming from magical as well as from "rational" economic and

political roots, are closely tied in with the development of centralized forms of rule. . . " The need to control a country in the bookkeeping sense, Childe (1951, 560) tells us, led in Egypt to the development of writing, with writing, in turn, of determinant importance for the establishment of bureaucratic rule.

In proto-literate cultures with difficult non-alphabetic writing there are extremely high barriers between those who know the written language and the rest of the populace (Goody and Watt 1963, 341). A more extensive distribution of the knowledge of writing – insofar as writing was anyhow not considered a secret branch of learning – was not possible if only because non-phonetic writings are so complex (that is, they have a large number of symbols) that only a minority of the people had the necessary resources and the time to learn the written language. Goody and Watt (1963) use the term "oligoliterate societies," in which a small, specially educated part of the populace attains a knowledge of writing and can participate in the literary culture. Between the esoteric literacy and the exoteric oral culture, however, there was a wide gap. "An ideographic system in China was able, despite the differences in spoken diction, to guarantee the cultural unity of the elite level of the literati." (Luckmann 1969, 1069.)

The invention of writing, however, not only had determinant effects on the quality of the pattern of domination, but also brought about another significant consequence: The reduction of religious texts to writing – and the concomitant rigidification of the foundations of religion – made possible the emergence of universal creeds. The existence of writing has particular effects on the form of domination when knowledge of writing is one of the essential characteristics of the elite. According to Goody and Watt (1963), pictographic systems of writing are linked with a conservative tendency: that of reifying the natural and social order. The authors refer to Egypt, which over many centuries experienced no or at most slight changes in social structure. (Ancient Egypt is characterized as a nation of fellahin ruled with a rod of iron by a Society of Antiquaries.) To be sure, there were rebellions, but no revolutions. Here too, a strongly deterministic role is attributed to the medium of writing. In illiterate societies the conservative, homeostatic, state-of-equilibrium tendency (at least partially) stems from the exclusive transmission of culture via interpersonal channels. This situation favors a consistent picture, linking past and present. To be sure, a certain skepticism can arise in the minds of the individuals to be socialized. But this skepticism to a considerable extent remains not cumulative in nature, and localized at the personal level.

By contrast, the broad proliferation of a knowledge of writing has the effect, in general, of favouring an awareness of inconsistencies and a consciousness of social change. Although basically each generation writes – that is, interprets – history anew, "history" as such in the presence of writing attains a new form of existence, one which leads to a gain in the cultural heritage. It is harder to forget the past, because writing makes possible

diachronic communication. Writing favors, so Goody (1968a), the coming into existence of a new perspective that potentially permits planning into the future. The thesis of Goody and Watt (1963, 340) that societies with writing have no possibility of incurring structural amnesia is, however, not convincing. We need only to point to censorship, book-burning and so on. It

"Societies with writing can still undergo such attacks of structural amnesia as censorship and book-burning."

remains, though, to observe that also in societies with writing, the transmission of culture takes place primarily in the form of interpersonal contacts, with a "written culture" easier to avoid than is a culture based on the spoken word. (Compare this with the sources cited by Goody and Watt [1963, 343].) A first criticism of the book-reading public is found in Aristophanes' "The Frogs." In "Phaedrus" Plato argues that through the invention of the alphabet the souls of the new learners are instilled with oblivion from letting their memories fall into disuse; for the readers, trusting in the written language, will remember only externalities, conveyed by signs, and will lose their skill at direct, inward recall. The ancient Greek writer's glum attitude illustrates how each "new medium" has been negatively received from a "culture-pessimistic" point of view.

Within the above conjunction, the work of Elizabeth Eisenstein (1979) on "The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe" takes an exceptional position. Eisenstein investigates the interplay between the invention of the printing press and the intellectual revolution of the Renaissance and the Reformation. The central theory is that the determinant consequence of the invention of the printing press is not a new form of information transfer (for example, the reaching of a new, broad puplic). It is rather, says Eisenstein, the way in which tradition is fixed and secured. Specifically, the capability of the typographical culture to fix and secure traditions freed the elite from the necessity of constantly physically reproducing the symbolic reality. (The copying of a book by hand had been the work of a lifetime.) Instead of the old procedure, it was now possible to reflect critically on central cultural values, and under some circumstances also to manipulate them. In particular in Eisenstein's analysis of the interrelationships between book-printing and the Italian Renaissance, she argues that book-printing in no sense has led to the shaping of individualism. Instead, the encounter with thinkers who had been dead a thousand years permitted a rational analyzing of thought models independently of current political connotations. In this process, book-printing by no means stimulated interest in the classics; but book-printing institutionalized the Renaissance, and made it an all-European event. At the

same time there took place a drastic transformation of intellectual life. Not only did the classics become generally accessible, but simultaneously the network of feedback became more extensive. The printed book in editions of several thousands of copies evoked reactions from readers who no longer viewed science as a mystery, but reported their own observations. Eisenstein (1979, 687) writes: "The advantages of issuing identical images bearing identical labels to scattered observers who could feed back information to publishers enabled astronomers, geographers, botanists and zoologists to expand data pools far beyound all previous limits. . . The closed sphere or single corpus, passed down from generation to generation, was replaced by an open-ended investigation process pressing against ever-advancing frontiers." Things came to a first information explosion. Basically everyone had the chance to make a contribution to the new stock of knowledge or to correct erroneous concepts. A widespread delight in the natural sciences emerged. This enthusiasm was based on the fact that through the invention of the printing press knowledge had become something one could accumulate.

The most influential author of recent times to represent a primitive medium-technological determinism is beyond doubt Marshall McLuhan. His deliberations can hardly be described as media theory. They are more of a media-theoretical happening. (Cf. Kunczik 1977.) Precisely in regard to McLuhan it becomes clear what damaging influences lay notions of social science can have on the communications science. McLuhan argues that societies are more strongly influenced by the nature of communications media than by the quality of the content.

McLuhan distinguishes among three eras delineated by the respective form of the transmission of information:

- The illiterate, tribal epoch,

- The typographical, mechanistic and individualistic Gutenberg era,

- The electronic epoch.

Through the invention of the phonetic alphabet, the human being was led from the magic world of the ear into the neutral, visual world. Structures of thought and perceptions have been reshaped. Formal logic has developed as a consequence of the tendency to linear thinking. Writing is, so McLuhan, not a repetition of oral speech, but instead writing amounts to a new language favoring analytical thinking. With the invention of the printing press the reorganization became complete, and individualism was born. With electro-technologies the human being, McLuhan continues, created a true-to-nature model of his central nervous system, which he broadened and externalized. Next came a total transformation of human perceptive faculties. After the three-thousand-year explosion of the techniques of dispersion – so McLuhan – during the era of electricity an implosion, a contraction of the world, is to

occur. Humanity is living in a global village, created by electronic interdependence. For the electrical media have brought all social establishments into an organic mutual interdependence. The tribal society is being revived. McLuhan writes: We are living in a single compressed space that is resounding with jungle drums.

The communications media determine the "world-view" in that the media influence the human being's sensory equipment. Up to now, the author continues, we have paid too much attention to the content and have overlooked the important point. McLuhan: "The medium is the message." Here his argumentation shows a certain affinity to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (cf. Ch. 2.2) of linguistic relativity; the function of language is replaced by the function of the media. The only decision in the field of the media policy that, according to McLuhan's ideas, remains to be made is that for or against the introduction of a certain medium (for instance, television). Afterward no further potitical interventions can successfully be undertaken, since the medium is completely independent of the content that it is, at any given time, disseminating. The content is, for its part, indeed, strongly dependent on the organizational form (e.g. state or private control of the medium). The pressure of the media results in a convergent development of societies that may well have entirely disparate political structures before.

Sociologically, what is interesting in McLuhan is not these speculations, but the fact that they, despite or precisely because of, their nonscientific character obtained and are obtaining so many adherents and so much attention. (For example, The Journal of Communication, 31, 1981, No. 3, is dedicated to the

"At least every representative of a line of thought – no matter how senseless – can, by referring to Marshall McLuhan, appoint himself a media expert."

theme "The Living McLuhan.") At least every representative of a line of thought – no matter how senseless – can, by referring to McLuhan, appoint himself a media expert. When McLuhan's logically loose, naive technological determinism clothed in ad hoc aphorisms is equated, in utter seriousness, with the work of Karl Marx – this is, for example, done by Alan Wells (1972, 70) – then this comparison certainly is an insult to the works of Marx.

Such erroneous notions of the effects of mass media as the omnipotence model of mass communication, or as the speculations of McLuhan, tend all

too easily to be laughed off because of their scientific naiveté and no longer taken seriously by social science. Yet such notions – especially if they are "bought" by persons responsible for media-policy decisions – can have considerable political consequences. Thus, according to the "doctrine" of McLuhan, the effect of the media is entirely independent of the content. That is, who controls the media and what content the media distribute is quite unimportant – McLuhan tells us that only the technology is determinant.

3. Individualistic Modernization Theories

3.1 The Point of Departure: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

The surely most influential theory to explain the genesis of rational capitalistic society in Western Europe and North America originates with Max Weber. For him the entire development history of the modern occidental state is identical with the history of the modern officialdom or civil service. Weber seeks to reveal the structural requirements that make possible the bureaucratization of a society, and indeed this process of bureaucratization is not limited to the state apparatus. Bureaucracy as a type of organization has gradually penetrated all social intitutions, whether in the religious, educational or economic domain. Among the structural requirements Weber counts the existence of a fixed system of taxation – that is, a source of secured revenue for paying public officials. Here a developed monetary economy also is an important factor. The quantitative and qualitative expansion of administrative tasks also favors the coming into existence of a rationally oriented officialdom. A modern bureaucratic administration is characterized by Weber (1968) ideal-typically (cf. Ch. 2.3) as follows:

1. There is a continuous organization of official functions bound by rules.

2. There is a specified sphere of competence. This involves (a) a sphere of obligations to perform functions which has been marked off as part of a systematic division of labor. (b) The provision of the incumbent with the necessary authority to carry out these functions. (c) A clear definition of the necessary means of compulsion, and subjection of their use to definite conditions.

3. The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one. There is a right of appeal and of statement of grievances from the lower to the higher.

4. The rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules or norms. In both cases, if their application is to be fully rational, specialized training is necessary.

5. The administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership of the means of production or administration.

6. There is also a complete absence of appropriation of his official position by the incumbent.

7. Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing.

The whole administrative staff consists of individual officials who are appointed and function according to the following criteria: – They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations. – They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices with a clearly defined sphere of competence. – Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. – Officials are remunerated by fixed salaries in money. – The office is treated as the sole occupation of the incumbent. – It constitutes a career with a system of promotion according to seniority or achievement. – The whole administrative staff is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office. Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. The dominant norms are concepts of straightforward duty without regard to personal considerations.

Research could show that the individual characteristics of bureaucracy in no sense always emerge jointly. Then again, this Weber has never maintained. Weber was quite aware of the fact that the reality deviated from his ideal-typical model. But he believed that the closer an organization resembled his model, the more effective the organization would be. The determinant reason for the marked emergence of bureaucratic organizations in all modern forms of association – such as state, church, the military, party or business

"The bureaucratic type of administrative organization is . . . the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings."

enterprises – Weber sees in the technical superiority of bureaucracy to all other forms of administration. The bureaucratic type of administrative organization is, according to Weber, from a purely technical point of view capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency, and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. This superiority is, Weber reasons, the result of orientation toward impersonal, calculable rules without regard to personal considerations. By this means an optimum of precision, speed, clarity, continuity, discretion, uniformity and economies in human frictions and in material costs is attained. Bureaucratic administration is control based on expert knowledge. In the field of administration, the choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism.

As a prerequisite for the orientation toward impersonal rules, the existence of a codified, rational body of law like the Roman law is considered. The reception of this law, which was summarized by the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian as the Corpus Juris Civilis and since the 11th century has been further worked on by Italian jurists, was accompanied by a bureaucratization of the administration of justice. Closely linked with this process of rationalizing the law the development of capitalism proceeded. The capitalistic enterprise, based on calculation and on rationally organizing the work, had to be able to estimate in advance how justice and administration would operate. This condition has, so Weber argues, been met only in the Occident.

Only against the background of these ideas about bureaucracy is Weber's thesis on the interrelationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism comprehensible. Weber proceeded on the assumption of the existence of a positive relationship between Protestant piety and economic growth. He tried to unterstand this relationship. Thus he did not seek – as he

The interrelationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism.

is often unjustly accused of having done – causal relationship. Decisevely important for Weber's line of thought was the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. Because of his belief in the concept of predestination, the Calvinist lived in constant anxiety. For no one was certain whether he belonged to the saved or those damned by God. By way of illustration, the Westminster Confessions of 1647 state that God, in a revelation of his majesty, by his decision has predestined some individuals to eternal life and has foreordained others to perpetual death. But since God's decision is not alterable through human merits, the ministers made two suggestions: For one, a person should consider himself chosen. As for the other recommendation: In order to gain self-certainty one should work; for work is decreed by God to be the purpose of life. Disinclination to work is in any case a sure sign of a state of grace withheld. Nor was a short-term success in professional life sufficient; there was no point after which one was allowed to rest. The state of secular asceticism one was not permitted to abandon. One had to save and invest to be sure of God's mercy. The saying "He who does not work shall eat no bread" applied unconditionally to everyone. To be successful and to survive in the competitive struggle, economic enterprises were bureaucratized. But as soon as capitalism had become the dominant economic form, it no longer needed religion. Now capitalism possessed its own dynamic. "The Puritan," says Max Weber, "wanted to be a career person. We have to be!" Another aspect, that will not here be treated in datail, is that the historical connection between an increasingly religious rationality and the growth of the natural sciences was very close (cf. Merton 1970).

3.2 Mass Communication and Motivation to Achieve: Consequences for Media Policy

In "The Achieving Society" David McClelland seeks to continue Weber's line of thought. McClelland provides a comprehensive presentation of Weber's analysis of the causal relationship between specific modal personality characteristics, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the rate of the respective economic growth. McClelland argued that behind the Protestant ethic there was a more basic need: namely, a need for achievement. If one were to succeed in measuring this motivation, then one would have "at least crude estimates of group levels or differences in human motives that would be of use to economists and other social theorists in dealing with the behavior of large groups of people." (McClelland 1961, 39.) Motivation to achieve denotes the motivation to set relatively high standard for oneself, and to want to conduct one's affairs accordingly. The measuring of the need for achievement should cover "thoughts of doing well in respect to some standard of good performance, of being blocked in the attempt to achieve, of trying various means of achieving, and of reacting with joy or sadness to the results of one's efforts." (1961, 41.)

McClelland tries to find out co-variations between the occurrence of periods of economic growth or economic stagnation and the presence in the population of motivation to achieve. Motivation to achieve is understood to be a consequence of "child-rearing experiences." In their course, independence, self-reliance and mastery are emphasized. However, this emphasis is only in a relatively moderate form. For when expectations of the child are too high, the child becomes dependent and cautious. As an adult, a child who has been trained in self-reliance will be in a position to fill entrepreneurial roles that are linked with a great extent of responsibility for the fulfillment of professional tasks; roles that are also connected with a certain extent of insecurity or risk.

Conclusions as to the existing motivations to achieve in certain societies are drawn by way of analyses of the content of a number of cultural products. These include popular fairy tales, children's readers, ancient Greek literature, Spanish and English literature of specific periods. Serving as a basis is the thesis that authors have success when they manage to express in writing what everyone thinks and dreams. Thus McClelland upholds a reflection thesis. According to it, the value structures that are dominant at a certain time in society are also expressed in artistic products, and social transformations particularly are also reflected in them. Thus two theses are presented, unquestioned, as being self-evident: 1. In certain societies there are modal personality structures, characteristic of these societies. 2. The society distinguishes itself through a certain cultural unity or consistency.

In the analysis of children's readers, which are investigated not only for the need for achievement, but also for a large number of other characteristics of personality, including other-directedness, need for affiliation, power motivation, and so on, McClelland determines that countries in which the children's readers emphasize both the need for achievement and other-directedness record three times as high a growth rate as do countries in which these two dimensions recieve only scant attention. Thus other-directedness distinguishes individuals who strive for recognition by others and exhibit conformism. The other-directed character type is characterized, according to Riesman (1950), in that the individual's behavior is guided by others or by mass media. These sources of guidance are internal, since the feeling of dependence is established in childhood. The goals that are being pursued are altered each time according to the signals received from outside.

Basically McClelland proceeds on the assumption that motivation to achieve is, while indeed the most important, nevertheless only one element of a matrix of personality characteristics that ultimately influence the economic development. These traits of personality include self-esteem, future orientation, delay of gratification, competence, risk-preference, and others. (Cf. Spenner and Featherman 1978.) It can be demonstrated that in many cases (e.g. ancient Greece, Spain, Britain, the United States) the economic growth was preceded by an increase in the motivation of achieve (the time-lag was 30 to 50 years). And, the other way around, a falling-off in motivation to achieve indicated a later economic decline. Bradburn and Berlew (1961/62) also are able to demonstrate in an analysis of English literature a parallel oscillation of motivation to achieve and indices of economic growth – with a time-lag of some 50 years. Such cyclical fluctuations McClelland documents with, for instance, the example of ancient Greece, while at the same time he indicates the way in which abundance and success have a negative influence on the motivation to achieve. With increasing affluence, the education of the children was left to slaves. And the slaves did not transmit to the children the same extent of motivation to achieve that the parents received. The decline of Greece began, according to McClelland, at the moment at which the generation brought up by slaves took over the decisive positions. A comparable cyclical portrayal of history, one that does not correspond to the usual linear optimism of the other theoreticians of modernization, is contained in the already-mentioned thesis: namely, that parents characterized by high motivation to achieve very likely do not manage to bring up their children to comparably high motivation to achieve because such parents overtax their children.

McClelland (1961, Ch. 10) asks, also, what consequences his line of thought or his findings could have for an acceleration of economic growth, not least in developing countries. He assumes that ideas are in fact more important in shaping history than purely materialistic arrangements. What the human being does with his environment is his true capital. What really counts is human resources, especially the extent of the drive to achieve. So the thing is

to "infect" individuals, systematically, with the virus of the motivation to achieve. Thus the primary task is not the alteration of traditional social structures but the forming of persons. In doing this, the first step is the

"What the human being does with his environment is his true capital."

recognition that the traditional norms *must* be replaced by new ones, if we want to attain the enjoyment of the new, progressive material culture. If the necessity of a change of orientation is once accepted, then means can be found to implement the change. McClelland reminds us of the old English adage: "Where there's a will there's a way." The first prerequisite for the transition from theory to practice is intensified communication. This means, along with roads, cheap public transport and electricity, as well as radio, the telephone, newspapers, speeches on public occasions. There is only one way, as McClelland sees it, to overcome a possible massive resistance to this change: the carrying out of an ideological campaign similar to those that in our time have been carried on by by the Communists, and earlier by religious movements. The communications vehicles (radio, publicly delivered speeches, the press) must be used to prepare the transformation, and the more intensively the better.

At the same time McClelland emphasizes the significance of ideological movements. They represent a haven of emotional security and a new authority for people who have become rootless and unhappy because of the breakdown of traditional structures. (Cf. Ch. 7.4.) So McClelland recommends, among others, the following three specific methods for fostering the way into modernity and an intensification of the motive to achieve:
1. Important is the creation of an informed public opinion, as typified by a society with a free press. Unfortunately, the central problem – how is an ideological movement to guarantee a free press? – is left unresolved. According to McClelland, the press is to communicate a knowledge of the new norms, and to foster more respect for the "impersonal other." Strangers are no longer to be cheated; one should, rather, feel able to trust them in business dealings. To this end, the press must simply make public denunciations. Publicly attended "show trials" are to have a demonstration effect and incite fear that the "anonymous other" might one day catch you at your own deceptions. Important, therefore, are the liberty and readiness of the press to reveal, freely and without penalty, profiteering and corruption. Thus the press has the function of punishment by publicity, and can be regarded as an "implementing aide of justice." The "fear of publicity" in newspapers would accordingly have taken over the function of successor to the pillory as a place of shame on the market square (cf. Noelle-Neumann 1980, 175.)

2. An important step on the way to modernity is, further, the emancipation of women, who after all are bringing up the next generation. Women must be so influenced by the mass media that they take over new norms and values. The values and motivations in a society would hardly change, even if the men were to be "Westernized" through factory work (cf. Ch. 3.6), as long as the women were not to pass on the new values to the next generations. Within this conjunction, the results of a study by Schnaiberg (1970) are significant. He was using data from married Turkish women in Ankara and four villages. Schnaiberg found that mass-media exposure and an egalitarian nuclear family structure was strongly linked to modernity. But the question whether women participate in mass media because their husbands have freed them from the traditional role of the Turkish women or whether the involvement in mass media leads them to question and defy traditional role-expectations cannot be answered from the data.

3. McClelland also emphasizes the significance of foreign educational influences for the strengthening of the motivation to achieve.

However, as Spenner and Featherman (1978, 409 f.) sum up in an analysis of the literature on the theme of "achievement ambitions," the explicatory value of possibly measured differences in the motivation to achieve dare not be overestimated. For at least in regard to the surveyed, primarily American, literature, it is true that ". . .in tightly controlled experimental situations, success and failure at competitive tasks influence levels of ambition and are

"Does your marital and family status predetermine how you will do in the outside world?"

consequences of ambition. But in the natural world of multiple and often competing roles, the successes and failures of persons in schools and across their occupational careers are more likely to result from contingencies in their life cycles such as marriages, divorces and births of children rather than from their differential ambition to achieve in these competitive settings."

Without a wish here to characterize McClelland's thesis as a "crude and simplicistic vulgar misinterpretation of Weber," as this is the case with Roxborough (1979, 21), nevertheless it does emerge clearly how the thought of classic sociologists still had its impact, even during the period after the Second World War, on media-policy conceptions. However, it is certain that Max Weber, who did not even know the modern mass media, would not have advocated such a simple media-policy conception as is suggested by McClelland. This if only because it is not possible to resolve the contradiction between an advocacy of ideological movements and a simultaneous demand for a free press of Western provenience.

Can motivation to achieve that is proliferated by mass media break through the cyclical development that is assumed by McClelland? This can only be speculated. At least from the research results to date, the assumption contained in McClelland's media-policy strategy that alteration of attitudes is accompanied by a corresponding alteration of behavior is quite dubious. Analyses in the literature (e.g. Insko and Schopler 1967; Wicker 1969) arrive, in regard to the relationship of attitude and behavior, at the very cautious conclusion: Between attitude and behavior there is no, or only a very weak, relationship. Alterations of behavior seem more apt to be followed by alterations of attitude than the other way around.

3.3 Daniel Lerner: The Passing of Traditional Society

The book by Daniel Lerner (1957, 1958) "The Passing of Traditional Society" for a long time has been taken as the standard work on the theme of mass media and development. Moreover, it has influenced international media policy – UNESCO's, for example – determinantly. Jeremy Tunstall (1977, 207) observes in regard to "The Passing of Traditional Society": "Lerner's book has been one of the most influential in the whole literature on Third World development." Lerner assumes that communications systems are both indicators and agents of social change. The change always takes place in one direction namely from oral to medial communications system. The oral system is adequate to traditional, and the medial system to modern society. Lerner contrasts the two communication types ideal-typically as follows:

Communication Aspect	Traditional (Oral) System	Modern (Media) System
Channel	Personal (face-to-face)	Broadcast (mediated)
Audience	Primary (groups)	Heterogeneous (mass)
Content	Prescriptive (rules)	Descriptive (news)
Source	Hierarchical (status)	Professional (skill)

The process of transition from oral to medial communication goes along with changes into other key spheres:

Sector	Medial System	Oral System
socio-economic	urban	rural
political	representative	nonrepresentative
cultural	literate	illiterate

Lerner regards modernization as primarily a communications process. He, like many other authors, also sees local or national cultures as being hindrances that have to be surmounted on the way to modern society. The transition from traditional to modern society is considered as being linked on the level of the individual with a character change that is regarded as the correlate of modernization. "Mobile personalities in modern societies are characterized by empathy – that is, by the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation . . . a skill in imagining oneself as being in strange situations, places and times."

Empathy (ability to feel with someone or something, capability of adjusting, readiness to innovate) is for Lerner a prerequisite for taking over new roles as well as for adjustment to new situations. The shaping of empathic personalities is fostered in traditional societies by the introduction of mass communication. The horizon of the people is no longer limited to local matters. The mass media result in the education of the public for receptivity to supra-local news (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1963). A sensibility is created that is a forerunner of actual mobility (anticipated socialization). Modernizing, according to Lerner, involves a comprehensive character alteration in the direction of psychic mobility. This process, Riesman (1973, 101) writes, characterizes self-identification in a state of flux; the ability to incorporate new requirements that emerge outside of the familiar experience. Empathy signifies an altering of the basic self-imagery by which a person defines what he is and what he will become. Empathy also denotes the capability of accepting an "as if" standpoint in relation to new life-forms. Empathy makes it possible to put oneself in the situation of a person for whom things are going better than for oneself. In other words, empathy nourishes upward mobility.

"The mass media are advantageous for the fostering of empathy. Thus they become mobility multipliers."

The mass media, which are advantageous for the fostering of empathy, thus become mobility multipliers. Lerner did in fact receive the highest empathy scores for roles that have been portrayed in the media. A finding, which, by the way, could not be replicated by Rogers (1969, Ch. 9).

Along with empathy Lerner (1958) emphasizes the significance of an increased and ever more diffused rationality. (Ways of thinking and acting are instruments of intention, not articles of faith.) Rationality also involves a

tendency to see the future and their personal prospects in terms of achievement rather than heritage. Thus modern men and women are no longer characterized by personal impotency – that is, by a feeling that you cannot do something about a personal or communal problem, linked with the idea that you cannot go against fate or religion. The modern human being as Lerner sees him entertains, by contrast, an expectation that what one does and says will matter in the world. Thus the modern personality is

"The modern human being entertains an expectation that what one does and says will matter in the world."

characterized by a psycho-social complex of values. There is particular emphasis on a preparedness for new experiences and an openness toward innovations; a democratic orientation that implies a distributive justice based on achievement as well as on the dignity of the human personality as value-concepts. These along with a planning, forward-looking way of acting, one that is guided by an attitude that the world is basically manageable, that it runs according to the rules of science and technology.

The deliberations by Lerner indicate here a close relationship with the ideas that another classic sociological thinker, George Simmel, developed in an article published in 1903: "The Metropolis and Mental Life." The character traits of the modern person – especially his rationality – are a result of adjustment to the complexity of and the consequent variety of stimulations inherent in metropolitan life. Simmel writes: ". . . the psychological basis of the metropolitan type of individuality consists in the intensification of nervous stimulation which results from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli. . . Thus the metropolitan type of man develops an organ protecting him against the threatening currents and discrepancies of his external environment which would uproot him." (A line of thought which incidentally also is taken in American urban sociology by Robert E. Park 1915 and other authors. On the relation of urbanization and personality, cf. Fischer 1975.) The modern psychologically oriented modernization theoreticians have in a sense reversed the causal chain of Simmel's thinking and claim that through the creation of modern personalities it is possible to build a modern society.

The objection that can particularly be made to the measuring of "empathy" is that projective questions were used. Their application in modern Western society can be entirely appropriate, but in non-Western societies can produce results that are possibly not valid (cf. e.g. Awa 1979. On the measuring of empathy in India, cf. Rao 1966, 72 ff.). Thus Lerner

himself reports that some of his projective questions were considered by his interviewees in the Middle East simply as "baffling" or even "impious." A typical question called on the interviewees to say what they would do if they were to assume the powers of government. This question was asked even though everyone knows that the typical "man in the street," as Awa (1979, 268) argues, even in his fantasies cannot imagine such a situation, and thus isn't able to answer such a question.

A lack of empathy can, however, also be traced to another cause. All the questions used by Lerner to measure empathy began with the formulation "What would you do if you were. . .?" Individuals who consider that they personally face pronounced, practically insurmountable barriers keeping them from a possible upward mobility will hardly be able to

"Lack of empathy . . . is the result of frustrated experience."

respond to such a question. Similarly, Gans (1970) ascertains among U.S. slum-dwellers low values on empathy scales. This occasions Golding (1974, 47) to conclude: "Lack of empathy . . . is the result of frustrated experience, not the cause of fatalism."

Vernon (1969, 10) in particular has referred to the cultural relativity of cognitive structures and has pointed out that Western researchers ". . . tend to evaluate the intelligence of other ethnic groups on the same criteria, though it would surely be more psychologically sound to recognize that such groups required, and stimulate, the growth of different mental as well as physical skills for coping with their particular environments, i.e., that they posses different intelligences." Even the question about income, one that in Western countries is customary in surveys and which generally receives correct answers from the interviewees, is, in other socio-cultural conjunctions, problematic. Thus Ugboajah (1978, 110) reports that in a study of Nigerian communicators as affluence indicators he had to note the make of automobile owned by each interviewee, because a question about income wouldn't have been answered correctly.

Lerner takes into consideration, in his explanation of what he regards as a modernization trend taking place on a global scale and irreversible, four variables: 1. Urbanization (proportion of the population in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants); 2. Literacy (proportion of the population which can read one language); 3. Participation divided into economic (indicated via urbanization and per-capita income) and political participation (voting); 4. Media consumption (daily-newspaper circulation, number of radio sets, number of seats in motion-picture theaters). Lerner (1958, 46) presents his theses in two variants: 1. Urbanization everywhere leads to a reduction of illiteracy. This brings about a higher consumption of media. This in turn is

interrelated with more intensive economic and political participation. 2. The second variant postulates an interrelationship between media consumption and education, as well as the dependence of participation on these two variables. Frey (1973, 400) represents the two variants graphically:



U = Urbanization; L = Literacy; M = Media Participation; P = Political Participation.

Lerner (1957, 272) offers the following data to demonstrate the interrelationships among the four variables:

Dependent variable	Multiple-correlation coefficient	Standard error
Urbanization	.61	.09
Media participation	.84	.04
Literacy	.91	.03
Political participation	.82	.05

Both the size of these coefficients and their ascending order are relevant. Their consistent significance demonstrates that the relationship between these four series of independent events is *systemic* – that rates of growth in these four sectors of the participant society have in fact "gone together" in most extant societies.

The theory that is behind the operationalization of the individual variables remains unclear. Thus the operationalization of the economic participation based on the per-capita income is unfortunate, in that in this way

the aspect of income distribution is not taken into consideration. You can arrive at the same per-capita income if a very few individuals have very high and very many individuals very low incomes; and, again, if nearly all have equal incomes. The use of voting participation as an index of political participation equates pure acclamation in totalitarian states with democratic elections. And this method proceeds from the questionable assumption that participation in a vote is an indicator for political participation.

Lerner (1958, 46) argues that the transition from rural to urban forms of society leads, independently of the respective socio-historical context, to rising literacy. The thesis underlying the operationalizing of urbanization is valid, to be sure, for the "Occidental socio-cultural area". But it does not hold true for hydraulic societies (Oriental despotisms, Asiatic traditional societies) in which cities consistently have the character of administration and garrison towns (Wittfogel 1962, 85). The result can be, as for example in China, that "an insurmountable obstacle (was) put in the way of . . . a bourgeois process of emancipation" (Wilhelm 1960, 38). Hoselitz (1960, 219), too, characterizes the cities in pre-industrial societies as religious or cultural center, or as political-administrative center, or a central place of protection – but not as an economic center. Lerner's global thesis obviously requires limitation in regard to the aspects of space and time. It should be recorded, though, that Lerner in his later publications goes into the problem of overurbanization (1968, 390): "The great cities of the transitional world have often become massive impediments to orderly social change rather then productive centers of modernization." The marginal settlements on the fringes of big cities are occasionally looked on as rural enclaves in the city. Their inhabitants are regarded as urban villagers, characterized by low empathy, fatality, deference to traditional authority and little tendency toward innovation (cf. Inkeles 1969; on other positions, Peattie and Aldrete-Haas 1981, 162 ff.). Migration into the large cities in any event means, however, that the set of significant others is becoming more heterogeneous, and thus the behavior of the individual is subjected to less narrow social controls. Then too, of necessity, new ways of behavior have to be learned; in their train come contacts with previously unknown life-styles and views.

Something else that remains unclear is what Lerner understands by "traditional societies." Oral communications systems are attributed to illiterate societies, which comprehend a – not more sharply defined – conglomerate of societal types. On the one hand, Lerner (1957, 132) argues that oral systems occur in societies with "natural primacy groups of work," that is, in societies without a marked degree of division of labor. But on the other hand, he speaks of "traditional hierarchic societies" (1957, 135). The two statements are not immediately reconcilable. For it is precisely the lack of hierarchies that characterizes societies without a division of labor. The individuals are directly linked with the society, without intermediate groups (Durkheim 1895; Sigrist 1967). If hierarchical societies, which are societies

with a specialized division of labor, are categorized as oral systems, then at least there must be a distinguishing between European feudal societies and the above-mentioned hydraulic societies. The latter are characterized precisely by their excellently organized non-oral communications systems (cf. Baudin 1956; Wittfogel 1962). In this case, too, Lerner's theses are too inclusive; that is, their range needs to be limited in space and time. This could be done by taking into consideration the economic strata (e.g. McNelly and Molina, 1972, in a study conducted in Lima). Or the socio-historical restrictions need too be made clear (thus Winham in 1979 conducted a study by using U.S. historical data).

In view of Lerner's all-embracing thesis, and the conceptual unclarity of some of his definitions, as well as the problems involved in the operationalizing of the variables, it is not astonishing that empirical examinations of the Lerner model (e.g. Alker 1966; McCrone and Cnudde 1967; further sources in: Bobrow 1974, 111) grant the model no unequivocal support. McCrone and Cnudde (1967, 78) in a causal analysis do, however, obtain data that can be interpreted along the lines of the Lerner model. Also according to Schramm and Ruggels (1967, 60), there is little doubt about the

"Mass-media growth is highly related to general economic and social development."

basic pattern of media development: Mass-media growth is highly related to general economic and social development. However, thereby nothing is stated about different stages of development. Schramm and Ruggels examine the following three hypotheses of Lerner (1958, 58 ff.):

- Only after a country reaches 10 percent of urbanization does its literacy rate begin to rise significantly.
- Thereafter, urbanization and literacy increase together in a direct (monotonic) relationship until they reach 25 percent.
- Once societies are about 25-percent urbanized, the highest correlate of media consumption is with literacy.

Contrary to the first hypothesis the authors find that notable rises in literacy do take place when countries are still at very low stages of urbanization. The test of the second hypothesis brought no significant results. The third hypothesis tested well. The results gave no reason to doubt that after a

country reaches a certain level of urbanization, literacy is then a strong correlate of media consumption. Looking at four regions of developing countries (Latin America, Sub-Sahara, Asia and the Middle East) the authors find:

1. For the entire sample of 82 countries, literacy is most important in explaining the rank of countries in newspaper circulation, gross national product (GNP) is second, and urbanization explains little of the variation.

2. For Asia and Latin America, however, urbanization is very important in explaining newspaper variation; and in both regions literacy is also important. Only in the Middle East do we get a pattern somewhat like that of the world sample.

3. For the entire world sample, GNP is the most important variable in explaining variation in the number of radio receiving sets.

4. In Latin America, urbanization is most useful in explaining radio variation; in the Middle East, literacy is the chief variable; and in Asia all three variables appear to make important contributions.

In other words, these developing regions are significantly different from each other. The basic variables of urbanization, literacy, and GNP seem to be related in different ways, in the several regions, to the developing media. This suggest that we may indeed have several different patterns of development.

Bales (1980) presents data that give evidence of the relationship between mass media and developmental factors in two squatter settlements in Lima (Peru) and in Guayaquil (Ecuador). Bales can substantiate the existence of a relationship between media use and education in squatter settlements. In regard to political participation, the Lima data support the association between local political activism and media use, while the Guayaquil data do not. But in general the problem of causality remains unclarified, because the authors only submit correlations.

An answer to the question of causality could be given by longitudinal studies that would be based on less inclusive theses and could have regard for variables which Lerner excludes. Thus with Lerner neither the specific media content nor the political system is significant. Moreover, it remains unobserved that system-external factors can have a potential influence. In essence, Lerner upholds a technological determinism in the sense of McLuhan (cf. Ch. 2.4), with the quality of the content proliferated by mass media being of no significance. The developments in the subsystem policy are treated by Lerner as dependent variables.

Is it possible that the entire conception underlying Lerner's "The Passing of Traditional Society" at bottom is more a matter of wishful thinking than of

scientific sociological thought? This possibility is at least implied by David Riesman even in the introduction to this book. To be sure, the "transitional individual" accounts for a high consumption of mass media. But as a rule this individual cannot read, so a question becomes: "What will a society look like which is dominated by such 'post-literate' types?" In other words, Riesman doubts whether matters can come at all to Lerner's postulation of a Westernization of the developing countries. In essence, Lerner argues as Herbert Spencer or Spencer's antipode Karl Marx did before him. For both Spencer and Marx saw in England the model example of the globally-evolving development of capitalism. Lerner simply replaced England with the West in its entirety as the advance guard of a supposedly globally proceeding modernization.

3.4 Mass Communication as Agent of Modern Consciousness

In the argumentation closely related to the deliberations of Lerner is a macro-sociologically oriented phenomenological approach to analysis of the position held by mass communication. This approach is offered by Berger, Berger and Kellner in "Das Unbehagen in der Modernität" (The Uneasiness in Modernity) (1973). The authors argue that qualities of consciousness are based on everyday experiences, which are reflected. Technological production and the bureaucratically organized state are regarded as primary agents of modern consciousness. Among the agents of consciousness that are characterized as secondary are, as the most important, mass education and mass communication. The latter bombarding the public with models of behavior that are adequate to technological thinking, the themes become independent of their primary bearers, and become a component of a modern world-view. On the quality of a reality developed in that way, Berger i.a. write (1975, 96): "We can assume that the symbolic universe of modern societies is a loosely assembled constellation, which is everything else but stable, of definitions of reality." In the argumentation of Berger i.a. the institutions of modern society generate their own consciousness and are the society's primary bearers. The authors are arguing reductionistically. For two variables (technology and bureaucracy) are interpreted as determining the other societal phenomena. The consciousness (of the worker), through the constant contact with the technology of production as well as through the pronounced diverging of the public and the private spheres, is determined not only in regard to content, but also in respect to the "style."

The central theme-complex of the symbolic universe determined by technological production is presented by Berger i.a. (1975, 98 f.) as: rationality, componentiality, multi-relationality, implementability, plurality, progressivism. The consequences of the distribution of this style of consciousness through mass education and mass media is said to be an "urbanization of consciousness." This "urbanization" refers to the ability to cope adroitly with various attitudes toward reality. Supposedly a widening of horizon is taking place: "Through mass publications, film, radio and television, cognitive and normative definitions invented in the city are very quickly proliferated within society as a whole." (Berger i.a. 1975, 62)

In characterizing the central theme-complexes of modern thought, Berger and his co-authors do not go into the distinction, originating with Karl Mannheim (1958, 62) of functional and substantive rationality. It would then become clearer that a functionalization or rationalization applying to society as a whole can be linked with a decrease of substantive rationality; with insight into over-all conjunctions. In general, the authors evaluate the significance of mass media in part neutrally, in part positively. For within the frame of mass communication they do not enter into the uncertainties of insufficient insight into over-all societal conjunctions – a matter that precisely in regard to a phenomenological analysis of the construction of reality is of major interest. Moreover, the authors argue the supposed "urbanization of consciousness" without further empirical documentation, as a given, and they regard this concept unqualifiedly positively.

They infer a process through which in the sense of an anticipated socialization a mobile sensibility preceding the actual mobility is being created. "Urbanization" indeed means, at the same time, a comprehensive alteration of characters: namely, the development of mobile personalities distinguished by empathy.

What the authors do not contemplate is that precisely the opposite process could develop: Through mass communication, "one-dimensional," atrophied personalities could be shaped, personalities that would lack the ability to gain reflexive insights into their own situations. Yet the macro-sociological theses of Berger and his co-authors in regard to the conjunctions between mass communication and social structure cannot be empirica tested. All the authors do is to supply hypotheses for orientation – that is, they assert conjunctions among various phenomena. They do not, however, sufficiently specify the phenomena.

Cees Hamelink (1983b) argues comparably in justifying his policy of cultural dissociation. Hamelink postulates a globally proceeding process of cultural synchronization, whose principal agents would be the transnational corporations. Cultural synchronization means that the decisions regarding the cultural development of a given country are made in accordance with the interests and needs of a powerful central nation, and imposed with subtle but

devastating effectiveness without regard for the adaptive necessities of the dependent nation. Hamelink (1983b, 8) argues further: "The public media are the major cultural institutions mediating the values inherent in industrialization." Moreover, in most social systems the public transmission of information and entertainment is guided by a concern to create a consensus regarding societal goals and their underlying values. For Hamelink, this synchronization is made operative on a global scale by the transnational communications industry. Therefore Hamelink demands a cultural dissociation. Only by developing self-reliantly – which necessitates sovereign control of resources (including information) – can a state become independent not only culturally but also economically and politically. However, here utopian points are entering the discussion. For example, Hamelink calls for, along with decentralization and participation, the avoidance of control by media professionals. Structural decentralization results in the ordinary person's seeing "his or her participation as a form of public service." Here Bertolt Brecht's radio utopia (cf. Ch. 1.2), which for structural reasons is not realizable, is revived once more. If along the lines of Hamelink's argumentation an attempt is made to deprofessionalize, the result will be, not improved information but total confusion. A nation "buying" such an approach would become politically powerless.

3.5 "Mass Media and National Development": The Great Program

On assignment from UNESCO, Wilbur Schramm, in "Mass Media and National development. The Role of Information in the Developing Countries" (Stanford, 1964), seeks to indicate the significance of mass media within the context of a program of concrete action. Of particular interest is the contribution that effective communication can make to economic and social development. Here Schramm was concerned in particular with the use of sociological-research results to improve the living conditions in developing countries (cf. also Ch. 2.1). Is free and adequate information generally desirable? Of course, says Schramm (1964, IX), taking this for granted. He emphasizes the significance of the media for the mobilization of human resources. "There must be information designed to encourage productive attitudes, social patterns, and customs." Here an ethical question arises: Dare one use the mass media to manipulate people? Schramm sees no problem here. For one thing, social change is inevitable. For another, there is no manipulation, since after all people are first informed about what possibilities

there are. In any case, it is impossible to take over only the mechanistic aspects of Western civilization, and to retain the traditional values.

Communication is seen as "a kind of temperature-controlling agent". Through the stimulation of aspirations the "social temperature" can be raised, and, the other way around, by providing explanation the "temperature" can be lowered. An improved flow of information provides a climate for national development. Relevantly here, the UNESCO target in the media sector has been ten copies of daily newspapers, five radio receivers and two television sets per 100 persons. (At that time, UNESCO also aimed at two motion-picture seats per 100 persons.) Despite what is, in general, a very optimistic evaluation of the influence of the media, Schramm warns against an uncritical use of this supposed influence, since the media are "ineffective, if they are not used without adequate knowledge of the local culture." In answering the question as to what help the media can be in a process of national development, Schramm names 11 spheres. The media, he reasons, can: 1. widen horizons, 2. focus attention (that is, attention can be kept on development), 3. raise aspirations, 4. help, although only indirectly, to change strongly held attitudes or valued practices, 5. feed the interpersonal channel, 6. confer status, 7. broaden policy dialogue, 8. enforce social norms, 9. help form tastes, 10. affect attitudes lightly held, and slightly channel stronger attitudes, 11. help substantially in all types of education and training. In particular the first three above-listed media functions – widening horizons; focusing attention; raising aspirations – are relevant that the mass media create a climate for development.

Schramm provides quite specific media-policy guidelines. Thus a developing country (and its friends and aiders) should not hesitate to invest in

"A developing country (and its friends and aiders) should not hesitate to invest in a well-considererd program of mass-media development and use."

a well-considered program of mass-media development and use, nor hesitate to make use of new technical developments in communication, in cases where these new developments fit the country's needs and capabilities. The trouble with such recommendations is clear: A decision as to whether a program of mass-media development and use has been well-considered or not can always be taken only after the fact. The same goes for the answer to the question: Do new technical developments really fit the needs and capabilities of a developing country? Schramm's media-policy suggestions are simply kept too general to be useful as operation instructions in specific situations.

The concept of theoreticians of modernization, that for the modernization of a society first individuals must be changed, (Lerner [1963, 331] writes: "Social change is the sum of mobilities acquired by individual persons") is also found in the influential phases theory of economic development of Walt Rostow (1960). In "The Stages of Economic Growth" Rostow delineates five phases of socio-economic progress – traditional society, pre-take-off, take-off, maturity, mass consumption. States that are considered ideally suited for development-aid measures are those that are in the phase of take-off – a pre-stage of self-sustaining economic growth. Among the prerequisites of an economic take-off, besides a productivity revolution in agriculture, a massive build-up of transport facilities and sources of energy, and the development of a capacity to earn more foreign exchange, particular importance is attached to the education of a new generation of men and women trained appropriately and motivated to operate in a modern society. During this process, according to the ideas of the theoreticians of modernization, the mass media can make an outstanding contribution. Precisely in the take-off phase, as Rostow (1960, 38) argues, there must be assurance of the existence or the quick emergence of a political, social and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external economic effects of the take-off, while providing growth with an ongoing character. And this, too, is not possible without the mass media.

3.6 Mass Media as Modernizing Institutions: Making Men Modern

The effects of modernizing institutions (factory, mass media, school) on individual modernity were investigated by Alex Inkeles and D. Smith: "Becoming Modern. Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, Cambridge, Mass., 1974) on the basis of data assembled between 1962 and 1964. The emphasis in the analysis was not on society as a whole, but on the level of the individual. In six developing countries (Argentina, Bangladesh, Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria) questionnaires were distributed to some 6,000 young men. Determinant in the selection of these six countries were purely pragmatic considerations: the presence in the country of a scholar interested in the research topic and competent to oversee its administrative details. (Cf. Elder 1976, 218.) The central hypothesis guiding the research postulated that the greater the individual's exposure to the presumably modernizing institutions, the further should be his movement along the psychological dimensions of individual modernization. It was an investigation of whether modernizing institutions would have similar effects on people of different

cultures, such as Yoruba in Nigeria, Hindus and tribal Christians in Northeast India, Bengali Moslems in East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Yemenite Jews in Israel, Catholic descendants of Italians in Argentina, and Chileans of Spanish and Indian origin. That each of these cultures is unique is not contested by Inkeles and Smith (1974, 12). But the authors wish to affirm the common nature of the people who make up each of these diverse societies. These transcultural similarities provide the basis for common response to common stimuli.

Inkeles' (1960) main proposition is that men's environment, as expressed in the institutional patterns they adopt or have introduced to them, shapes their experience, and through this their perceptions, attitudes and values, in standardized ways which are manifest from country to country, despite the countervailing randomizing influence of traditional cultural patterns. Here is an inference of development along the lines of the convergence theory. (On the discussion of convergence theory cf. i.a. Baum 1974; Form 1979; Goldthorpe 1971; Kerr i.a. 1960; Meyer i.a. 1975; Weinberg 1969.) Local cultures and other particularisms are being destroyed in the course of the industrialization process, and are being succeeded by a new culture, unitarily oriented toward universal norms. Thus it is inferred that organizations with comparable structures bring about common psychic dispositions (structure and content) in the persons working in these organizations. For Inkeles, factories are such a significant environment that they, also in quite differing societies, bring about common patterns of values, along with common structures of perceptions and thought for the persons concerned. The factory is regarded as a school of modernity. Contact with the rationally organized factory leads to a readiness to accept new experiences, favours an increasing confidence that the human being can control his environment, fosters the ability to act with foresight, and in general leads to recognition of the

"Modernity at the level of the individual includes tolerance, faith in science and technology, openness to change."

importance of learning and education. In other words, modernity at the level of the individual is achieved, including tolerance, faith in science and technology, openness to change. The significance of the working environment for modernity at the level of the individual is also confirmed by Fliegel (1976). In Ghana, China, the United States, and Brazil, workers exposed to more complex technology scored higher on an modernity scale (achievement, independence, universalism, openness to new ideas, need-achievement, secularism, cosmopolitanism, alienation).

The relationships between different factory experience and individual modernity have been investigated by Inkeles and Smith (1974). They assured

the basis for cross-cultural generalization by keeping the structure of the six samples comparable. In each country the subgroups included: cultivators still living in their native villages; migrants just leaving the village; workers with varying degress of experience in industry; and urban non-industrials pursuing traditional crafts and services in an urban setting. Inkeles and Smith report that the over-all modernity scores were the higher the better the education, the more intense the exposure to mass media and the longer the experience with working life in the factory had been. The socializing effect of factory life in regard to modernity at the level of the individual is indicated by the fact that the length of time spent in factory work has significant positive effects on feelings of personal efficacy, favorable attitudes toward change, openness to

"Two years of factory experience equaled one year of formal education, as reflected by the over-all modernity scores."

new experiences, emphases on time and punctuality, and so on. According to the data from Inkeles and Smith, two years of factory experience equaled one year of formal education, as reflected by the over-all modernity scores.

Inkeles and Smith uphold a generalization theory. According to it, values, attitudes, structures of thought, and so on that are learned and successfully applied in one sector of everyday life (in the factory, for instance) also become generalized to other spheres. The authors argue that the socio-psychic functions of individuals living in different cultures are based on the same structural mechanism. They assert that successfully applied on-the-job orientations are also carried over into family life. In this process, roles corresponding to the cognitive orientations learned in working life would be newly formed and performed. The personality structures of the persons who are prospectively to become socialized, subjected to the process of modernization at the individual level, is not further emphasized. For individuals confronted with identical situations are regarded as reacting to them identically. The result of the process of socialization is considered to be predictable since the persons being socialized have no influence on the socialization process.

Without the broad proliferation of the quality of modern man, Inkeles and Smith (1974, 316) argue, neither economic growth nor a stable political system can be attained. Modernizing institutions create modern individuals who can fulfill career roles in the modern institutions necessary for economic growth. Although education is the variable most closely correlated with modernity at the individual level, considerable significance also attaches, within this frame of reference, to the mass media. Inkeles and Smith construct their measure of mass-media influence with data on newspaper and radio exposure. Inkeles (1971, 277) postulates: "Of the modernizing experiences, education is by far the single most powerful. It generally yields an increase of up to three points

per year on the overall scale of individual modernization, a scale with a range between 0 and 100. Nevertheless, late socialization variables also prove to be independently powerful influences. For example, each year that a man spends in a factory yields him a gain of 1½ to 2 points on the individual modernity scale. Extensive exposure to the mass media produces equal or more powerful effects. Because industrial work and intensive contact with the mass media come only after the presumably formative early years, these extensive changes give powerful support to the argument that quite basic personality change can

"The mass media, if they disseminate 'modern' values, have generally positive effects on developing countries."

occur in adult life." From this two consequences can be drawn: 1. The mass media, if they disseminate "modern" values, have generally positive effects on developing countries. 2. Because traditional personalities require modernization before they can take and adequately fill positions in modern institutions, a recommended early step is an investment in "human capital" – that is, in the educational system and in mass media.

Inkeles (and Levinson 1969, 470) summarizes his opinion in regard to the significance of mass media: "Norms of behavior deriving from the core cultural values are the most obvious source of potential influence on adult personality. In the more modern societies the dissemination of such standards is in good part taken over by mass media of communication." Thus contents distributed by the mass media are regarded as independent variables and the values accepted by the society as dependent variables. To examine this control theory, co-variations between reality that has been arrived at by content-analysis, and also various indices for the "reality" possible influenced by the media, must be investigated. (Here, in accordance with a functional content analysis, the perceptions of the respective recipients should be resorted to for the establishment of content-analytical categories, since the category pattern developed by the respective researchers as a rule does not correspond to the perception and use of certain media content by specific recipients.) This is a procedure that George Gerbner used in the United States to examine the theory that television is the central cultural arm of American society, with its function enculturation; that is, the process by which a person adapts to a culture and assimilates its values. (Cf. Gerbner and Gross 1976, 175.) The world-view of recipients who are strong consumers of television must, according to this theory, reflect more intensive agreement with the symbolic reality of television than does the world-view of recipients who are not heavy consumers of television. If this conclusion could be documented empirically, it would have been proven that television can impose its symbol-world on the viewer.

While McClelland attributes central importance to the significance of women in the modernization process, this matter receives no further attention from Inkeles and Smith. Modernization takes place through the generalization on family life of the life-experience of the man. For the woman, along with education, the mass media, so to speak as a flanking institution, can effect a modernization. The individualistic character of the modernization theory espoused by Inkeles is made clear by the following statement (1971, 278): "We *assume* that societies that have more modern individuals, or a larger proportion of the population scoring *high* on modernity, will experience accelerated structural change toward increased modernity."

As yet no author has been able to prove empirically the causal connection between the creation of modern personalities and the consequent economic growth. It is rather the case that attitudes adequate to industrialized societies in developing countries can have detrimental effects. For example, competent individuals with modern attitudes are in some circumstances more ready to emigrate from a developing country, which means a continuous loss of human capital. Britain's National Health Service, Peterson (1978, 450) argues, continued to function only because of the brain drain into Britain of Indians and Pakistanis, who already in the 1960s comprised almost half of the country's junior medical staff. It is also to be presumed that modern individuals are more likely to be interested in consumption than in saving. This means that in a developing country the capital accumulation necessary for breaking out of the vicious circle of poverty would not take place. Finally, it is conceivable that the individual secularism of the modern person ties down energies that could be channeled into possible mobilizing ideologies. Portes (1973) implies that the main task of the elites of a developing country is to restrain modern thoughts – to channel only small doses of modern thinking into broader circles of the population. But Portes does not go into the question of how this could concretely be done.

"Are modern individuals more interested in consuming than in saving?"

The theories of modernization proceed from the assumption that there should first be a rationalization at the level of the individual. But once such rationally acting individuals are created, it is still by no means certain that, by means of a kind of ruse of social reason, advantages will emerge, too, for the society as a whole. Rational individuals will in the main pursue their own interests. Mancur Olson (1965) argues that only at the level of small groups is it rational to make a contribution toward achieving collective goals. A contribution toward attaining non-excludable benefits in large-scale collectivities would be irrational. For one gets to enjoy the collective benefits anyhow, indifferently as to whether one contributes or doesn't. (The Free

Rider problem.) But Marwell and Ames (1979/80) postulate in an empirical examination of the free-rider hypothesis that the theory in the strict formulation is untenable. Thus more than 50% of the persons interviewed were contributing to the attainment of collective advantage without their being offered selective benefits.

3.7 An Excursus: Science and Morals: Everett E. Hagen's Theory of Social Change

If certain theories of social change are put directly into practice, then, as Montesquieu and Herbert Spencer already realized in their time, they can have consequences that are ethically not supportable. This argument is documented here by way of a thesis of the creativity of persecuted minorities from Everett E. Hagen (1962). Hagen, an economist, explains processes of social change and/or economic growth with the help of depth-psychological categories. Hagen wanted an answer to the question: Why do certain societies participate in technological progress sooner and more effectively than others? He starts with the assumption that "the differences were due only in a minor degree to economic obstacles, lack of information or lack of training." Hagen develops a model "which stresses the chain of causation from social structures through parental behavior to childhood environment, and then that from childhood environment through personality to social change." (1972, 8 f.) The basic assumption here is the thesis that the individual development is determinantly shaped during the first half-dozen years of life (1972, XII). Like McClelland, Hagen presents familial socialization processes as being determinant for getting economic growth started with the need to achieve taking on a central status in the matrix of the personality. Other than McClelland, however, Hagen sees the reasons for character change as being localized in socio-structural variables.

Hagen characterizes traditional social systems. In doing so, he restricts himself to "agricultural societies". Communities of hunters and gatherers are excluded, because up to now economic growth has always had its beginnings in agrarian societies (1962, 20). Hagen's argumentation (1962, 55 f.) follows: "Behavior is governed by custom, not law. The social structure is hierarchical. The individual's position in the society is normally inherited rather than achieved. And, at least in the traditional state so far in the world's history, economic productivity is low." In such societies with pronounced difference between the elite and the mass of the population it is true that partial innovations emerge; but there are no continuing processes. Hagen maintains

that during a period from the beginning of agriculture to about the year 1600 societies everywhere were in the traditional phase. He assumes that the social structure is a function of personality. In other words, certain modal personality types bring about certain social systems. Traditional societies are based on traditional, and modern societies on innovative personalities. Hagen (1962, 73 f.) defines the authoritarian, traditional personality: "Satisfaction in yielding to the judgement and wishes of superiors, and satisfaction in dominating inferiors, are interwoven in the personality of the simple folk in traditional societies the world over. . . We may conclude that the structure of traditional society has lasted as long as it has because the personalities of the simple folk are authoritarian."

A hard struggle to survive under markedly difficult conditions results in, so Hagen (1962, 97), "a perception of the world as arbitrary, capricious, not amenable to analysis. . ." This feeling of helplessness in regard to the forces that determine man's destiny creates a need to rely on the judgement or will of individuals superior to one in authority or power. At the same time, the elites have a pronounced need to differentiate themselves from the non-elites. While a person who attains a leading position in an "open" society through his own achievements has no difficulty about justifying his having that position, it is otherwise with persons who acquire leading positions through the accident of birth. They have developed special mechanisms of justification: The notion is fostered that a favored individual in principle is more worthwhile than the broad masses are. Typically, according to Hagen, this attitude of superiority is expressed in the feeling that the favored individual's inborn worth-whileness consists of his marked differentiation from crude, simple people. For example, the high-born person despises what he considers the masses' obsession with the material details of life. Again, as LeVine (1963) is able to show for Nigeria, often a demonstrative doing nothing is considered a sign of a high social status. Bureaucrats will take every opportunity to delegate work to – frequently less competent – subordinates, because to work hard themselves is considered undignified.

The traditional systems are quite stable (1962, 71) because the simple folk as well as the elite accepted them. The reason for the perseverance of the authoritarian, hierarchical, traditional social structure is seen as being twofold:

- The subjection to higher authority and the exercise of one's own authority over subordinates was satisfying.

- The respective conditions of life produced personalities generation for generation that continued to be content with this way of living. To proceed from such a societal type to another type, Hagen argues, a deepgoing transformation of the modal personality has to take place. That is, the traditional personality, characterized by authoritarianism, rigidity, paucity of creativity, opposition to innovation, and slight motivation to achieve

must go. For Hagen (1982, 86), social change will not occur without change in personality. Contact with technological advanced societies is regarded by

"Social change will not occur without change in personality."

Hagen, it is true, as a necessary but not as a sufficient condition of social change in the form of economic and/or technological growth. But there must also be the presence of other factors, such as material resources and the requisite social – along with, particularly in Hagen, psychological – factors. The determinants of growth seem to be, according to Hagen, largely internal rather than external.

The determinant initiator of social change Hagen localizes in situations in which one or more elite groups that previously, while not dominating, nevertheless held a significant position undergo withdrawal of status respect. This loss of status, Hagen reasons, introduces a personality transformation, extending over several generations. This change, in turn, is said to be based on a deep-going change in the home environment. The withdrawal of status respect means for those undergoing it anxiety, embitteredness and dissonance. For the formerly looked-up-to person is no longer esteemed in a society that he himself regards highly, and whose traditional structure of values he has internalized. In the second, third or fourth generation, a pronounced lack of norms becomes evident. That is, an erosion of values has occurred, which fosters a retreat into apathy. Because of differing definitions of the sexual roles, men are harder hit then women by this retreat into apathy: After some generations, Hagen reasons, we shall find men who are apathetic and weak – and women who are comparably stronger. These women, as a reaction to the failure of their men, will react attentively to any achievement and show of initiative on the part of their sons – who can hardly accept their unsuccesful parents as role models – and the women will encourage their sons' initiatives. Hagen argues that a certain combination and intensity of these attitudes of mothers and the weakness of the fathers creates an almost ideal environment for the development of a type of anxiety-driven creativity. Such persons provide themselves with security, in that they are traditional and authoritarian in most of their ways of behaving, while at the same time being in quite specific aspects daring and creative.

However, these conditions of education will make their appearance only within a certain part of the membership of the former lower elite. Nor must readiness for innovation necessarily make itself known in the economic sector. The question "Which direction do the innovative energies flow in?" is answered, rather, in dependence on references to time and space, by the activities that are held in high esteem in a specific society, and that, at the same time, can also be performed by the members of the former sub-elite.

Hagen (1962, 241) argues that creative persons will be drawn to where the opportunity seems best to exercise one's talent, prove one's worth to oneself, and gain social recognition. To be sure, in most of the traditional societies business and trade are very often the most important available channels for getting ahead, because access to top positions in politics, the military, religion or real estate is blocked. But to be able to initiate economic growth a certain market dimension is necessary, a certain rate of savings, and so on. Continuing the argumentation: Even if a certain number of innovative persons are active in the economic sector, the question remains unanswered: Can a whole society be reoriented in that way?

For a practical political activity, the consequence from Hagen's theory would be – that in order to increase economic productivity, there would be discrimination against a self-assured, tradition-steeped sub-elite; – and that then there would be a wait of several generations for the emergence of innovative personalities with entrepreneurial ability in the economic sphere.

"He is always, to be sure,
on the lookout for ways to prove his theory,
but he never seeks evidence
that would disprove it."

This would be a procedure that in view of Hagen's vague data (he always, to be sure, is on the lookout for ways to prove his theory, but he never seeks evidence that would disprove it) would certainly have horrendous consequences for those involved. What Hagen resorts to, in particular, is quite generous concepts of time. The periods of retreat and the accompanying reaction-formation oscillate between some 40 to 400 years before the start of the economic growth. Hagen likes to resort to quite undefined terms, such as, for example, a period of retreat of "several centuries" (1962, 378). Roxborough (1979, 22) observes in regard to the quality of Hagen's arguments: "McCarthyism in the United States is explained as a response to the 1930s depression. Why not the trauma of 1776?"

Intensive considerations as to how things are to come to the respective loss of status by a sub-elite are not found in Hagen's writing. [The close relationship between economic growth and ideological aspects is pointed out by Ayal (1966) similarly to Hagen. Nationalism is regarded as a reaction, favorable to economic growth, to an identity crisis. Strategically well-placed groups who experience the identity crisis (the Samurai, for instance), become adherents of a nationalism whose main motivation is a deep desire for moral initiative and integration. Walt Rostow (1960) also sees such a reactive nationalism as a determinant factor in the beginning of a self-sustaining

economic growth.] For his reasoning Hagen offers two justifications of a historical sort: 1. The replacement of native elites with European elites, who do hold the native elite in low esteem. (The fact that the colonial masters have a "modern" attitude toward manual and technical work explains for Hagen – along with the tendency of disadvantaged groups to reject the values of their oppressors – why the native elite do not invest their energies in the enterprises of the colonists.) 2. A corrosion of the attitudes of the elite toward native sub-elites through "events of history."

4. Mass Communication and Interpersonal Communication

4.1 The Significance of Interpersonal Communication

One of the wrong assumptions about the Third World, writes John Lent (1982, 14), is that communication networks do not exist if they do not conform to Westernized, more modern information systems. A further bias of research is that although, to be sure, the significance of communication in developing countries has been investigated, nevertheless an analysis of the communication efforts that helped to start the development process has not been made. An exception is the study by Kusum J. Singh (1979). In it she examines the communication strategies of Gandhi and Mao during the liberation struggles of India and China in the 1940s. Both Mahatma Gandhi and Mao Tse-Tung were faced with the task of communicating with hundreds of millions of illiterate peasants – and both were able to succeed as "mass communicators" without the use of modern mass media.

How did the two leaders manage this? According to Singh (1979), both sought the aid of the elite to activate the potential of the masses while at the same time educating the elite to be more concerned with the masses of the people than with themselves. In order to educate the elite, a continuous flow of communication through small-circulation newspapers was maintained. Because the access to mass media of communication was severely limited for Gandhi and Mao, both developed a quite successful multi-modal and multi-directional strategy for communication with the masses, the most important three elements of which were (Singh 1979, 79):

- "close interpersonal relations in which basic mutual identification was developed and maintained;
- party organization and mass organizations through which leaders and masses were linked;
- the role of the press in disseminating ideas and in educating leaders."

According to Singh (1979, 101), the concept of symbolic action was central for the communication style of both Mao and Gandhi: "It is through symbolic action that they both expressed fully their identification with the masses. Gandhi's loincloth and Mao's rustic living fulfilled a triple function: Simplicity of living was emphasized; homespun cloth became a militant symbol of self-

sufficiency; and Gandhi and Mao were identified with the poorest of their people." By means of a loudspeaker system, word-of-mouth communication channels, various mass campaigns attended by hundreds of millions of people, and especially by using a language specifically aimed at their particular audiences (the masses, the intellectual elite and the opponents), both were able to secure the transmission of mobilizing information. For Singh the success of the communication styles of Gandhi and Mao was based not on the

"The success of the communication styles of Gandhi and Mao was based not on the two leaders' personal charisma but on a multiple flow of messages."

two leaders' personal charisma but on a multiple flow of messages. She writes: "They move from the leader to specialized spokespersons to hundreds of thousands of lesser party activists to the masses, while also moving directly from the leader to the masses."

The fact that in developing countries interpersonal communication is of key significance for the proliferation and/or the blocking of new ideas and techniques can be shown by a number of examples; a sampling is offered below. Pye (1956) reports on an election in Johore, Malaya, in which two equally "Westernized" candidates were competing. One candidate led an expensive election campaign. He went from village to village and drew crowds; obviously they were attracted by his arguments. But his competitor was the winner. The victor had led an indirect election campaign, and had concentrated on the traditional opinion leaders. Because the other candidate who appealed to the masses was endangering the traditional structure of authority, the opinion leaders supported the campaigner who, by contrast, was not imperiling their position.

The fact that the mass media can easily slide into contradiction to the traditional interpersonal communication media is illustrated by the revolution in Iran. The regime of the Shah had one of the best media systems of a developing country. The elites who were no longer incorporated within the traditional value structure made, according to Tehranian (1982), the error of regarding mass communication as a substitute for effective political communication. Mowlana reasons that the modernized middle and upper classes of Iran relied more and more on outside media from the West, even for the assessment of their own country's situation. While the traditional communications system continued to exist, organized around some 200,000 mullahs in around 90,000 mosques, the official media – especially the radio – were losing their credibility. Fathi (1979, 102) characterizes the role of the Islamic pulpit as follows: "Communication is carried on face-to-face,

but it is institutional, not personal, in nature." In pre-revolutionary Iran, it was not the large mass media that were the functioning communication channels; it was the small media, such as little newspapers of a religious nature and Xerox copies that circulated the contents that found access to the interpersonal communications structure. The conflict between the official, Westernized communications structure and the traditional communications structures of the masses (on this, cf. Fathi 1979) was clearly decided in favor of the traditional trusted channels that had served for centuries. The messages of Ayatollah Khomeini were circulated via the traditional communications channels. At the same time, though, at least so Mowlana (1979) conjectures, television favored the revolutionaries in another way still: Through the Shah's constant television appearances, he destroyed his image as the King of Kings, the Shadow of God, and the Light of the Aryans. Television took away that mystery.

An example of the efficiency of interpersonal communications systems from Morocco is provided by William Hachten (1971, 13): "Within hours, news of the March 1965 Casablanca riots had reached the marketplaces of every city and town in the country, despite the Government's complete ban on the news in press and radio." The author emphasizes the significance as a communications medium for West Africa of the "mammy wagons." These are the buses and trucks with which women traders from the villages travel to the cities. Hachten also relates that Nkrumah made purposeful use of bus drivers to spread news of political events to the bush and, the other way around, to inform himself about the climate of opinion. Moreover, Nkrumah recruited, for pay, literate Government employees whose work took them to the bush regularly, as well as the traditional town criers, to circulate news and the political views of the Government. In the Bahamas, Lent (1977, 178) reports, interpersonal communication is superior to mass communication. Since the islands are quite small, the people apparently feel it's up to them to spread information faster than the newspapers can. A way that a traditional communications form of the villages can be used in Nigeria to create an effective role for mass communication is illustrated by Ugboajah (1979). The village gongman is deeply rooted in the village tradition as an effective and credible communicator, one who, other than the radio, reaches his target groups.

A summary of the advantages of the traditional media is presented by H. S. Ranganath (1976, 25), who has been the deputy director of the Song & Drama Division of the Indian Government's Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. His resumé: ". . . more intimate with the masses (in fact, an aspect of their life-style) than any other media; rich in variety; readily available at low cost for experimentation and field application; relished by different age groups and both sexes; greater potential for persuasive communication; creating a face-to-face-situation, which augments a direct and instant feed-back possibility; and above all, that they (the traditional media) were the 'theme carriers', traditionally." Among such traditional

media can be counted, for example, folk drama, folk dance, shadow plays, puppetry, ballads, story-telling, drumming, masquerade, songs of praise singers, and so on. Both in order to preserve the cultural identity of indigenous performing arts and also to bring a sense of functional relevance to them in the context of contemporary communication, the Song & Drama Division was established in India in 1954.

Ranganath (1976; 1982) presents a survey of experiences in India. His writing indicates that even persons like himself, non-foreign to a country, have to proceed with the utmost delicacy if traditional communications channels are to be used for transmitting modern content. An example is an

"If traditional communications channels are to be used for transmitting modern content – be careful."

attempt to enlighten adherents of the goddess Yellama, who are described as being extremely poor, and noted for their large families, about possibilities of family planning. This was to be done through Yellama songs, the content of which is described as being seemingly relaxed and flexible. Popular performing troupes were picked up and cajoled to alter the content of some of the songs, so as to include calculated indirect messages pertaining to family-welfare plans. The new songs were pre-tested in the field without courting discernible adverse reactions. On the day of the great fair when thousands of followers of the goddess converged on the Saudatti hills the reaction was of another quality: "It was hostile to start with, and turned violent when the crowds became vocal and even vociferous, squarely questioning the content of the songs, which to them was not merely incongruous but sacrilegeous. The performing parties had to be quickly withdrawn in the interest of the personal safety of the performers." (1976, 27.) Another mistake, involving an attempt to carry out a program containing messages that would make an impact on family planning, is also reported by Ranganath (1976). In a slum section in Madras a highly popular artist was to present a carefully planned program of ballads that was thought to have an impact on family planning. Because most of the public for the performance were wage-earners, the program was to take place in the evening. But on the scheduled evening, it was found that the arena was largely filled with children. It turned out that the elders had driven the children out to see the program, while the parents stayed home to enjoy a little precious privacy.

But among the vast number of experiences in India there are not only errors to chronicle. Orthodox Hindus, for example, who were against any form of family planning because the children came from God, nevertheless could be

addressed via the Katha, a narration of God's own story in song and spoken word. To start with, via this medium the "conscience-keepers" were addressed. The skilled performer, himself a high-caste Hindu, hinted at the desirability of accepting the small-family form, and argued, in a personal discussion following his performance, that good gods always had small families. Ranganath (1976, 30) believes there was a noticeable crack in the impregnable fortress of orthodox opinion.

Thus folk media are suited for the conveying of "modern" messages only under quite specific conditions, which vary from situation to situation (e.g. Dissanayake 1977; Lent 1982). Determinant always is this criterion: It is necessary to reach the local opinion leaders and to win their support. In general the traditional media are more credible than are the mass media,

"In general the traditional media are more credible than the mass media, which illiterates often distrust."

which illiterates often distrust (Gupta 1981). Besides, the language of the mass media often is not understood. Illustrative of this situation, Lerner (1958, 190) quotes remarks of Lebanese villagers (in 1950): "I don't want to listen to the radio." – "I don't understand it. It's talking and singing." – "I listened but I didn't understand." Another indication that radio is often not used because of its unintelligibility to some circles stems from Rao's (1966) findings in two Indian villages. For many villagers the modern media are something completely alien, something to distrust. However, exaggerated optimism in regard to the use of traditional media to communicate modern messages is uncalled-for. Often these traditional channels cannot be used to disseminate modern messages. As Dissanayake (1977) remarks: "In trying to adapt traditional media to suit modern conditions, a question that is likely to prove troublesome is the concept of performance."

A consequence of such findings would be that, for example, there would be special support for local radio programs discussing local problems in local idioms. As the experience in India shows, radio and television can also be used to communicate traditional song patterns, when the folk medium is captured by the camera or microphone in its own natural environment. In other words, media such as radio, television and film can definitely contribute to the identity and continuity of national cultures by giving expression to their indigenous arts.

It is an all-too-common assumption that an effect of the modern mass media is to distort development and to destroy authentic cultures. Thus Lee (1980, 143 ff.) shows that the introduction of TV has helped in Taiwan to revive the Peking opera – clearly a traditional art form. Moreover, the Latin American narrative form of the telenovela represents, as does Thai's mau lum (a story in

song) an adaptation of traditional communications forms by a modern medium (cf. Katz and Wedell 1978; Katz 1977). There is "a fragile hope," Elihu Katz (1977) tells us, "that broadcasting might steer a course which refuses to sacrifice authenticity to modernity and refuses to sacrifice freedom to authenticity." Nevertheless, because of the relatively limited repertoire of traditional media, there is a danger that this content will be consumed, in the sense of used up, quite quickly by the mass media. Anyway, especially the traditional media that are tied to certain situations (such as festivals) cannot simply be made a fixed part of a program and, instead of perhaps once a year, be transmitted, say, every week.

4.2 The Two-Step Flow Model of Mass Media and the Diffusion of Innovations

A central aspect of any modernization process is the diffusion of innovations. In case there are any weak links or resistances in the chain of communications from innovator to beneficiary (we are considering here primarily rural populations), the attempt to disseminate innovations will as a rule come to nothing. One of the roots of diffusion research is in the cultural anthropology of the 19th century, which regarded diffusion and the adoption of new techniques as the essential cause of social change. But deliberations about the theme of diffusion were also made by Gabriel Tarde (1901), who considered the basic social process to be imitation. He assumed the existence of an S-shaped diffusion curve. It represented a slow advance in the beginning, followed by rapid and uniformly accelerated progress, followed again by progress that continues to slacken until it finally stops. There is also reference to the significance of "opinion leaders," and the importance of similarity between model person and receiving individuals. Tarde reasoned that social relations are much closer between individuals who resemble each other in occupation and education.

In the rural sociology, Ryan and Gross (1943) lay the basis for further studies of diffusion in their investigation of the diffusion of hybrid seed corn among Iowa farmers. The literature unanimously regards a diffusion process as meaning the taking over, within a certain period, of an idea or a procedure by individuals or groups. "There are four crucial elements," Everett M. Rogers (1962, 12) writes, "in the analysis of the diffusion of innovations: 1. the innovation, 2. its communication from one individual to another, 3. in a social system, 4. over time." It is to be noted that the diffusion of

innovations is clearly distinct from the diffusion of information, since with the former we are dealing with the uncertainties of the possible take-over of known techniques or procedures which conceivably can alter the entire life-style.

In accordance with Rogers (1962, 81 ff.), one can differentiate among five steps of the process of adoption:

1. The awareness stage, in which the individual is exposed to the innovation but lacks complete information about it.

2. The interest stage, in which the individual becomes interested in the new idea and seeks additional information about it.

3. The evaluation stage, in which the individual mentally applies the innovation to his present and anticipated future situation, and then decides whether or not to try it.

4. The trial stage, in which the individual uses the innovation on a small scale in order to determine its utility in his own situation.

5. The adoption stage, in which the individual decides to continue the full use of the innovation.

Most of the diffusion studies proceeded according to the following design (cf. Müller 1970, 47): First the time was determined at which specific contents were first disseminated by the mass media. Then the reception quota (the proportion of the persons questioned who actually had received the content in one or another way) was measured at several time intervals. The place was determined at which the informed interviewees had received the mass-communicated content. The medium through which the reception was ascertained, and thus the relative import of mass and interpersonal communication, was determined for the diffusion of the content that first had been disseminated via mass communicators.

Illustration 4.1 shows, as an example of a diffusion study, the adoption period for 2.4-D weed spray.

In explanation of the diffusion processes there are several models available. One, for example, is the AIDA model, widely used in market research. It is, however, more a mnemo-technical abbreviation for the structure of a marketing message which is supposed to occasion the recipient to certain reactions, namely: attention, interest, desire, action. Within the context of the Yale studies carried out by Hovland and others, there was a distinction between the successive stages of attention, comprehension and acceptance. The influencing factors in the individual stages were investigated. Five successive stages of persuasion are distinguished by McGuire (e.g. 1969, 173),

Illustration 4.1: Adoption Period for Iowa Farmers Adopting 2.4-D Weed Spray by Year (Rogers 1962, 109).



The shaded area in this figure illustrates the aggregate adoption period between awareness and adoption of 2.4-D weed spray. Awareness proceeds at a more rapid rate than does adoption. This suggests that relatively later adopters have a longer average adoption period than do earlier adopters. For example, there are 1.7 years between 10 per cent awareness and 10 per cent adoption, but 3.1 years between 92 per cent awareness and 92 per cent adoption.

namely attention (before this stage, there is still the matter of the way in which the content will be offered), comprehension, yielding, retention and action. In use, too, is a distinction, in accordance with Kelman (1961), among three forms of social influence:

- There is compliance when an individual accepts influence from another person because he hopes to achieve a favorable reaction from the other.

- There is identification when an individual adopts behavior derived from another person or group because this behavior is associated with a satisfying self-defining relationship to this person or group.

- There is internalization when an individual accepts influence because the induced behavior is congruent with his value system. The content of the induced behavior is intrinsically rewarding in this case; behavior is adopted because it is defined as useful for the solution of a problem. The credibility of the influencing change agent is of crucial importance for the occurence of internalization.

Concerning the diffusion of innovations, research shows that the mass media are most important during the stage of attention or awareness, while interpersonal communication is most important in the phase of adoption. Interpersonal channels are determinate as to the success or non-success of development projects (for instance, agricultural extension in Bangladesh; fertility control in China, Taiwan and Southern Korea; cf. Lee 1980, 191). A distinction is made among four phases of diffusion by Rogers and Shoemaker (1973), whose model of the diffusion of innovations is depicted in illustration 4.2: – knowledge (the existence of innovation as well as some information on its significance are known); – persuasion (the shaping of a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the innovation); – decision (activities are undertaken that lead to acceptance or rejection;); – confirmation (reinforcements are sought for the decision that has been taken, with, in the event of conflicting information, revision of the decision). In addition, there is a distinction among antecedents, process and consequences.

Illustration 4.2: Paradigm of the Innovation-Decision Process According to Rogers and Shoemaker.



There is an effort in the model by Rogers and Shoemaker also to take into consideration the non-mass-media sources of information. The impression created by the graphics that, for example, the receiver variables and the social-system variables are significant solely in the knowledge phase is

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misleading. For both variable clusters also influence the succeeding phases. The model does not, however, provide information as to which communications sources are significant in which phase of diffusion. In particular, the model is localized at the level of the individual as an adopting unit. The decision for or against the adopting of an innovation is, however, usually taken at the level of the group. Moreover, the model is set up from the perspective of a change agent. He decides from outside what innovations are to be introduced, and how this move can most effectively be taken. The interests of those concerned are determined by a sort of "wise dictator," but are not ascertained at the base in advance. A weak point in the model is in the assumption that change of attitude would precede change of behavior, or would involve it. The inference of such a mechanistic one-to-one relationship between attitude and behavior finds no support in the literature (cf. Ch. 3.2).

Proceeding from the statistical measurements of mean and standard deviation, Rogers (1962, 168 ff.) develops a typology of the adopter (cf. ill. 4.3). The earliest 2½% of the individuals taking over the innovation – that is, those who are localized as being "earlier" by more than two standard deviations than the median line of adoption of something new – are termed innovators. Innovators are eager to try ideas. They prefer cosmopolite social relationships and travel in a circle of venturesomeness. The next 13½% are called early adopters. Early adopters are localites and have the greatest degree of opinion leadership. They are respected by their peers and are the embodiment of the successful use of new ideas. The 34% between one standard deviation early and the mean are the early majority. They adopt new ideas just before the average member of a social system and are an important link in the process of legitimizing innovations. The late majority, the next 34%, approaches innovations with caution. Adoption may be both an economic necessity and the result of social pressure. The last 16% are called the laggards; they are the most localite, and their point of reference is the past.

This is the method most used in practice to disseminate or carry through innovation, and thereby in some circumstances also to overcome traditional attitudes: to have organized groups, under the guidance of an expert, jointly receive radio or television programs. Then there is group discussion by means of which a purposeful effort is made to bring about a decision-taking process in favor of the adoption of the innovation (which may, for example, be in the spheres of agriculture, hygiene, bringing up children, and so on). Projects sponsored by UNESCO in particular (cf. Weiss 1964, 152) follow this pattern. (Compare, as a prime example of practical implementation of such a project, David Crowley i.a., "How to Run a Radio Learning-Group Campaign," Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation 1982). This method of proceeding takes into account a lesson of experience: While it is true that the mass media can influence knowledge, and thus can be used especially in the awareness stage, these media rarely, however, change attitudes or behavior, goals for which interpersonal communication is better suited. Mass media are able to provide

Illustration 4.3: Adopter Categorization on the Basis of Relative Time of Adoption of Innovations



The innovativeness dimension, as measured by the time at which an individual adopts an innovation or innovations, is continuous. However, this variable may be partitioned into five adopter categories by laying off standard deviations from the average time of adoption.

information about innovations. But how this information will be used is decided by interpersonal communication. The multiplier effect of mass media has its optimal effect if the points of junction with the system of interpersonal communication can be reached. Inasmuch as in developing countries a typical situation is community reception of mass media, the following observation by Weiss (1972, 142) is noteworthy: "It is because of this one-many linkage between media units and exposure contacts, as well as the general significance of personal channels in the diffusion of news, that the social impact of the mass media in developing countries will be underestimated by indexes composed of physical units per some amount of population."

The literature (e.g. Aufermann 1971; Luthe 1968) summarizes the operations of a great number of radio and television forums (for example, farm radio forums in Canada; tele-clubs in France; radio clubs in the Republique du Niger; farm radio forums in India). Here we shall examine, as what might be called a prototype, the results of the study in India that was conducted from February to April 1956. At the start it became clear that in view of existing traditions women and Harijans (the caste of the untouchables) could not take part in the forums. Mathur and Neurath (1959, 105 f.) summarize the results of the project: "Radio farm forum as an agent for transmission of knowledge has proved to be a success beyond expectation. Increase in knowledge in the forum villages between pre- and post-broadcast was spectacular, whereas in the non-forum villages it was negligible. What little gain there was in the non-forum villages occurred mostly in those with radio. . . Group discussion as a means of transmitting knowledge was a

complete success. What occasional weaknesses were still found at the end of the experiment were of a kind that could easily be eliminated through proper advice and guidance from the district organizer."

The significance of the forum becomes still clearer if you consider the degree of alteration of the participants' state of knowledge on a scale of 0 to 18. The state of knowledge within the 20 forum groups rose from 6.4 to an average of 12.1 points. In 10 control groups that, it is true, had a radio set, but were not organized as listening groups, the score on the scale rose only from 5.5 to 7.0 points (cf. Neurath 1962). A clear indication of the superiority for this purpose of organized over unorganized radio listeners. Again, a mass medium (radio) was combined with interpersonal communication via organized listener groups to conduct health campaigns in Tanzania (cf.

"A mass medium combined with interpersonal communication can achieve large-scale alteration of behaviour."

Solomon 1982). The groups listened to the shows, discussed them, and planned follow-up activities. The "Man is Health" campaign demonstrated that large-scale alteration of behavior is possible. The campaign resulted in the construction of 700,000 latrines as advocated in the radio broadcasts and related printed material. In the second campaign, "Food is Life," a total of 1.5 million adults, organized in some 75,000 study groups, took part. The goals of the campaign included increased knowledge of nutrition and of how to use available foods; planning of low-cost balanced diets; elimination of food taboos; better food storage and preservation techniques; better farming methods; and co-operative activities. The campaign resulted in an increased awareness of the need for more indigeneously produced food, the establishment of vegetable gardens, and poultry production, and an improvement in dietary habits. (Recommendable as a survey of the attempts to co-ordinate mass media and interpersonal communication within the frame of campaigns is: Juan E. Diaz Bordenave, "Communication and Rural Development," UNESCO 1977.)

The development of the Two-Step-Flow-Model (TSFM) – on which the conception of the media forums was based – has as its point of departure the findings in an investigation of the American Presidential election campaign of 1940. Lazarsfeld and others (1944) ascertained the degree to which election propaganda is effective. They found that, contrary to the then accepted theoretical models, such election publicity had no (or only exceptionally had any) direct influence on the recipients. This finding was not explainable with the help of the model of a "one-step Flow" of mass communication: that is, the theory that each single member of the public will be reached directly. The

authors interpreted their data with the help of the Two-Step Flow Model of mass communication. According to this model, the messages disseminated by mass media flow first to the so-called opinion leaders (OL), and from them to less active sectors of the populace. However, the validity of the Two-Step Flow Model is not confirmed by the data assembled by Lazarsfeld and co-authors. Yet this fact is not astonishing, since the format of the study was not based on the significance of interpersonal communication. In the study, it was only possible to show that the one-step model has no explicatory value.

The Two-Step Flow Model (TSFM) includes the assumption that the opinion leaders are the active, information-seeking individuals. Moreover,

Opinion leaders as the active information-seeking individuals.

that they are characterized by a higher consumption of media as well as by a more active social life and a certain openness toward the world, a so-called cosmopolitan orientation. The others, the non-opinion leaders, are the mass public. According to this model, the mass media function vertically, while the opinion leaders operate horizontally. In the first stage, a vertical transfer of information from medium to opinion leader and in the second stage, a horizontal exercise of influence by the opinion leaders to the "followers" is inferred. As for the definition of opinion leader, the literature reveals, however, non-consistency. "Those individuals who have a great share of influence are called opinion leaders," Rogers (1962, 208) writes, "because they take the lead in influencing the opinions of others. Opinion leaders are defined as those individuals from whom others seek advice and information." The "classical model" of TSF is depicted in illustration 4.4.

How is opinion leadership to be best defined? According to Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955, 138) the term indicates "leadership at its simplest," that is, leading that occasionally, sometimes unconsciously, mostly hardly visible, is exercised during normal every-day contacts. "Opinion leadership" denotes the ability to influence, relatively often informally, the attitudes or the behavior of other individuals along desired lines. Leaders and followers are not opposites; they simply represent graduated ways of behavior. A survey of the sociological literature shows that opinion leaders are to be differentiated, slightly, from followers through these characteristics: higher education, higher social status, greater readiness to accept new ideas, greater degree of participation in social life, and a cosmopolitan rather than local orientation. These differences must, however, in no event be too pronounced. For otherwise the person involved as a rule is no longer accepted by the group as leader.

Opinion leadership is dependent on: 1. The personality structure of the leader, his inborn talents, his experiences, his definitions of the situation, and

Illustration 4.4: Model of the Two-Step-Flow.



the resources he has at hand to achieve the goal. 2. The personalities of the group members, their inborn talents, their experiences, their definitions of the situation, and the assets and/or liabilities they possess for reaching and/or blocking the goal. 3. The situative context, in which leader and led interact. From this conception of leadership it follows that in order to elucidate behavior toward, as well as the possible effects of, mass communication you need a knowledge of the network of interpersonal relations in which the individual is integrated as well as of the respective reference groups. Accordingly, this thesis presents itself: The greater an indivicual's know-how in the sense of its being adequate to the situation (the functional authority), the greater is the likelihood of his becoming an opinion leader. Whether an individual acts only for a specific thematic field (monomorphic or specialist opinion leadership) or for various topical areas (polymorphic or generalist opinion leadership), our concept of leadership cannot determine. An argument against the existence of a general opinion leadership is found in the data of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955, 334). However, the study was undertaken in a modern industrialized society. Therefore, the thesis can be submitted that

the more division of labor a society possesses, the more specialized opinion leaders there are. Accordingly, in developing countries more polymorphic/generalist opinion leaders would be anticipatable.

A Two-Cycle-Flow Model was developed by Troldahl (1966). The theory assumes that opinion leaders are not necessarily the persons who must take over the initiative for interpersonal communication. It is asserted that individuals who obtain new information that isn't reconcilable with their previous predispositions or attitudes strive to restore consistency. According to Troldahl, opinion leaders and followers are equally exposed to and equally attentive to the mass media. Opinion leaders behave upon the emergence of inconsistent information exactly as followers do: They seek supplementary information. However, the opinion leaders turn to another circle of persons – to experts such as, for example, development workers or change agents. These opinion leaders of the opinion leaders are, according to the empirically tested but not yet entirely proven concept of Troldahl, also of determinant significance in the communication process.

In the two-cycle flow of communication model (cf. ill. 4.5), it is assumed at least for learning effects that there is a one-step flow of communication, direct from the mass media to the members of the social system. The theory, on which the model is based, of cognitive consistency or cognitive balance assumes that people are motivated to maintain an apparent consistency among the facts and beliefs they possess. New, inconsistent information brings about a condition of cognitive "imbalance," linked with psychic stress. A possibility of overcoming this condition is to get advice and/or new information from the respective opinion leader. The second step of communication thus is initiated by the followers. Here the opinion leaders traditionally exhibit another way of seeking information. While followers usually seek advice from individuals who are perceived as being relatively like the seekers, as we have seen, opinion leaders seek advice from persons who are more knowledgeable than themselves (professional intermediaries).

The empirical examination by Troldahl of the two-cycle model shows, however, that this model, too, still requires modification. In particular, the significance of the consistency-theoretical assumptions ought not to be overestimated. For one thing, cognitive balance is in no sense the normal condition of an attitudinal system. For another, many authors uphold the thesis that there is not striving for consistency, but instead a search for variety or new information.

"The role of the opinion-giver is often exchanged with the role of the opinion-asker."

Illustration 4.5: Two-Cycle Flow of Communication Model After Troldahl 1966, 614.



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Often a process of opinion-sharing occurs, Troldahl and van Dam (1965) also ascertain. That is, the role of the opinion-giver is often exchanged with the role of the opinion-asker. These givers and askers strongly resemble each other, and are clearly distinguished from the opinion avoiders. These "avoiders" are more or less cut off from the flow of communication and are not particularly interested in the respective issue. In other words, there needs to be a clear distinction between non-leaders and the non-active. It is not leading and following that are opposites; instead, the contrast with both leaders and followers is indifference – the inability or lack of readiness either to lead or to follow. (Regarding "opinion avoiders," cf. Wright and Cantor 1967.) During the course of a diffusion process, it appears that, at first, a group of interested and well-informed individuals emerges. This group, through interpersonal communication, both seeks and passes on information. In this process it is not certain that information is also passed on to the inactive sector.

Various objections can be raised against the Two-Step Flow Model: 1. TSFM includes the implication that the opinion leaders (OL) are the active, information-seeking individuals, with the rest of the recipients constituting, however, a passive mass public without influence. As has been shown, this thesis does not hold. 2. It is also assumed that the mass media would be the primary information source for the OL. But OL use various information channels, depending on the respective subject of a message and also according to the opinion-leaders' position in the social structure. 3. TSFM does not take into consideration which information channels are significant in a diffusion process at which time. The finding of the diffusion studies that innovators use mass media as information sources more often than do individuals who learn about an innovation later can mean, Rogers (1973, 294) argues, that the

"The opinion leaders under some circumstances are simply people who are informed about innovations earlier."

opinion leaders under some circumstances are simply people who are informed about innovations earlier. Since other individuals don't yet have this information, at first there are only the mass media as a source of information. That is to say, the dependence on the mass media can under some conditions be founded, not primarily on the opinion leadership, but simply on early knowledge. 4. Still another objection that can be made to the TSFM is that it leaves unclear what the opinion leader does with information. Does he reject it? Pass it on? Modify it? Klapper (1967, 59) argues that opinion leaders

embody the norms of their groups and have a conservative significance, in that the OLs provide the group members with the assurance that here there are shared values. The Two-Step Flow neutralizes mass-media effects through the opinion leaders' selective perception and through the interpersonal influence. But such a thesis may only be correct when "conservative values" are dominant. If a certain readiness for innovation is expected of the opinion leader (and that is often the case), or if the value structures favor social change, then this thesis requires modification. Also remaining unclear in the Two-Step Model is the distinction between pure transmission of information and possible attempts to exert influence on the part of an opinion leader.

We cannot here discuss in detail the methodological problems of the studies of the Two-Step Model. But the decisive weakness of the studies that have been carried out on the diffusion of innovations is clearly the use of random samples. What is of key significance here is the disregarding of the social environment of interviewees; they are investigated as if they were individuals existing in social isolation. Because of the disregarding of social-structural factors, the finds obtained can be termed "aggregated psychology" (Coleman 1958), but not "sociological." In view of the one-sided orientation of the research, Rogers (1973, 305 f.) writes that, while indeed the role of the individuals in the diffusion process has been sufficiently researched, very little is known, however, about the communications relationships. In the investigation of diffusion processes in which the dissemination of one or more informational messages is to be followed up during the course of time through various channels of a communications net, the use of random samples is obviously not a very promising technique. Instead, communications nets need analysis in their entirety (e.g. "snowball-sampling"; on problems of network samples cf. Granovetter 1976).

The assumption that there are only two steps in the flow of information has been refuted empirically. Depending on how important the information is,

Current effort is in the direction of developing a "multi-step model" of the flow of information.

there can be only one step, or more steps. The current effort is in the direction of developing a "multi-step model." The attempt proceeds from the assumption that in the communications process a variable number of relays and modification points can play a role. Some messages reach the recipients directly, others indirectly.

The number of steps depends on such variables as the importance of the news of innovation, the accessibility of the medium, and so on. Because of the

larger number of possible influencing factors, as of now such a multistep model is to be regarded as a programmatic guideline, rather than as a framework of hypotheses useable in research practice. Despite this qualification, the work on a multi-step model may well help to ensure that further researches are not patterned too narrowly – that is, anticipating only two steps.

What is the significance of the Two-Step Flow Model as a model for the diffusion of information and/or innovations in the developing countries? This aspect the literature shows to be uncontroversial. (For the more recent studies of opinion leadership, cf. e.g. Holz and Wright 1979, 202 ff.). But in the practical carrying out of projects, it has to be assumed that the readiness of specific categories of recipients to accept innovations enjoys only limited latitude. What if there should be a boomerang effect: the achievement, not of a change of opinion, but, instead, of increased resistance to change? In order to avoid such a contra-productive result, it must be seen to that the discrepancy between content of communication and attitude of recipient is not too great. Sherif and Sherif (1969, 357) define as the latitude of acceptance the most acceptable position plus other positions that the individual also finds acceptable on a scale of attitudes if a person voluntarily states his view on a topic. The latitude of rejection comprehends the position most objectionable to the individual, the thing he most detest in a particular domain, plus other positions also objectionable to him. The latitude of noncommitment comprehends the neutral sphere. The size of the indifference sphere is the indicator of the extent of ego-involvement; the smaller the zone of indifference, the greater is the involvement. With the aid of these three constructs, the following three hypotheses as to the effects of the mass media present themselves:

1. In the sphere of rejection, no effect of a persuasive communication, intended by the communicator, is to be expected; instead, the more probable outcome will be a boomerang effect.

2. In the sphere of indifference, changes of attitude along the intended lines are easiest to achieve – that is, with views that are not consented to and not rejected.

3. In the sphere of acceptance, most probable is an intensification of already existing attitudes.

A continuous feedback between change agents and communicators – that is, producers of mass-media contents – is, in connection with a continuous feedback between change agents and local opinion leaders, of determinant importance. Such feedback is essential for the carrying out of a campaign of any kind so as under given circumstances to be able promptly to implement necessary modifications of content. Of central importance is the credibility of the media. In even the most recent literature, communication theorists are

still frequently proceeding from the absolutely unjustified assumption that there is a "sleeper effect." According to the "sleeper" notion, after a long period (perhaps four weeks) no differentiation ought to be made between credible and non-credible communications; with respect to the change of attitude that has been brought about, since with time the association between source and message becomes constantly weaker (cf. ill. 4.6).

Illustration 4.6: The Sleeper Effect (Hovland 1954, 1087).



It is important to emphasize that this sleeper effect, which seems to invite a certain nonchalance in dealing with the credibility of media, has not been proven empirically. This even though, as said before, in the literature the sleeper effect is nevertheless repeatedly presented as having been empirically documented. With Gillig and Greenwald (1974), one could conclude that it is "time to lay the sleeper effect to rest since . . . a statistically significant increase in opinion for a group receiving a communication from a low-redibilit y source has *never* been reported."

If the goal of a campaign is the acceptance of an innovation – for example, by a rural populace – then consideration is to be given of the respective socio-cultural context representing the environment of the opinion leaders. If the norms of the social system are tradition-oriented and hostile to chance, then the OL will, as a rule, also be traditionally oriented. In such situations an early acceptance of innovations is often an indicator of imperfect integration and/or social marginality. In general, though, the flow of information from the mass media into the interpersonal channels will often proceed along the lines of the original Two-Step Flow Model: this if only because most of the peasants in a rural setting, to take an example, are not in the position to understand the

information distributed by the mass media and are dependent for its interpretation on the help of opinion leaders.

In a study conducted in Colombia, Rogers and Svenning (1969, 230 f.) discovered that in relatively modern villages the opinion leaders were more innovative than the non-leaders, while by contrast in tradition-oriented villages the OL were only slightly more prepared for innovation than the rest of the villagers. In such a traditional milieu the roles of the innovators and the opinion leaders usually diverge. Finally, it still remains to be examined whether the opinion leaders in a traditional environment do not quite purposefully manipulate information in their own interest. A particularly impressive example of this is presented by Abdul Muis (1983, 97) in the framework of a study carried out in South Sulawesi, Indonesia: "In 1981, in a remote village in South Sulawesi, an educated landowner was explaining to several poor peasants – whose labor had been used 'effectively' by him for rice cultivation and livestock-breeding – about a transmigration project in Sumatra. The night before, (the project) had been (reported) on television and many peasants were very interested in the news. Probably because land allotment and housing for the transmigrants and their families were also displayed. Being afraid of the possible influence of the news on his peers, the opinion leader persuaded them by telling that there were many tigers, elephants and other beasts as well as bandits in the vicinity of the location of the transmigrants – in the province of Lampung. He told them that many transmigrants had been killed by the beasts and robbers. The outcome of his tale (was): He managed to persuade his peers. The poor peasants preferred their stay in the village to transmigration."

Finally, a word of caution is in order. The overwhelming majority of the studies on the diffusion of innovations have been carried out in industrialized countries. The typical S-formed diffusion curve is not necessarily to be anticipated in developing countries. This is especially so in that the potential beneficiaries often are not reached at all. Or, customarily, a policy of "betting on the strong" is still being pursued (Rajagopal 1982).

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5. Structure-Functionalistic Theories

5.1 Basic Lines in Functionalistic Thinking

The goal of functionalistic analysis consists of showing to what extent the parts (subsystems) of a system contribute to the functioning of the system as a whole; or do not contribute. In other words, the purpose is to ask which consequences processes in self-regulating systems have. With functionalism, systemic thinking moves to the center of theoretical analysis. "Functional analysis," says Lewis Coser (1976, 146), "focuses attention on the causal loop through which the consequences of given courses of action act back on the item under observation, bringing out persistence or modification." At the same time, the conclusion of the causal analysis is reversed. No effort is made to derive a social phenomenon from specific causes. Instead the question is asked: Which functions have to be fullfilled so as to guarantee the maintenance of the system? Functional analysis doesn't aim at uncovering causes of social action, but at determining the importance of acting for the maintenance of the system. The results, not the causes, of the actions are analyzed or teleologically – in the sense of a contribution to stability of the system – interpreted.

The follwing six basic assumptions of functional analysis are outlined by Hagedorn and Labovitz (1973, 38 ff.):

1. The assumption of the existence of a social system consisting of subsystems that mutually influence each other.

2. The assumption that the system has a certain number of basic needs that must be fulfilled; otherwise, the system breaks down.

3. That for the maintenance of the system's equilibrium the needs of the subsystems must be met.

4. That the subsystems (parts of the system) can be functional (contributing to stability), dysfunctional (decreasing stability), or irrelevant in regard to the stability of the system as a whole.

5. That a specific need of the system can be satisfied in different ways (functional equivalents).

6. Finally, the assumption that only institutionalized (regularly recurring) patterns of behavior are adequate to a functional analysis.

Structural-functional analysis, Selznick (1948) argues, is suited for analysis of adaptative structures or processes, because this method places currently variable behavior (functions) in relation to an assumed stable system (structure), characterized by certain needs and mechanism. Functions are short-lived processes that quickly run their course. By contrast, structures are stable, long-lived processes. Functions, in the terminology of Lewis A. Coser (1976, 146), are those observed consequences that make for adaptation or adjustment of given structures; dysfunctions are those observed consequences that lessen adaptation or adjustment.

The structure-functionalism based on the organistic paradigm "views society as a systemic, interrelated, interdependent, evolving, equilibrium-oriented whole, representing underlying system needs or functions" (Kinloch 1977, 190). A prerequisite of structural-functional analysis is the assumption of the existence of a system-immanent need for self-maintenance – that is, for integration and continuity – which is responsible for the arrival at repetitive methods of adjustment. Every-day activities are interpreted according to the question of their contribution to system stability. Latent functions refer to the "unintended" consequences of modes of behavior. Here, however, there is the tendency to use the concept of latent functions as an instrument of explanation through which irrational ways of behavior (for example, prayers for rain) acquire a rational basis (for instance, strengthening of social solidarity). The weakness of structural-functional analysis lies in its lack of clear criteria for answering the question: What is functional; what is not? Thus there is always the danger that the value concepts of the respective researcher determine the answer to the question. This uncertainty occasionally results in the offering of uninformative formulations as frameworks of interpretation: "Dysfunctions are then unambiguous if they eliminate functional effects, or at least surpass such effects." (Ronneberger, 1971, 29.) At the same time the emphasis on systemic equilibrium implies the danger that functional analysis contains within itself a conservative perspective, one justifying the respective

"If a specific social system,
regardless of the extent of social injustice
that it contains,
is regarded as being
in a state of equilibrium . . ."

status quo. If a specific social system, regardless of the extent of social injustice that it contains, is regarded as being in a state of equilibrium, then unrest, rebellions and revolutions can easily be classified as upsetting the equilibrium, and accordingly as being dysfunctional.

5.2 Functions of Mass Media

Functionalistic approaches to the illumination of relationships between mass media and society seek to delineate the contribution of the sub-system mass communication to the functioning of the system as a whole. Characteristic of this is the strict functionalistic position of Lasswell (1948, 118): "We are less interested in dividing up the act of communication than in viewing the act as a whole in relation to the entire social process." Lasswell emphasizes the system-stabilizing function of communication, which (termed ideology) supports dominant value structures, and distinguishes as functions of mass communication the *surveillance* of the environment, disclosing threats and opportunities affecting the value position of the community and of the component parts within it; *correlation* of the compenents of society in responding to the environment and the *transmission* of the social heritage from one generation to the next.

The function of entertainment is added to this list by Wright (1960, 610; 1974; 1975). He formulates the "classic" question or functionalistic mass-communications research:

What are the

(1) manifest
and
(2) latent

(3) functions
and
(4) dysfunctions

of mass communicated

(5) surveillance (news)
(6) correlation (editorial activity)
(7) cultural transmission
(8) entertainment

for the

(9) society
(10) subgroups
(11) individual
(12) cultural systems?

On the basis of Merton's conception of functional analysis, an investigation is called for by Wright (1969, 606) of "those consequences of social phenomena which affect the normal operation, adaptation or adjustment of a given system: individuals, sub-groubs, social and cultural systems." In the case of Wright, the allegation of conservatism that is, often purely rhetorically, made against functionalistic approaches is relevant. The conservative orientation of Wright's analysis is expressed, for one thing, in his argument that the media's contribution to stabilization of control is to be categorized as

functional, while "dysfunction" is applied to news, threatening to stability, of better societies.

A great number of listings of mass-communications functions is found in the sociological literature. They are not only of heuristic significance. These lists, as paradigms or models, provide orientation assistance, and accordingly under certain circumstances structure the research process and establish priorities. Thus emphasis is placed on the functions of articulation of opinion; publicizing; checks on political activity; education and training; political socialization; the influencing of the economy via advertising; the creating of a focused public opinion; in other words, the communication with one another of groups actively participating in the socio-political process, lobbies and other interest groupings, political parties, and so on. Other authors place the respectively dominant media functions in relation with the political system. Thus some authors assign to private-enterprise media the dominant function of entertainment; by contrast, these authors argue, democratic, quasi-governmental media have primarily informing functions. For media in totalitarian states the primary task is ascribed as being the calibration of opinion, a function that is to be supplemented with shallow entertainment. As for this latter aspect, thus in Communist countries media policy is a component of agitation and propaganda. Mass communication in these societies doesn't have the job of disseminating information as widely as possible, but instead of attaining an indoctrination through targeted manipulation of opinion – which is termed "socialist guidance of consciousness." The mass media within Communist systems are regarded as a part of the apparatus of power of the ruling Communist Party.

"The mass media must retain to some degree their most basic function: that of serving as inspector-general to the entire political system . . ."

As for the function of mass media in developing countries, Pye (1967, 37) offers a most optimistic assumption: "Even in the most weak and unstable country the mass media must still retain to some degree their most basic function: that of serving as inspector-general to the entire political system so as to provide the necessary public criticism to ensure some degree of political integrity among the power-holders."

5.3 Mass Media and Social Change

A determinant influence on the more recent macro-sociological analysis is the structure-functionalistic theory of Talcott Parsons. It is linked with the claim of being able to illuminate, as well, over-all social structures and processes. Parsons is beyond doubt the most influential Western sociologist of the postwar period. The development of Parsons' theory, simplified, can be depicted on the continuum social action – social system to the effect that in the course of time the concept of the social system has taken on increasing importance. This system aspect is at the center of the following analysis.

"A social system is a system of the actions of individuals, the principal units of which are roles and constellations of roles" is the definition provided by Parsons and Shils (1951, 197). Roles that are regarded as junction points of the personal and the social system are the structure-building elements of the social system. Internal differentiation, which is a fundamental property of all systems, requires integration. It is a condition of the existence of the system that the differentiated roles must be co-ordinated either negatively, in the sense of the avoidance of disruptive interference with each other, or positively, in the sense of contributing to the realization of certain shared collective goals through collaborated activity. In principle, the integration of the value orientations of the various actors in a social system is regarded as one of the most important functional prerequisites for the maintenance of the system.

Of determinant significance for the functioning of social systems is the internalization of the dominant value patterns by individuals. The motives of

"A key to the functioning of social systems: the internalization of the dominant value patterns by individuals."

the individuals and the cultural values must be to a considerable extent in accord; the value patterns must also be oriented toward the individual needs of the actors. The prerequisite for the continuing existence of a social system is the shifting of the system's value-demands to the individual's disposition of needs. Every social system must resolve four basic problems: 1. adaptive function (means), 2. goal attainment (values), 3. integrative function (norms), 4. latent pattern-maintenance and tension-management function.

In complex social systems each of these functions is ascribed to a specific sub-system; thus, to the economy, the resolution of adaptive problems; or, to the law, normative directing. It is inferred that social systems can comply with increased demands in regard to the fulfilling of the four basic functions through differentiation. There is no special subsystem mass communications

in the the framework of Parson's analysis. That is, it isn't clear which functional primate is assigned to mass communication, or whether mass communication is to be viewed only as an appendage of one or more other sub-systems. The status and/or the function of mass media within the context of the system theory is not explained. Thus the question arises: To what extent is mass communication to be regarded as an annex to the sub-system economy (for example, stabilization of demand through mass-media advertising); policy (e.g. mobilization of political support or stabilization of rule through manipulation); the integrative sub-system – societal community (e.g. through socialization); or the sub-system pattern maintenance (for instance, resolution of tension via escapism)?

In a treatise "The Mass Media and the Structure of American Society," Parsons and White (1972) concern themselves explicitly with the analysis of mass communication. An interesting gap in this analysis is to be observed: The analysis of the significance of mass media is done without reference to system-theoretical considerations. Parsons' analysis of mass communications accordingly is made outside the theoretical framework of societal analysis developed by him. According to Parsons and White, the development in the sphere of mass communications in modern societies is in the direction of the broadening of access to superior cultural content for constantly larger circles of the population. The fact that at present a need for qualitatively inferior entertainment is being satisfied by the mass media, especially television, is seen as merely a temporary phenomenon. According to the ideas of the authors – documented neither by empirical findings nor by theoretical analysis – things should come to a quality-increasing differentiation in the sense that quite specific target publics are addressed. The authors assume that transmissions with a higher cultural level will find larger audiences than those with a lower level.

Of a developed mass-communication system it is asserted that it provides more freedom for the recipients; although here "freedom" is defined rather peculiarly as: 1. greater possibility of choice among alternative sources of cummunication; 2. wider choice in regard to content; 3. freedoms in regard to costs (in money and time); 4. freedom to receive or not to receive a mass medium. A development toward ever-greater "freedom" is postulated by Parsons. He doesn't go into potential abortive developments; if a person can

With Parsons,
if a person can choose among three
instead of between two
detective-thriller TV series,
then that person has more "freedom."

choose among three instead of between two detective-thriller TV series, then that person has more "freedom." Nor are questions of the production of mass-

media content investigated. Instead, it is imputed that, by means of a kind of voting at the box-office, media content will be disseminated that corresponds optimally to the respective needs of recipients. Comparably optimistic is the argument of Johnson: There is a kind of evolutionary pressure toward democracy. Accordingly, there must be – apparently on the assumption that after all what dare not be, cannot be – an evolutionary pressure toward a free system of mass media. "This historical movement from an 'authoritarian' press to a 'libertarian' press to a free press devoted to social responsibility," Johnson (1976, 623) maintains, "corresponds to the development of democracy itself." This chain of argument suffices Johnson in his asserting, with the aid of some cursory data, that in the Soviet Union, too, the development of a free mass-media system is unavoidable. One can only not predict the exact time when this will happen.

Mass communication amounts, as long as the contents correspond to the needs of the recipients (that is, as long as the organizational form of the media is purely private-enterprise in nature, free of state intervention) to an instrument to stabilize a democratic system; at the most possibly a vehicle to implement non-system-endangering endogenous social change (social differentiation) by the articulation of possible altered needs of the recipients. A conclusion from this argumentation would be that mass-communications contents that are not produced within a respectively analyzed social system itself (or are not produced so as to correspond to the needs of the recipients) very probably contain value structures stabilizing the rule of non-democratic elites, or value structures endangering the rule of the democratic elites. This would lead to the interesting conclusion that the structure-functional theory of Parsons, which, as far as analysis of mass communication goes, to a large extent represents an ideological defense of the free-enterprise-based American media systems rather than scientific analysis, implies for developing countries the demand for cultural protectionism or isolationism. Although cultural protectionism for developing countries is in no sense Parsons' inferred political intention, still, as a consequence of Parsons' argumentation, such protectionism for developing countries, linked with autonomous "democratic" (= more adequate to the needs of recipients) media production would be the recommendable course.

A modification of the line taken by Parsons is found in Henner Hess (1969), who distinguishes political systems, analogously to Weber's typology of ruling authorities, as:

- traditional systems, in which there are no mass-communication media,
- transitional societies, in which mass media appear,
- and the "legal-liberal" society.

Transitional societies are linked, we are told by Hess, with a charismatic or some other form of authoritarian or totalitarian rule. In transitional societies the media are authoritarian-dictatorially structured. In the "legal-liberal"

society the media are organized commercially or according to the law of public corporations. A more or less parallel development of societies in their entirety and of mass media is also imputed by Hess. Here again, the ultimate end of evolution is maintained to be the "legal-liberal" society.

According to Hess (1969, 281), who explicit takes up Parsons' argumentation, it is the respective specific character of each social system (authoritarian-dictatorially organized media are found in traditional, and charismatic-totalitarian media in transitional societies; these two media types contrasting with public-corporation types and commercially organized types of media in legal-democratic social systems) that determines the regulation of certain functional imperatives. Hess enumerates here integration, domination, regulation or distribution of societal and material goods (social stratification), and social change.

Mass media in totalitarian societies are characterized as an excellent instrument for ruling. Futhermore, the mass media in transitional societies are a particular factor fostering social change. In all social systems mass media are especially important as a factor in socialization. These media, according to

"In all social systems mass media are especially important as a factor in socialization."

Hess (1969, 282) set above all, standards for positive sanctions, for strengthening behavior. Mass communication by this interpretation would primarily contribute to the personal system and to the social system. In particular, Hess argues, mass communication is to contribute to national integration. This thesis in particular, in such an undifferentiated form, is untenable. To be sure, the mass media in transitional societies can definitely be credited with the ability to contribute as mobility multiplier to a broadening of the world-view, to psychic readiness for mobility, and to a heightened inclination to innovate. But the possibility has to be considered that mass media will operate dysfunctionally and as hindrances to integration. This is possible because modern mass media (e.g. the motion picture and television) are to be found in countries whose infrastructure otherwise does not come near corresponding to the level of industrialized countries. Consumption of films and television does not presuppose an ability to read. That is, traditionally oriented individuals are being massively confronted with modern values and life-styles.

Do mass media exercise an integrating function in the supposedly slow formation of a world society? Hess, like McLuhan (1968, 285), says they do. But how does this affirmation mesh with the assertion that mass media in a liberal-legal society in no sense play a determinant role in social change? The two positions are logically reconcilable only under the assumption that the

Western societal form represents the end-point of social evolution, and that all other societies are moving in that direction. Here again, the boundaries between social-scientific analysis and political-ideological wishful thinking are being overstepped.

5.4 Dysfunctional Consequences of Introducing Mass Media: The Revolution of Rising Expectations and the Enabling of Escapism

Mass media are found in developing countries before other facets of the productive potential (the infrastructure) come near corresponding to the level in industrialized countries. Within this conjunction the results of a study by Hadley Cantril (The Pattern of Human Concerns, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1965) merit attention. In the study the interests and problems of residents of 14 countries that have differing political systems and are in divergent states of development are surveyed. As far as developing countries are concerned, Cantril (1965, 313) concludes that despite much criticism directed against some Western values, "good living" is in fact taken as being equivalent in meaning to life in a Western industrialized society. This considerable degree of consensus among the interviewed persons is doubtless a result of the broad proliferation of mass media, which have disseminated a model view of Western affluence over the whole world, and have made it a model for meeting the recipients' own demands. In regard to the sought-for life-style, there seems to be international agreement.

This finding, too, can be taken as a confirmation of the general rule that in the event of a contact between various cultures, material aspects of culture (e.g. technology) are more readily accepted or adopted than are non-material aspects (values). A potentially anomic situation is inherent in the terminology of Merton (1957, 113 ff.): There is the danger of a breakdown of the cultural structure. This can happen, especially, where there is a sharp discrepancy between cultural norms and goals, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the socially structured possibility of acting in conformity with these norms and goals. Anomie means here the existence of a central contradiction between social structure and value structure; a gap between goals regarded as legitimate (material well-being and consumption) and access to the institutionalized means of reaching these goals. Within the frame of this argumentation, contents that in modern, industrialized societies (in the view of theoreticians of manipulation) operate to stabilize the system acquire, by contrast, a potential that endangers stability in non-industrialized societies.

New needs are created, without simultaneous provision of the means for satisfying these needs in socially accepted ways. A result can be a situation of relative deprivation: Television programs portray affluence as attainable,

"TV in its capacity as a source of frustration."

while it is not attainable. In this sense, the effect of television is in the way it alters the recipients' level of expectations; thus, TV in its capacity as a source of frustration.

Within the framework of such a functionalistic argumentation, developing countries' imports of mass-media contents from industrialized countries could be characterized as endangering the stability of the system. For it is not poverty, but the rejection of poverty – that is, a sense of relative deprivation – that leads to the questioning of existing power relationships. Based on such argumentation, the consequence could be drawn along the lines of Wright (cf. Ch. 5.2) that information about "better societies" works dysfunctionally and therefore is to be stopped.

The theory that successful modernization presupposes adequate stimulus to achieve is put forward by representatives of modernization theory such as Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner. "Without raising aspirations, without stimulating people to strive for a better life and for national growth," Schramm (1964, 131) postulates, "development is unlikely to occur." And the consequences of a possible discrepancy between the stimulated expectations and the possibility of fulfilling them? Schramm: "At worst, the Government may have an ugly situation on its hands." "What is required to motivate the isolated and illiterate peasants and tribesmen who compose the bulk of the world's population," argues David Lerner (1963, 341 ff.) similarly, "is to provide them with clues to what the better things of life might be." This theory, later corrected, does not take into consideration what Alexis de Tocqueville had already written in 1856 (Alexis de Tocqueville, "L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution," translated by M. W. Patterson, Oxford 1947, 186):

"It is not always by going from bad to worse that a society falls into revolution. It happens most often that a people, which has supported without complaint, as if they were not felt, the most oppressive laws, violently throws them off as soon as their weight is lightened. The social order destroyed by a revolution is almost always better than that which immediately preceded it, and experience shows that the most dangerous moment for a bad government is generally that in which it sets about reform. Only great genius can save a prince who undertakes to relieve his subjects after a long oppression. The evil which was suffered patiently as inevitable, seems unendurable as soon as the idea of escaping from it is conceived. All the abuses then removed seem to throw into greater relief those which remain, so that their feeling is more

painful. The evil, it is true, has become less, but sensibility to it has become more acute. Feudalism at the height of its power had not inspired Frenchmen with so much hatred as it did on the eve of its disappearing. The slightest acts of arbitrary power under Louis XVI seemed less easy to endure than all the despotism of Louis XIV."

So writing, Tocqueville refers to the revolution of rising frustrations' underlying socio-psychological principle of relative deprivation. According to it, the estimation of one's own social situation is made according to, not absolute but relative standards of measurement; that is, in comparison with the income, degree of affluence, privileges, and so on, of certain other reference persons or reference groups. Empirical backing-up came the way of the principle of relative deprivation within the frame of a study, "American Soldier," conducted during the Second World War (cf. Stouffer i.a. 1949, Vol. I, 250 ff.). The study explained the apparent paradox (of) why men in the Air Corps, who were on the average most favored by promotions, were also the most critical of promotion policy. The theoretical explanation: ". . . such opinions by soldiers represent a relationship between their expectations

"Relative deprivation can also be present in the relationship between countries."

and their achievements relative to others *in the same boat with them."* Objectively, the chances of promotion among Air Corps men were better (specifically, the chances of becoming a non-commissioned officer were 56 in 100) than for men in the Military Police (where the chances of becoming a noncom were 34 out of 100). The authors characterize the psychic process of the feeling of relative deprivation on the part of an Air Corps man (1949, I, 251): "If he had earned a rating, so had the majority of his fellows in the branch, and his achievement was relatively less conspicuous than in the MPs. If he had failed to earn a rating, while the majority had succeeded, he had more reason to feel a sense of personal frustration, which could be expressed as criticism of the promotion system, than if he were one of two-thirds in the same boat, as among the MPs."

Relative deprivation can also be present in the relationship between countries. Thus the German ethnologist Mühlmann (1964, 365) refers to the "strange phenomenon" that "progress attained, help rendered receives no recognition or even gratitude. It is not valued at all, or at best considered a kind of down payment on an immeasureably greater justified claim." This fact is a result of the international ideology of equality, not only *de jure* in United Nations activities, but also in national consciousness and claims. "The consciousness of equality," Mühlmann (1965, 336) continues, "leads inevitably to the goal concept of a comprehensive redistribution of all opportunities for power, possession, happiness, etc.; this one could

characterize as the secularized theodicy of the modern welfare doctrine." The more the classes come to resemble each other, the stronger will be the feeling of inequality. It is the social minimal difference that looses the revolutionary sting.

How does this phenomenon of relative deprivation affect developing countries? Discussing the effects of development aid, Mühlmann (1965, 366) writes: Every lessening of the social and economic distance, every narrowing of the gap between the "rich" and the "poor" nations, every bridging-over of the differences in level of living and in standard of education will work in the direction of a radicalization of those "favored" by development aid. This statement is intended by Mühlmann as, first, an objective diagnosis of a situation; and second, as support for his theory that Europe has been exporting, not civilization but revolution.

The distinction between absolute and relative deprivation is important particularly because certain negatively privileged groups or individuals possibly are not even aware of their being disadvantaged – as that has been so in an intact society of castes. "Oppression and misery have been widespread throughout history," Goldstone (1982, 186) writes, "yet revolutions have been relatively rare." It is at least quite probable that the worldwide dissemination of modern mass media (especially television) can lead to a global transformation from absolute to relative deprivation. However, this is not saying that relative deprivation leads to rebellion. For it can be that the disadvantaged by no means have the power or organizational ability for such an undertaking. Relative deprivation can also favor the coming into existence of a hope for a better life (cf. Ch. 7.3).

Below we shall be investigating the phenomenon of relative deprivation only in regard to the social relationships in a developing country. We shall consider in particular whether, for example, the introduction of television

"Does the introduction of television lead to a revolution of rising expectations?"

leads to a revolution of rising expectations, because linked with the arrival of TV on the scene is an increasing knowledge of the possibilities of a better life, of new ideologies and of other political systems. Thus Indonesia's President Sukarno during a visit to Hollywood characterized the movie moguls as "unconscious revolutionaries," because in nearly all films electric refrigerators were shown. Finally Indonesian moviegoers wanted to know for themselves what the big white boxes were all about, and so a demand for electric refrigerators was awakened. Sukarno: "So you see that, in a hot country like mine, a refrigerator is a revolutionary

symbol. In two hours any of your films can stimulate desires for more refrigerators than Indonesia can produce in 20 years."

Independently of the media, economic development also always means an increase in the scope and centrality of economic markets, and therewith an improvement in communications possibilities. In developing countries economic growth is always linked with the proliferation of education, skill, technology and – especially important – the increasing dissemination of information conveying that there are possibilities for another and better life, and that there are other systems of government. Economic growth generally leads, as already has been seen, to a higher income for certain parts of the population who previously had a lower standard of living. In this case, economic growth stimulates rising expectations. Economic growth, especially when in addition, it is linked with political reforms, can awaken people to the possibilities of further improvement; and so, despite an objective bettering of the living standard, can lead to greater dissatisfaction. Not only a worsening of the economic situation, but also an improvement in it can bring about a sense of increased relative deprivation. Only one exceptional situation, in which economic growth need not be linked with a heightened sense of relative deprivation, is seen by Mancur Olson (1963, 542): "That is in a modern totalitarian country, where the media are controlled in such a way that they glorify the existing situation and keep out any ideas that would threaten the existing system." Olson (1963, 542) argues further: "Modern totalitarian regimes of a Stalinist and Hitlerian kind will also have other techniques for guaranteeing their own stability, most notably the practice of liquidating anyone who shows any lack of enthusiasm for the prevailing regime."

His previous optimistic perspective regarding the positive effects of the dissemination of empathy (cf. Ch. 3.3) has since been revised by Daniel Lerner (1968, 391). In this later writing, Lerner recognizes that the contact of a less-developed society with an industrialized society will visit on the developing country externally induced tensions and/or demands: "The global spread of empathy has . . . diffused a new demand for well-being among peoples who, over all previous centuries, had never been exposed to the idea that well-being was theirs to demand." The counter-productive use of communication is now seen as determinant for the abortive developments, because values of consumption have received priority over values of productivity (Lerner 1976, 292). The urban explosion, writes Lerner (1968, 390 f.) with pronounced pessimism, is systemic with the population and literacy explosion: "These explosions are systemic in the sense that they derive from a common source, converge on a common demand, and produce a common failure to satisfy the demand. The common source is empathy; the common demand is well-being; the common failure is poverty." In compliance with William James, Lerner (1968, 392) uses the following formula:

$$\text{Frustration} = \frac{\text{Want}}{\text{Get}}$$

Whereas in traditional societies want remains constant, this variable takes on a drastic increase in contact with new life-styles.

The revolution of rising expectations has inspired populist movements in countries of the Third World, Lerner (1974) argues. Great hopes have been awakened, but not fulfilled. The expectations have been transformed, in the majority of the populace that had been striving for improvements, into frustration. This frustration can lead to regression – that is, to a turning

"The revolution of rising expectations has inspired populist movements in countries in the Third World."

away from new expectations and to a descent into apathy. "People experiencing continuing frustration often become generally apathetic," Leonard Berkowitz (1969, 13) writes in "Roots of Aggression": "(These apathetic persons) give up trying." More often, though, frustration leads to system-endangering aggression. Lerner (1976, 291) argues that important regularities common to all of development experience are manifested in the sequence of three phases: 1. rising expectations, 2. rising frustrations, 3. military take-over. The latter phase, military take-over, illuminates why there are so many military regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America (cf. also Ch. 7.6). "The fundamental answer," Lerner (1974, 89) writes, "is the acceleration of history propagated by the ideology of development and diffused by the mass media."

A J-curve hypothesis of revolution is proposed by James C. Davies (1969, 54 ff.). The proposal reconciles the theory of Tocqueville that revolutions are most likely to occur precisely when the situation has improved with the observation of Karl Marx that revolutions are most likely to occur precisely when the situation has gotten worse. This is the J-curve hypothesis: "Revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratification is followed by a short period of sharp reversal, during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes intolerable. The frustration that develops, when it is intense and widespread in the society, seeks outlets in violent action. When the frustration becomes focused on the government, the violence becomes coherent and directional. If the frustration is sufficiently widespread, intense and focused on government, the violence will become a revolution that displaces irrevocably the ruling government and changes markedly the power structure of the society. Or the violence will be contained within the system, which it modifies but does not displace. This latter case is rebellion."

The following chart (Davies 1969, 548) shows what happens as a society heads toward revolution:


∞
NEEDS
0
EXPECTED NEED SATISFACTION
ACTUAL NEED SATISFACTION
AN INTOLERABLE GAP BETWEEN WHAT PEOPLE WANT AND WHAT THEY GET
A TOLERABLE GAP BETWEEN WHAT PEOPLE WANT AND WHAT THEY GET
REVOLUTION OCCURS AT THIS TIME

As long as oppression and want are regarded as a normal and inalterable component of life, to that extent it is not relevant to apply the theory that misery breads revolution. Through cultural contact with industrialized countries, however, the situation in developing countries drastically changes. An assertion about the state of mind of individual persons who are likely to revolt is a premise of argumentation by Lerner and Davies. Such individuals' state of mind is one of high tension and rather generalized hostility, derived from the widening of the gap between what they want and what they get. They fear not just that things will no longer continue to get better, but that the ground will be lost that they have already gained. The determinant weakness of the J-curve hypothesis and the line taken by Lerner is that he and Davies theorize exclusively on the level of individuals. Individuals are considered as socially isolated behavioral units. There is no consideration of the fact that people are integrated within social and group structures. Moreover, it remains unclear how the level of relative deprivation of a specific group is determined. As little is said about distributive justice as about the choice of reference groups to serve as a basis for social comparison; for by definition, "relative deprivation" involves comparison. Essentially, it is merely stated that social conditions which increase expectations without increasing capabilities to realize them, or which reduce capabilities without reducing expectations, increase the intensity of discontent.

Thus Lerner upholds a "breakdown theory," according to which the dissolution of traditional social formations and communal solidarities is considered to be a result of rapid social change, within which a key importance is attached to the grievance-frustration notion. (Cf. on this and on other theories of conflict and/or revolution e.g. Oberschall 1978; Goldstone 1982.) Gurr (1970, 13), too, proceeds from the thesis that relative deprivation is a prerequisite for social unrest: "Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for the participants in collective violence."

In view of the indeed still most insufficient researching on the effects of mass media on recipients in countries of the Third World, a certain caution is called for in regard to the area of validity of the hypothesis of the revolution of rising frustrations. Possibly the mass-media-effected rise in the level of demand refers only to the urban elites in the developing countries and not to the broad mass of the population in the agrarian sector or in the slums. Thus Frey (1973, 387) also argues that the expressions "revolution of rising expectations" and "revolution of rising frustrations" seem more speculation than fact.

Is "excessive, media-promoted demand . . . a problem faced both by status-quo and development-oriented governments in the Third World"? This assertion by Portes (1976, 72) he cannot support empirically. The

Is "excessive, media-promoted demand . . . a problem faced both by status-quo and development-oriented governments in the Third World"?

influence of mass media on the expectations and/or frustrations still requires empirical researching. As a resumé of the discussion, these two alternatives in development policy present themselves: – First, the stimulation of realizable aspirations could contribute to support of economic development projects. – But, by contrast, the stimulation of exaggerated, unrealizable expectations can lead to frustration, alienation, and to withheld support for development programs, while fostering tendencies toward "more radical" solutions.[1])

Within the framework of the breakdown theories of modernization there is no consideration of the possibility that the mass media under some

[1]) Feierabend and Feierabend (1966) ascertain in a study carried out with aggregate data that in 84 countries an "index of systematic frustration" (a want-get ratio) is in close correlation ($r = 0{,}5$) with an index of political instability, one that, among other aspects, included incidence of demonstrations, political assassinations, arrests, coups d'etats and civil wars.

circumstances don't at all lead to a heightening of the level of expectation; that, instead, in some cases mass media enable a flight from reality – that is, a retreat from the existential concerns and pressures of every day. By use of the media for escapist ends is meant here a compensatory use of the media as the result of relative deprivations or frustrations resulting from causes within the individual personality and/or difficulties involving the social structure. The recreational value of such escapes is found, particularly, in a temporary loosening of the ties to one's own "real" social situation. Relevant here is an analysis of the late medieval European society by Johan Huizinga (1924, 353). He calls attention to the significance of tension-relaxing, compensatory mechanisms: ". . . the greater the contrast with the misery of daily life, the more indispensable is the festival, and the stronger is the means that one needs so as through the intoxication of simultaneous beauty and pleasure, so to speak as a modification of reality, to lend life a sparkle."

The concept that in particular film and television meanwhile have taken over this tension-relaxing function, important for the stability of social systems, is freqently expounded in the sociological literature. Motion pictures and television, in other words, can be regarded as functional equivalents of the safety-valve measures of traditional societies, with their purpose the neutralization of tension threatening to the social order. While it is true that the media permit a flight from real problems, and contribute to the overcoming of temporary depressive feelings, on the other hand the media while performing this escapist function do not offer solutions of real problems. In fact, efforts to solve real problems that lead to the escapist use of the media in the first place are hindered by precisely this resort to the media. Here there is a definite danger that a vicious circle will get underway, with constant intensification of the motivation that led to the

"Film and television have taken over a tension-relaxing function, important for the stability of social systems."

escapist use of the media in the first place. A related aspect of the situation is this: The stabilization of existent patterns of rule by the constant, narcotizing distraction from real problems – and therefore a hindrance to getting a grip on the solution of actual problems – can, from the functionalistic perspective, be characterized as quite "positive" (that is, system-stabilizing). Individuals who gain no rational insight into their situation and flee into a dream world are not likely to take action against injustices. An application of this problem to the Third World specifically is provided in the following observation by Tunstall (1977, 212): "In most African and Asian countries, governments have tended to use the media as a sedative rather than as a stimulant." (Cf. Ch. 7.4.)

6. Change of Paradigms in Developing-Country Research: Dependency Theory and World-System Theory

6.1 Reasons for the Change of Paradigms

According to the logic of the modernization theories, the causes of the underdevelopment of certain societies or geographical regions are found, above all, in these societies themselves. Underdevelopment is seen as a result of socio-cultural characteristics (for example, traditionalism) or of other system-immanent negative developments (population explosion, for instance). The consideration that precisely the setting in which developing countries find themselves – within a modern, industrialized environment – can prevent modernization or development does not appear in the context of the modernization theories. By contrast, this theory is championed precisely within the context of the dependency theories. (The world-system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein is regarded here as a variant or a further development of the dependency theories. Within the context of dependency theories the nation-state tends to dominate as a unit of analysis, but the transition to the world-system theory is fluid.) The dependency theories seek an all-encompassing explanation of the failure of the decadeslong efforts to develop the Third World. These theories look on underdevelopment as a result of the global economic interdependencies. Development aid has not changed the system of "international economic stratification." On the contrary, the "disparities between the wealthiest and the poorest nations" have become ever more pronounced (cf. e.g. Portes 1976, 57).

Moreover, this principle has emerged as a rule of thumb: The poorer the country, the greater the difference between rich and poor (cf. e.g. Myrdal 1957). And something else: The development-aid measures have turned out to have a conservative bias, because usually the aiders have taken over the perspective of the inhabitants of the positions of power in the Third World. In consequence, as Hermassi (1978, 248) remarks, most of the development strategies "tend to be more regime-building than nation-building."

Ecomomic dependency has, for theoreticians of dependence, two consequences: – a negative influence on economic growth, and – an increase in the system-internal social inequalities in the respective developing country. The dependency theorists differ widely from the neoclassical ecomomists in analyzing the problems and prospects of developing countries:

- Neoclassical economists such as Walt W. Rostow (1960; cf. Ch. 3.5) emphasize what they see as the determinant importance in the Third World of system-internal mechanisms that reduce consumption and favor increased savings, investment and capital formation. (Thus, according to Rostow, an investment rate of more than 10% of the net national product is necessary in order to enable a "take-off" to self-sustained economic growth.)

- By contrast, the dependency theoreticians regard the development of underdevelopment (André Gunder Frank 1969) as the consequence of capitalistic exploitation of developing countries, taking place on an international level.

Thus all efforts by developing countries on their own to get positive development processes underway are seen by Samir Amin (1976) as doomed to fail. To fail, that is, unless a country uncouples itself from the world capitalistic system; or unless the international terms of trade were to be rearranged.

Although at this point we shall not be going into the dependency theories in detail, one general observation is relevant: Economic factors are the essence of this type of analysis. Nevertheless, a knowledge of the most important arguments of the dependency theories is necessary toward the adequate approaching of such problems as cultural imperialism. The other way around, there is an astonishing disregard of communicative processes on the part of dependency theories. For example, only the theory of structural imperialism (Ch. 8.6) also gives due emphasis to the aspect of communicative and/or cultural imperialism. The dependency theories' concentration on economics at the cost of broader interrelationships would seem to overlook actual more recent developments in the communications sector. For when worldwide mutual dependencies (in the case of the dependency theories, economic interrelationships) are the point of departure for analysis, then it would seem that the current, evolved global situation would have to be taken into consideration: Namely, that because of the development of mass media, for the first time in the history of humanity the possibility exists of a country's taking the world, or other societies in the world, as a frame of reference for sizing up that country's own social situation. Thus the populace of a developing society can cease to think of the country's future as inalterable.

The origin of the theories of dependency are in primarily Latin American socio-economic doctrines, which in turn stem from three sources: 1. the classical school of international economic relations, 2. the Marxist theories of imperialism, which originally were to explain the anticipated breakdown of capitalism, 3. a Fascistic variant of the protective-tariff policy for strengthening the economic autonomy of underdeveloped, agrarian national economies. The terms "imperialism" and "dependence" are often used together or interchangeably. They are characterized by their pronounced

emotive character and uncertain substantive content. It is this very lack of clear profile that makes these two terms seem suited to describe – in a hardly measurable range of variations – a situation that is more felt than analytically processed and sharply defined. There is a common denominator in regard to the concept of imperialism only in that imperialism is seen as representing a specific form of aggressive behavior of one state against another state (cf. e.g. Daalder 1968; Schumpeter 1953; Wehler 1970). In view of the ambiguity of the concept, Schumpeter uses the term sociology of imperialisms (Soziologie der Imperialismen), and in 1919 (1953, 74) offers this definition: "Imperialism is the object-less disposition of a state to forcible expansion without definable limits."

Accusations of imperialism are every-day occurrences. Thus the Soviet Union is depicted as the last empire: or Western development aid as an instrument of the imperialistic exploitation of developing countries – an instrument that at the same time conceals this exploitation. The term "neocolonialism" is used by Kwame Nkrumah (1965, IX) to characterize a situation in which a state is, to be sure, theoretically independent, and has all the outward trappings of national sovereignty, while it is simultaneously true that the country's economic system and thus its political system is directed from outside. A new form of economic dependency, post-imperialism, is diagnosed by Samir Amin (1976, 191). There is deliberation about a new form of unequal specialization that has become evident as the result of the failure of an industrialization policy oriented toward import substitution. This increasing divergence between sectoral productivities in the periphery heralds another expansionist phase of capitalism: post-imperialism.

Dependency theories regard economic development and economic underdevelopment as two sides of a coin. Theotonio dos Santos (1970, 231) provides this definition: "By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development." Thus the causes of a country's lack of economic success are traced to factors that are localized outside that country.

6.2 David Ricardo and Friedrich List: Free Trade vs. Protectionism

David Ricardo (1772–1823) determinantly influenced the doctrine of international trade, and his thinking is still today a central point of reference in the discussion of this subject. Ricardo not only argues that the international division of labor is a source of wealth. He also upholds the theory that international trade is advantageous for all concerned even when a country is superior to a trading partner in all spheres of production. This concept Ricardo demonstrated with a famed example, in which Britain and Portugal trade woolen cloth and wine with each other. For one production of a unit of woolen cloth, Ricardo calculates, in Britain 100 but in Portugal only 90 workers are required per unit of time. As for wine production, in Britain 120 workers and in Portugal 80 workers are needed per time-unit. According to Ricardo the foreign trade is also advantageous for Portugal, which is superior to Britain in the production of both commodities. Portugal, which would have required 90 workers for the woolen production, can obtain British woolens for the equivalent of the output of only 80 workers, when Portugal trades its wine for British textiles. For Britain, too, the exchange pays. The United Kingdom exchanges woolens, for the production of which 100 workers are required, for wine for the production of which 120 workers would be needed in Britain. Thus Ricardo argues that for foreign trade other laws apply than for trade on the domestic market. While the domestic trade's relationship of exchange is determined by the working power required for production of the commodities involved, in foreign trade a commodity requiring more work can be exchanged – advantageously for both countries – against a commodity requiring less work. If both countries now specialize in the production of goods that each country respectively can produce more advantageously – thus, Britain woolen cloth and Portugal wine – then, Ricardo continues, both countries can consume a greater amount of commodities than would be the case without international division of labor. This "Law of Comparative Costs," which was modified somewhat by John Stuart Mill, is still valid today in the theory of international trade. The quintessence of the law: Even for countries that are superior in all branches of production, the international division of labor is advantageous.

Without our getting involved here in the history of economic doctrine, it can be noted that quite early the German economist Friedrich List (1789–1840) came out in opposition to the argumentation behind the Law of Comparative Costs. List expounded the thesis that comprehension of the conditions for producing wealth is more important than the wealth itself. His "Theory of Productive Forces" reasons: Adam Smith considered only activities that brought forth material values. But a nation's productive force is also dependent on that country's social institutions, the predominating

values, the state of the sciences, the arts, and so on. In order to make possible an optimum development of the productive forces in the individual national economies, protective tariffs are needed, designed to shelter the national industries until they are economically mature. (Cf.: List F., "Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie" [The National System of Political Economy], Jena 1928; List F., "Das natürliche System der politischen Ökonomie" [The Natural System of Political Economy], Berlin 1927.) However, for List protective tariffs are only acceptable until the country concerned has attained the highest degree of economic productivity. Then free trade is advantageous. Until then, however, protective tariffs should shelter the national industries from the superior strength of industry abroad, while permitting time to educate the domestic economy on making better use of its productive forces.

Those considerations aside, the thinking of Ricardo about free foreign trade was not applied in practice by the economically dominant British of Ricardo's time. A state of affairs that Carlo Cippola (quoted from Mowlana 1983, 165) describes as follows: "It was fortunate for England that no Indian Ricardo arose to convince the English people that, according to the Law of Comparative Cost, it would be advantageous for them to turn into shepherds and import from India all the textiles that were needed. Instead, England passed a series of acts designed to prevent importation of Indian textiles, and some 'good results' were achieved."

The protective-tariff thinking developed by Friedrich List found its way into the dependency theories by way of the Fascist Rumanian economist Mihail Manoilesco, whose arguments were very widely disseminated in Latin America (cf. e.g. Chirot and Hall 1982). In international trade, Manoilesco (1937, 201), who attemps a detailed rebuttal of the Law of Comparative Costs, argues, industry buys, with the work of a single laborer, the work of numerous farm laborers. For agrarian countries it is advantageous, Manoilesco continues, to uncouple themselves from the world market, and to industrialize. No matter how inferior such newly built-up quality industries may be (1937, 201), when the industries develop in a state with an agricultural economy, the industries cannot be so inferior that they do not offset the disadvantaging that an unfavorable export pattern involves. According to Manoilesco, a country that exports goods made under conditions of poor labor productivity and imports goods made under conditions of good labor productivity does not, to be sure, become poorer in an absolute sense; but such a country does grow relatively poorer. The more extensively an agriculturally structured country takes part in international trade, in other words, the greater its relative underdevelopment will be. This concept of an unequal exchange is later upheld once more by Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) and Ernest Mandel (1975). Since a global economic harmony does not come into existence automatically, according to Manoilesco this balance must be produced "artificially," by putting the principle of international solidarity on new

foundations, Manoilesco writes (1937, 348): "Above all, it is necessary not uncomplainingly to accept the world's existing injustices, but instead to take critical issue with them."

6.3 The Marxistic Dependency Theories

The Marxistic roots of the dependency theories are traceable less to Karl Marx himself than to others. Karl Marx (1818–1883) was convinced of the quite apparent expansive power of capitalism. The capitalists would overcome the backward methods of production in the "underdeveloped countries" in a worldwide process of expansion. Marx writes in the foreword to "Capital": "It is a question of these laws themselves [the natural laws of capitalistic production], of these tendencies working with iron necessity toward inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future."

Marx wanted to reveal the law of economic motion in modern society. For him capitalism was characterized by the phases: concentration – accumulation – crisis. In regard to the economic development of the then colonies, Marx argues in Volume III of "Capital" (1965, 248) (here on a level with Adam Smith) that in the colonies profits would be higher because there the rate of profit is higher anyhow because of the low state of development. The rate of profit (p) according to Marx decreases over the long range, and is largely responsible for the predicted crisis of capitalism. Behind this argument is the thought that production costs are made up of wage costs (v = variable capital) and material costs (c = constant capital):

$$p = \frac{s}{c+v.}$$

The more capital-intensive the production, i. e. the higher the share of c, the smaller, given a constant level of exploitation, will be the profit rate (i. e. the relation of the surplus value [s] to the entire capital [C = c+v]). According to Marx, it is true that the constant capital "generates" the surplus value, but this constant capital is not in itself productive. Not until there is a linking with the variable capital, the capital of living persons, can the means of production create surplus value. Work, for Marx, is the only means of creating value. Surplus value is the amount of the value of the product made by the worker that is in excess of the value of the commodity

labor. Labor value corresponds to the value of the means of existence necessary for the maintenance of the workers. Thus while the worker receives the full value of the commodity labor, the entrepreneur receives the product in its entirety, including the surplus value. The capitalists reinvest the profit obtained, and this reinvestment increases productivity. Given constant real wages, in other words, the rate of surplus values increases (Law of Relative Surplus Value). Simultaneously, however, the rate of profit decreases through the continuous accumulation of constant capital (Law of Decreasing Profit Rate).

Now because the entrepreneurs invest (= accumulate) the major portion of their income, many goods will be confronted with insufficient demand. This situation will be worsened in that many workers can be dismissed as a result of the increased productivity brought by the machines purchased via the reinvestments of profits. A result of this developing situation is under-consumption, which (with sinking prices for commodities) leads to a crisis. This crisis is ameliorated by a downward pressure on wages exerted by the "industrial reserve army" of the unemployed. In that way the profit rate can again rise so far that production, which at first requires no new investments, gets started again. The constant up and down of the business cycle leads to changes in the social structure: Capital becomes concentrated in ever-fewer enterprises, because small and medium-sized enterprises fold during the crises. The working population's misery keeps increasing. The industrial reserve army grows. The class contrasts grow sharper. The crises become ever more severe – until capitalism breaks down.

Quite obviously, this prediction by Karl Marx has not come true. Accordingly, Rosa Luxemburg tried to rescue the Marxist theory. Rosa Luxemburg (The Accumulation of Capital 1913, English edition New York 1964) argues that crises occurring as Marx anticipated, because of under-consumption, take place only within "pure capitalism," a state that, however, has never been realized, so Luxemburg argues, bacause it has been possible to find demand abroad. Further articulating her thesis Luxemburg says that in order to avoid crises the capitalistic countries have to conquer colonies. The tendency of the domestic profit rate to fall is held in check because of economic performance in the colonies: The lower wages there and the lower level of subsistence make it possible in the colonies to achieve a considerably higher surplus value. Imperialism is regarded in Rosa Luxemburg's argumentation as the prerequisite for the continuing existence or further growth of capitalism. However, the colonial broadening of the market, too, runs up against its limits. Finally economic imperialism also breaks down.

The bourgeois economy comes in for Luxemburg's criticism (1964, 452f.), at the same time, because it purportedly takes into consideration merely one aspect of economic development: "the realm of peaceful competition, the marvels of technology and pure commodity exchange; it separates it (the

realm of peaceful competition) strictly from the other aspect – the realm of capital's blustering violence, which is regarded as more or less incidental to foreign policy, and quite independent of the economic sphere of capital. In reality, political power is nothing but a vehicle for the economic process. The conditions for the reproduction of capital provide the organic link between these two aspects of the accumulation of capital. The historical career of capitalism can be appreciated only be taking them together."

Rosa Luxemburg anticipates aspects of the dependency theories that were to come later, and that also had already been hinted at by Marx in "Capital" (1966, 373): "The foundation of every division of labor that is well developed, and brought about by the exchange of commodities, is the separation between town and country. It may be said that the whole economical history of society is summed up in the movement of this antithesis. We pass it over, however, for the present." Luxemburg also discusses the consequences of capitalism for the farming inhabitants of the colonies. She cites, especially, the example of drawing Egypt into the capitalist world system by means of international loans. The Egyptian economy was completely restructured. Railways were built, and simultaneously the farmers were ruined. The Egyptian state went bankrupt, and was taken over by the British. This turn of events brought European finance capital enormous winnings at the expense of the Egyptians. Luxemburg sees comparable developments in North Africa, Russia, China and Turkey, thus in the "hinterlands" of capitalism.

A line of thought that goes the farthest in anticipating the "modern" dependency theories is developed, finally, by Bucharin – who leans strongly on Hilferding – in his work "Imperialism and World Economy." Bucharin (1969, 19) writes: "The cleavage between 'town and country,' as well as the 'development of this cleavage,' formerly confined to one country only, are now being reproduced on a tremendously enlarged basis. Viewed from this standpoint, entire countries appear today as 'towns,' namely the industrial countries, whereas entire agrarian territories appear to be 'country.'" The international division of labor coincides here with the division of labor between the two largest sectors of over-all societal production, industry and agriculture, and accordingly is a so-called "division of work in general." Britain's one-time policy in Egypt is also discussed by Bucharin (1969, 103). He uses Egypt's transformation into an enormous cotton plantation which supplies the raw materials to the English textile industry as an example for such an international division of work. He writes: "The faster the tempo of capitalistic development, the faster the process of industrialization of the economy and the 'urbanization' of nations (growth of cities) proceed, the more will the balance between industry and agriculture be upset, the stronger will be the competition among the developed countries for the backward countries – and the more inevitable will be their open clash."

Considerably more influential in the development of the Marxist theory of

imperialism than Karl Marx himself was the American economist John A. Hobson (1902). He emphasizes the economic nature of imperialism – that is, the expansionist colonial policy before the First World War. European expansionism is based on under-consumption in modern capitalism, he maintains, and on the manipulations of profit-seeking capitalists. (Hobson champions a quite specific variant of the theory of under-consumption: a

"Considerably more influential in the development of the Marxist theory of imperialism than Karl Marx himself was the American economist John A. Hobson."

theory of excess savings. According to it, during an upturn in the economic cycle large incomes increase, bringing about a rise in savings and the concomitant investments. Accordingly, not only does the demand for consumer goods decrease, but also, meanwhile, the supply of consumer goods rises. [Cf. e.g. Hobson, J. A., "The Problem of the Unemployed," London 1896; "Economics of Unemployment," London 1922.])

Other than Rosa Luxemburg, Hobson puts more emphasis on the active components of expansion. For Luxemburg, the imperialistic tendencies are based on the negative development of capitalistic society, which exerts pressure from within to expand. Instead, Hobson theorizes that the opportunities for profit to be found abroad (cheap labor, raw materials, favorable terms of trade) lure money magnates. "The economic tap-root, the chief directing motive of all the modern imperialistic expansion," Hobson (1917, 262) writes, "is the pressure of capitalist industries for markets, primarily markets for investment, secondarily markets for surplus products of home industry." On the situation in the United States, Hobson asserts: "The political destiny of America is controlled by the financial magnates." Regarding the building up of a strong American navy, Hobson (1917, 263) declares: "Its real meaning and use is to forward the aggressive political policy imposed upon the nation by the economic needs of the financial capitalists." Here the radical-liberal economist Hobson takes a position that had already been outlined in the Communist Manifesto: The modern apparatus of governmental power is only a "committee," which administers the business of the entire bourgeoisie. (Marx and Engels 1963, 45.) So it is in no sense astonishing that Vladimir I. Lenin (1962) makes direct reference to Hobson.

The second root of the Leninist theory of imperialism is the argumentation by Rudolf Hilferding (1910) in regard to "finance capital," especially the line taken in his chapter XXII on the exporting of capital and the economic

struggle. The term finance capital, Hilferding (1910, 408) writes, signifies the unification of capital. The spheres, previously separated, of industrial, commercial, and bank capital now are under the common roof of "high finance," with "the lords of industry and the banks" sharing an intimate personal union. And the continuing absence of the predicted worldwide crisis of capitalism? This Hilferding (1910, 516) explains by citing advances of finance capital: Through the export of funds, finance capital has assured even the sale of over-production. The opening up of the Far East, along with rapid development in Canada, South Africa and South America have had a major share in capitalism's having progressed so "dizzingly" since 1895, interrupted only by short depressions.

To safeguard exported capital in case of doubt, military interventions are, however, necessary, the argumentation continues. Thus finance capital champions the strengthening of the power of the state with all possible means. In other words, finance capital, Hilferding tells us, has as a goal the creation of as extended an economic sphere as possible. This area is to be sealed off against foreign competition by protective-tariff walls. Consequently, the protected economic sphere becomes a field of exploitation by national monopolistic groups. The battle for domination of the world market, Hilferding argues, will be the more severe the more developed the finance capital is. It is to be noted that Rudolf Hilferding revised his position on the necessity of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle against capitalism and imperialism. The later argumentation holds it to be also possible that there will be a peaceful growing toward Socialism, because of what Hilferding calls the historical tendency of finance capital toward a "general cartel" (on this, cf. Gottschalk i.a. 1969, 211).

In "Imperialism as the Last Stage of Capitalism," Lenin, as the title anticipates, characterizes imperialism as the final phase in the development of capitalism. He attributes to this historical stage five economic characteristics:

1. Monopolistic concentration of production and capital.

2. The coming into existence of a finance oligarchy through the amalgamation of bank and industry capital.

3. Attachment of particular importance to export capital.

4. Formation of international, monopolistic associations of capitalists, who divide the world among themselves.

5. Following the dividing-up of the world by the capitalistic great Powers, a constant struggle over a redistribution of these great-Power spheres.

Under imperialism, the domination of monopoly succeeds the economy of free competition in the economic sector. As a result of the concentration and centralization of capital, powerful aggregations of capital are formed. Small and medium-sized enterprises are ruined by the monopolies. The competitive struggle does not cease, but, rather, becomes constantly more destructive and plundering because of the existence of monopolies. Economic crises have constantly more terrifying effects.

In the banking sector, too, monopolies come into existence that dispose over almost the entire money capital of all capitalistic and small enterprises, as well as over the largest part of the means of production and the raw-materials sources of the country in question or of a great number of countries. The finance oligarchy rules the political and economic life of the imperialistic countries. The apparatus of the state is subordinated to the monopolies. The exploitation of the masses and the enormous capital accumulation that this exploitation makes possible causes the formation of a surplus of capital, which can no longer be invested profitably enough in the country of its origin. The monopolies export their capital particularly to the economically less-developed countries. These countries now become the object of exploitation. For Lenin, the capital-exporting countries in a figurative sense have divided the world among themselves; but it is finance capital that also leads to the partitioning of the world in the direct sense. At the beginning of the 20th century, according to Lenin, capitalism had become a global system of colonial oppression and the financial throttling of by far the great majority of the population by a handful of advanced countries. Because capitalism develops unevenly, a struggle – expressed as blood-letting imperialistic wars – takes place for the redivision of the earth.

Capitalism in the stage of imperialism, Lenin continues, is decaying and parasitic – a consequence of the creation of monopolies. Productive forces are not used; innovations not put into practice. At the same time, the capitalism of imperialism is a dying capitalism. Imperialism, by driving the contradictions of capitalism to the extreme, provides the prerequisites for Socialism. Lenin, too asserts the inevitability of world wars as soon as the capitalists master the entire globe. However, Lenin gave capitalism a certain grace period because in capitalist countries a worker aristocracy, its membership bribed by the capitalists, would emerge (cf. also Bucharin 1969, 187 f.). At least for some time, a "bourgeoisation" of the proletariat – their indoctrination into middle-class ways and attitudes – takes place. These converted proletarians, now agents of the bourgeoisie, become thoroughly won over to middle-class ways. The theory that through the creation of jobs in export industry the capitalist countries would gain a grace period is also upheld by Fritz Sternberg ("Der Imperialismus" 1926). According to him, the workers in the capitalist countries will be spared actual misery, which is, instead transmitted to the colonies. The basic lines of the bribery thesis are also developed by Otto Bauer (1907, 469 f.). The subjection of economically backward countries to the exploitation of the capitalist class of a European

country, has, according to Bauer, two effects: "Directly, areas of investment for capital (are provided) in a colonial land, and thereby also an increased sales opportunity for the industry of the dominating country. Indirectly, new opportunities also arise for investment of capital in the dominating country itself, with increased sales chances for all industries. Accordingly, there is a reduction in the quantity of the capital lying idle at any moment in a country. Domestic prices, profits, wages rise. Thus the capitalistic policy of expansionism also appears to be in the general interest of the economy."

6.4 "Modern" Theories of Dependency

The founding of the theories of dependency is generally attributed in the literature of sociology to the Argentine Raúl Prebisch. In a report of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America submitted in 1949, Prebisch (1950) presents data that document a worsening of the terms of trade for undifferentiated economies that are dependent on the production of raw materials or agricultural commodities, in relation to economies that produce manufactured goods and capital equipment. The terms of trade comprehend the real economic transactions in international trade. The inference is that the trade takes place, without bringing in currency units, in the form of a natural exchange. The price of a commodity is understood in net barter terms of trade; that is, the price is seen as that quantity of a commodity which has to be given to acquire another commodity.

The Prebish data indicate that, on the average, for a certain quantity of export goods at the end of the 1930s only 60% of the quantity of import goods were obtained that had been obtained at the end of the 19th century. However, the assumption of a continuous worsening of the terms of trade to the disadvantage of developing countries is no longer incontestably made in the literature. (Cf. e.g. Bairoch, P., "The Economic Development of the Third World Since 1900," Berkeley, Cal., 1977; Barrat-Brown, M. "Economics of Imperialism," Baltimore 1974; Daalder 1968; Lewis, W. A., "The Evolution of the International Economic Order," Princeton, N. J., 1978.) It is uncontested, however, that raw-material prices fluctuate sharply, a situation that makes it difficult, in view of the consequently fluctuating export revenues, to undertake long-range economic planning.

Gunnar Myrdal is the second author who has contributed determinantly to the dissemination of dependency-theory thought. Myrdal proceeds from the premise that political democracy and equal possibilities for all are the goals

to be sought. He admonishes in particular against disregarding non-economic factors – giving as an example the importance of bribery in weak countries – through economic theory, as well as via the concept, dominant in economic circles, of equilibrium.

Myrdal (1957 a, b) has produced awareness, especially in Europe and North America, of a social problem in that the international division of labor seems not to be advantageous for all concerned; that it can, instead, lead to a constantly more pronounced inequality. According to Myrdal, the development of capitalism releases market forces that via capital movements, trade and flow, have two consequences: "spread effects" and "backwash effects." Economic expansion in one locality, or in a certain economic sector, not only stimulates growth in neighbouring regions, but also leads to the withdrawal of resources from the hinterland – to concentration of resources at the core. At the level of the global system unequal development is the rule, with spread effects dominant in the developed countries and backwash effects at the periphery. The latter effects result in development's taking place in the core as well as in the enclaves of the core in the periphery. An equilibrium analysis of the traditional sort is fully unsuitable to explain such processes, for the free play of market forces leads to inequality.

This theory of agglomerative factors, according to which the inequalities that emerge among economic spheres constantly increase, is championed from a Marxist point of view in particular by Paul A. Baran (1957). Baran argues that persistent underdevelopment of countries of the Third World is not a result of traditional behavior patterns or social structures, of population explosion, or of an inadequate rate of saving; instead, it is the consequence of international capitalistic exploitations. The surplus product earned in developing countries, the argument continues, is not invested in productive forces in the respective developing land. Instead, this surplus product is skimmed off by capital-owners who sit in the capitalistic metropolises. Or the surplus is squandered on the non-productive consumption of luxury goods by the parasitic indigenous elites, who so to speak function as a bridgehead of the capitalist life-style in the metropolises. Only revolutionary actions can, in this view, end the process of continuous development toward underdevelopment – as only in that way is a detachment from foreign capital interests possible.

In Latin America in particular André Gunder Frank (1969) has upheld the dependency line of thinking. He writes of the present situation that the

A "new form of penetration of peripheral countries through central capitalism."

former direct colonial control has been succeeded by indirect neo-colonial mechanisms (e.g. development aid, granting of loans, and so on). This new form of penetrating the peripheral nations by central capitalism means a hindering of development processes, he continues. The underdevelopment of peripheral areas is also in this case regarded as a continuing process that is the consequence of world economic interdependence.

Along the lines of a proposal by Christopher Chase-Dunn (1975), it is possible to classify the theories of dependency under three variants (cf. for other classifications e.g. Chirot and Hall 1982; Delacroix and Ragin 1981; Hermassi 1978; Portes 1976; Roxborough 1979):

1. Exploitation of the periphery by the core.

2. Structural distortion of the peripheral economy.

3. Suppression of autonomous policies in the periphery.

All dependency theories have in common that the structural distortions of the peripheral economies or societies is interpreted as the result of participation in the capitalistic world system.

Let us examine the three variants above one by one.

First: The theory of exploitation of the periphery by the core is championed by, for instance, Frank (1969, 1978). According to it, foreign investments via the return of profits and interest, transfer the surplus value from the periphery to the center. Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) champions the thesis that exploitation takes place via the wage structures contained in the prices for which goods are exchanged between industrialized and developing countries. For example: A product that in the periphery costs five hours to make is exchanged for a commodity that in the core at the same level of productivity costs only one hour to produce. Through the prices there occurs a transfer of values. Unequal exchange is the result of enormous differences in the wage level between countries of the center and the peripheral lands – differences that are not matched by comparable differences of labor productivity. Against Emmanuel's theory one can make, in particular, the objection that it is based on a naive labor theory of value. A diagnosis of unequal exchange of commodities produced in conditions of a higher productivity of labor against commodities produced in conditions of a lower productivity of labor is also advanced by Ernest Mandel (1975, 53): ". . . it is an exchange of less against more labor, which inevitably (leads) to a drain, an outward flow of capital . . . to the advantage of Western Europe."

Second: The theory of the structural distortion of the peripheral economic spheres is supported by the argument that the infrastructures stamped or built up by colonialism and foreign investments are export-oriented, that is,

that raw materials are to be exported, manufactured products imported. Roads, railways and telegraph lines are so laid out that they hinder a national economic integration. It is true that individual economic sectors are linked with the outer world. But these economic branches within a country are not integrated with one another. Such infra-structures stand in the way of the development of a differentiated, internal economic structure. Moreover, the peripheral countries, as raw-materials producers, are often under the domination of monocultures such as coffee, cacao, tea, sugar, cotton, tin, copper, bauxite. As primarily producers of raw materials, these lands are dependent on an economic sector with little potential for growth. Nor does the production of these goods involve a high degree of technical adroitness that could be transferred to other economic sectors. These undifferentiated economies are especially hard hit by business cycles running their course in core countries, and by price oscillations on the world market. Regarding the dependence on export of a raw material, the International Monetary Fund has made available figures for the 1980–1982 period. Here are some of the IMF's examples of the share of a country's only major raw material in that country's total export: Uganda 96% (coffee), Burundi 90% (coffee), Zambia 89% (copper), Surinam 79% (bauxite), Cuba 75% (sugar), Jamaica 74% (bauxite), Ruanda 68% (coffee), Ethiopia 65% (coffee), El Salvador 60% (coffee), Ghana 59% (cacao), Colombia 58% (coffee), Papua-New Guinea 50% (copper), Madagascar 47% (coffee), Mali 46% (cotton), Guyana 45% (bauxite), Chile 45% (copper), Zaire 43% (copper), Grenada 43% (cacao), Bolivia 43% (tin), Upper Volta 40% (cotton), Dominican Republic 40% (sugar), Sudan 39% (cotton), Paraguay 37% (cotton), Sri Lanka 34% (tea), Nicaragua 32% (coffee). As the example of coconut production shows, world market-price oscillations can also be quite hard on a country's economy even when the share of a product in the land's over-all export is less than the percentages given in the examples above. Thus the revenue from coconut products, which account for some 20% of the Philippines' export earnings, and on which, directly or indirectly, one-third of the country's population depends, receded from more than 1,000 million dollars in 1978 to – because of a price crash – only 600 million dollars in 1982.

Third: As to the thesis of the suppression of autonomous policies in developing countries, arguments are advanced by, among others, Baran (1957), Frank (1978) and Sunkel (1973). In developing countries the development of a national middle class is hindered, Baran (1957) argues. The reason: The traders earn from the export of raw materials and the import of manufactured products. Moreover, the large landowners have comparable interests. So there is an obstacle to carrying out an economically rational protective-tariff policy. Within this conjunction a bridgehead thesis is presented. It runs along the line that liaison elites, circles who provide for a good investment climate, represent the interests of the center, and accordingly they hinder the development of a balanced economic growth in their country. This position of the country's liaison elites fosters more severe

internal inequality – because the incomes of the local elite rise while the wages of their countrymen remain low.

Many theorists of dependency have awakened the misleading impression, Alejandro Portes (1976, 75) points out, that dependency analyses are primarily concerned with quasi-colonial situations of economic stagnation and foreign control of export enclaves. But this is inaccurate: "Contemporary dependency studies address a situation in which domestic industrialization has occurred along with increasing economic denationalization; in which sustained economic growth has been accompanied by rising social inequalities; and in which rapid urbanization and the spread of literacy have converged with the ever more evident marginalization of the masses."

6.5 World-System Theory

Beyond doubt the most influential theorist of dependency currently is Immanuel Wallerstein (1974; 1979; 1980). A distinction between world systems and minisystems is made by this author. The latter are defined (1979, 5) as follows: "A minisystem is an entity that has within itself a complete division of labor, and a single cultural framework. Such systems are found only in very simple agricultural or hunting and gathering societies. Such minisystems no longer exist in the world." Each of these minisystems "became tied to an empire by the payment of tribute as protection costs and ceased by that fact to be a 'system.'" The minisystems have been succeeded by world-systems. Of these, two types are distinguished: world empires and world economies.

The prototype of the world empire is the unified political system. By contrast, the world economy is precisely defined by the continuing absence of such political unity. The determinant difference between Wallerstein's thinking and that of other authors, he argues, is his analysis' point of departure: The world-system perspective offers an alternative framework of explanation. Wallerstein (1979, 155) writes: "A world-system perspective assumes . . . that social action takes place in an entity within which there is an ongoing division of labor, and seeks to discover empirically whether such an entity is or is not unified politically or culturally, asking theroretically what are the consequences of the existence or non-existence of such unity." He continues: "By throwing overboard the presupposition that there is a

'society' we are forced to look at the alternative possibilities of organizing the material world." Only this world-system perspective, the author maintains, is suited for the analysis of a capitalist world economy not limited to nation-states.

The concept that until the emergence of capitalism world economies have historically been unstable structures leading either towards disintegration or conquest by one group and hence transformation into a world empire Wallerstein (1979, 5) sees as an empirical actuality. The great pre-modern civilizations of China, Rome and Egypt are offered by the author as examples of this process of transformation. But these redistributive world empires are all condemned to disintegration, because they lack system-immanent dynamic. To be sure, world empires for a certain period, especially through the peripheral regions' paying tribute, can appropriate an enormous amount of surplus capital. But sooner or later the costs of maintaining political stability (particularly the upkeep of the bureaucracy) exceed the economic benefits of exploitation. In other words, the maintenance of imperial structures eventually uses up the accumulated capital.

By contrast, what Wallerstein calls the European world economy is a system with an inherent dynamic. It is this precisely because this system has developed beyond the boundaries of a political system. The modern world economy has not gone the way of earlier world economies because the modern version has offered an alternative and more lucrative source of surplus appropriation. The European world economy represents a completely new social system: "It is an economic but not a political entity." (1974, 15.) While an empire is characterized as a mechanism for collecting tribute, the dynamic of capitalism is portrayed as follows (1974, 16): "In a capitalistic

The "use of political energy to secure monopoly rights."

world economy, political energy is used to secure monopoly rights (or as near to them as can be achieved). The state becomes less the central economic enterprise than the means of assuring certain terms of trade in other economic transactions. In this way, the operation of the market (not the free operation, but nonetheless its operation) creates incentives to increased productivity and all the consequent accompaniment of modern economic development."

How did this new European world economy come to be? Wallerstein traces its origins to the aftermath of the breakdown of the Habsburg Empire under Charles V. (The actual primal cause of the breakdown is regarded as having been the financial burden involved in trying to maintain the empire.) The framework within which the development of the European world economy took place was the expansion of the West European maritime countries. This development began in the 16th century. It was

linked with the evolving of a new international division of work. Another factor was an international system of stratification, which was dominated by small core states that were producing both agricultural and industrial products with the use of advanced technologies. Peripheral areas, from which the cores were extracting surplus, were, by contrast, specializing in the production of a few primary products meant for consumption in the cores. Morever, Wallerstein introduces a new category: semi-peripheral countries, their production system somewhat more diversified than that of the periphery.

The position of a society in the world economy, says Wallerstein, is determinant for that society's organization. Thus core states have a strong apparatus of state, wage labor, strong cities, a strong bourgeoisie, and culturally homogenous ideologies and policies. The other way around, peripheral societies have a weak state, coerced labor, weak cities, a weak middle class, and pluralistic cultural ideologies and policies. It is true that the differences between center and periphery were at first slight; but later the development of new transport technologies along with military superiority fostered the exploitation of the peripheries, so that the gap between them and the core constantly widened. In this line of thought, unequal development is one of the basic characteristics of the capitalist world economy. Development in the cores presuppose underdevelopment in the periphery. Which states become cores, which peripheries? As to that, the decision "is largely due to historical accident." (Hechter 1975, 219) The significance of unevenness for the development Wallerstein (1974, 86) describes as follows: "The solidarity of the system was based ultimately on . . . unequal development, since the multi-layered complexity provided the possibility of multi-layered identification and the constant realignment of political forces; which provided at one and the same time the underlying turbulence that permitted technological development and political transformations, and also the ideological confusion that contained the rebellions."

"The ongoing process of a world economy," Wallerstein (1974, 350) writes, "tends to expand the economic and social gaps among its varying areas in the very process of its development." Here Wallerstein seems to look on economic growth as a kind of zero-sum game. For the core manages to develop itself only because at the same time the periphery is exploited. (For criticism of this thesis, cf. Chirot and Hall 1982, 100f.) The positions in the core are not, however, fixed once and for all: "The hounds are ever to the hares for the position of topdog." (1974, 350.) Wallerstein even imputes a long-range rotation of elite, in the sense that a country dominant at a certain time has to sooner or later yield its position to another.

In view of the all-embracing approach of the world-system theory, it is not astonishing that the evaluation of Wallerstein in the literature of sociology is quite controversial. Hechter (1975, 218) rates the world-system theory as one of the most important theoretical statements about development since the

time of Max Weber. But Stinchcombe (1983) considers Wallerstein's work as at best a kind of "abstracting service." It is, so Stinchcombe, after all not a theory when one characterizes poor, weak countries as peripheral and strong ones as cores.

We need not at this point get into detailed criticism (cf. e.g. Chirot and Hall 1982; Review Symposium on Wallerstein 1977; Stinchcombe 1982), while still making a few critical observations: Wallerstein has been reproached as not knowing his history (for example, when he characterizes an earlier England and an earlier Holland as strong states). There are plausible arguments that, for instance, in the case of Poland the chain of causation went in another direction than assumed by Wallerstein. It cannot be ruled out that the backwardness of specific regions is not the result of dependency, but that – vice versa – backwardness is responsible for the coming into existence of peripheral structures. It is also held against Wallerstein that he allegedly extensively neglects technological development. Another objection made is that Wallerstein attempts to show the economic, political and social evolution of humanity over several centuries as having been under the influence of European capitalism; this by his merely taking into consideration the international division of labor brought about by European imperialism, and by contrast disregarding the significance of specific West European cultural values and/or social institutions.

"It cannot be ruled out that the backwardness of specific regions is not the result of dependency, but that – vice versa – backwardness is responsible for the coming into existence of peripheral structures."

Günther Roth (1981, 743 ff.) refers to the "extreme reductionism" of Immanuel Wallerstein. According to Roth, Wallerstein's actors in the capitalistic global economy perform along the lines of the model of a "rational actor," only according to the principle of maximizing profits. The critic continues: Wallerstein can't and doesn't want to conceive "that modern history consists of more than private profit interests and state strategies of trade. Only in passing does Wallerstein mention the domestic religious struggles that after 1650 were succeeded by an era of international wars. The moral of his Marxistically narrated history – which however is not supported by any explicit theory – is that the rich and those who want to become rich always try to live at the expense of the great majority of the poorer and

poorest." As Günther Roth sees it, Wallerstein's main line of thought doesn't go much beyond some entries in 'Meyers Konversationslexikon' of 1890.

A major criticism of Wallerstein is the inexact terminology, which is indicated, for example, in his giving no definition of the terms periphery, semi-periphery and core. Coreness is defined simply as the criterion of national success. On this, Stinchcombe (1982, 1391) remarks: "This means that coreness cannot be used to explain national success without going in circles."[1])

Of direct significance for predictions in regard to the further development of the world system is a study in which the concepts core and periphery are employed in the analysis of a society.

In "Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536–1966," Michael Hechter (1975) examines the continuing presence in Great Britain of ethnic stratification and domination. Why is this so, he asks, despite the allegedly leveling and integrating effects of industrialization; mass education; centralization of administration; labor mobility; improved possibilities of communication; spreading of civil rights, and not least a policy of linguistic and religious assimilation? Hechter seeks his answer with the help of the concept "internal colonialism." He asserts that the maintenance of the "ethnic distinctions in the stratification system" is not to be regarded as a deviation from universalistic norms, but that instead – in the terminology of Wallerstein – the preservation of these distinctions evidences the quality of the relationship between core and periphery. Hechter finds a cultural division of labor, which he (1975, 30) defines as "a system of stratification where objective cultural divisions are superimposed upon class lines."

The non-occurrence of leveling effects would then be explainable by the circumstance that the control of political activity and economic activity has remained with the center. Such a stratification system based on cultural differences (speech, religion) results in the disadvantaged population's seeking to safeguard its identity in the cultural and ethnical spheres. Hechter (1975, 42) even maintains: ". . . the aggregation of individual perceptions of economic inequality alone is insufficient for the development of collective solidarity." Instead, according to Hechter ethnicity must enter the picture.

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[1]) But precisely with reference to this terminological triad, Snyder and Kick (1979) in a multiple-network analysis report data which provide evidence for the existence of a core – semi-periphery – periphery structure of the world system. In a regression analysis Snyder and Kick are able to demonstrate the effects of these structural positions on the economic growth of nations. (They use as their reference material the per-capita change in gross national product from 1955 to 1970.)

For the British Isles, Hechter is able to show that economic indices point toward only a weak convergence. The situation is, rather, that long-term regional differences among England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland continue to exist. It is true that the Celtic language has practically disappeared, but the religious differences between core and periphery remain, and have maintained ethnic solidarity and boundaries. In view of this finding, there hardly remains ground for optimism that there will be a dismantling of the international stratification system in the foreseeable future.

6.6 The Practical Relevance of Dependency-Theory Doctrine

The tendency to use the word "dependency" as a magic formula with the help of which everything in the Third World that is condemned as negative can be explained is found in many authors. There is often circular argument along the lines of: "Dependent countries are those which lack the capacity for autonomous growth and they lack this because their structures are dependent ones." (O'Brien 1975, 24.) Often a logic is encountered which, in the words of Portes (1976, 78), asserts "that the elimination of imperialist influence will automatically bring about national welfare and a higher standard of living for the masses." The assumption of such perspectives can definitely go against the interests of the countries of the Third World if it results in the developing countries' projecting outward the blame for their own failings, and thus hindering the involved countries' implementation of the necessary political and social reforms at home. Within this conjunction W. Arthur Lewis upholds the thesis that it is not the nature of world trade which is at the root of the Third World's problems. Instead, he maintains, these problems are to be laid generally to internal social causes. Particularly important among these causes is said to be over-hasty industrialization; instead of this, there should be more progress in the agricultural sector. Economic growth in a developing country is doubtless not solely dependent on exogenous factors, as the dependency theory implies. Instead, endogenous variables, such as governing style or educational system, are also of key importance.

Doubtless, however, nations that are subject to external economic control are not in a position appropriately to invest the earned surplus capital so as to achieve comprehensive, balanced growth in a number of sectors. Within this context, the role of multinational enterprises is of particular importance. These firms, after all, are not motivated primarily by development goals, but by a quest for their own advantage (cf. Evans 1981).

The capitalistic economic system seems a kind of devil's workshop to many dependency theorists. For example, Wallerstein (1979, 109 ff.) feels called on to cite in detail the thoughts of North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung – whom he calls "Comrade." Samir Amin (1977) considers the Pol Pot regime of the Khmer Rouge a model worth emulating. Guidelines for practical policy are hardly to be obtained from the dependency theory (Hermassi 1978), aside from the call to revolution or uncoupling from the global economy. Thus Chirot (1977), Moulder (1977) and Senghaas (1977, 1982), to name only a few authors, argue that adequate rapid and equitable development in a poor country is only possible if the country closes itself off from most foreign economic influences.

The bimodal partitioning of the world into center and periphery, even if a semi-periphery is also introduced, is too severely simplified. Socio-cultural differences are considered as little as are internal, dynamic social processes in developing countries – which certainly can hardly be regarded as homogeneous categories. Are key distinctions among differing developing

"Are key distinctions among differing developing countries being overlooked?"

cultural aspects are only treated marginally allows the supposition that these are being interpreted as a superstructure on the economic foundation, and accordingly as being relatively unimportant. This is a thought that is also central to the much much-maligned modernization theories: Cultural differences are compensated for by the respective modern environment.

The fact that from developing country to developing country pronounced differences can exist is shown by the findings of Barrett and Whyte (1982). In Taiwan they come upon no evidence for two prognoses to be derived from the dependency theory: that foreign economic penetration leads to slow economic growth; and that such penetration also results in increased inequality. The thesis that participation in the world economy has impeded economic development only in the advanced periphery of the world economy is upheld by Delacroix and Regan (1981). In poor peripheral countries, participation in world trade, these authors argue, facilitates development by stimulating infrastructural improvements and removing pre-capitalist obstacles to development.

It is important to avoid being misled by this short presentation and criticism of the theories of dependency: The impression shouldn't be created that here the free-trade conceptions traceable back to Ricardo are so to speak being consigned to the old files. One can certainly say that the neoclassic international economics (e.g. Samuelson 1967) derives positive effects from dependent situations. Foreign investments are credited with the being able to

break a country out of the vicious circle of poverty – something that the developing countries on their own would not be able to do. The capital flow to less developed countries signifies a broadening of the benefits of foreign investment. For the new incomes created by new jobs have a trickle-down effect. That is, the result is an increased demand for land, labor and materials (cf. e.g. Schilling 1958). However, in particular the Anglo-American economic doctrine is charged with a willful neglect of Third World voices

"Cultural imperialism and ethnocentric arrogance."

within the context of development economics. Alan Sica (1977, 729) sees here a variant of cultural imperialism and ethnocentric arrogance: "This is yet another case of the West claiming ultimate competence for the interpretation of events occurring in other cultures. The quiet assumption behind it all is that indigenous political economists, by virtue of their existential position and assumed automatic Marxism, lack the objectivity to properly understood international economic relations."

7. The Discussion of Cultural and Communications Imperialism

7.1 Explanation of Terminology

The discussion of cultural imperialism is in no way new: It can be traced back to the 18th century (cf. Ch. 7.2). The issues raised by the concept of cultural imperialism have become topical again within the context of dependency-theory deliberations. Latin American authors in particular argue that cultural imperialism through communication is a vital process for "U.S. imperialism" – the existence of which is assumed without question – in securing and maintaining economic domination and political hegemony over others (e.g. Beltran 1978). Mass communication cannot be regarded as an isolated institution; it is, rather, an integral component of worldwide economic and political processes of interdependencies.

Cultural imperialism is in operation, as the dependency theorists see it, when the culture of a nation at the center is unilaterally imposed on the peripheral countries at the expense of their cultural integrity. So cultural or media imperialism considered a condition of the cultural hegemony of one country over one or more other countries. Emphasis is on extra-national forces (such as transnational or multinational corporations) that are considered as being responsible for the creation and maintenance of unbalanced communication flows. The media-imperialism approach Fejes (1962, 349) characterizes as a way of framing the problem of dependency in the media sector, but not a precisely articulated model comprising formal and testable propositions.

In view of its vagueness, the term "cultural imperialism" has become a standard component of the vocabulary of political insults. Frequently "cultural imperialism" has degenerated into a slogan used in railing against all foreign (and especially U.S.) cultural products. The following considerations are limited to the developing countries. But discussion of cultural imperialism also proceeds in regard to the relations between developed countries; one example here is the relationship between the United States and Canada. (Cf. e.G. Beattie 1977; Hamelink 1983, 33 ff.; Lee 1980, Ch. 4; Nordenstreng and Schiller 1979, X f.; McCormack 1981, 176 ff.; Tunstall 1977, 52 ff.) Lee (1980, 106) reports that because of British television, Irish school children regarded London as their capital. An interesting example of current aspects in the maintenance of cultural identity is the arrival on the communications scene in Europe of the German-originated PAL and the French-promoted SECAM television systems. Various nations of Western and Eastern Europe have respectively "voted" for one or the other of the competing systems because of,

commercial considerations aside, a particular country's historical and /or cultural orientation. European countries that have rejected PAL or SECAM usually were signaling a "no" to communication currents that were considered unwelcome. Nor is the issue of maintaining national identity vanishing. On the contrary, the matter of satellite television, with its disregard of national boundaries, seems sure to keep the discussion alive.

Accusations of media and/or cultural imperialism are heard particularly in conjunction with the matter of the international flow of news (cf. Ch. 8) and the worldwide dissemination of television entertainment transmissions from the industrialized countries. It is relevant here to mention the "war of frequencies."

The current situation in this regard is that the industrialized countries possess about 90% of the radio-electric spectrum and 10% of the population. Third World countries, with 90% of the population and 10% of the spectrum, are demanding a proportionate share of the air waves (Pasquali 1978). Then too, the capability to conduct sustained international broadcasting is primarily limited to the industrialized countries (especially the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain; exceptions include Radio Peking and Radio Cairo) that have the technical and professional prerequisites to capture sizeable audiences with such transmissions.

A quite extreme variant of the cultural-imperialism thesis is put forward by Tunstall (1977, 215). Referring to Kurt Lang (1974), Tunstall argues that the German media research by now is only taking over American models, and so

Is German media research "only taking over American models, and so has lost its cultural identity?"

has lost its "cultural identity." The author forgets that the allegedly purely American media research is also rooted in the German language area – with one example sufficient: that of the certainly most influential of the media sociologists, Paul F. Lazarsfeld.

The attitude that media imperialism is a forceful impingement is held particularly by neo-Marxist authors. They regard well-coordinated, targeted actions by the U.S. military-industrial complex as evident. Thus Herbert I. Schiller (1969) regards communications imperialism as a deliberately planned attempt by U.S. military-communication conglomerates to ensure commercial, military and political superiority. The same author (1976) depicts practically all Western communications systems (including tourism, media technology, and educational systems) as unacceptable for countries of the Third World. As an alternative, this author simply recommends slogans such as uncoupling and Socialist planning.

Nine forms of U.S. cultural influence in Latin America are listed by Bertram (1978, 185):

- international news agencies,
- international advertising agencies,
- international public opinion, marketing and public-relations firms,
- transnational business corporations acting as advisers,
- exporters of printed, auditive and audio-visual programming materials,
- exporters of communication equipment and technologies,
- international telecommunication companies,
- the official propaganda agency, and
- the official central security agency.

In regard to foreign ownership and control of media in Latin America, Lee (1980, 177) writes: "Multinational media conglomerates attempted to gain control or ownership of media outlets in some foreign nations, especially in Latin America. These ventures, however, proved unprofitable and have since been withdrawn." This statement may be quite true for "classical" mass media (television, radio, press), but it certainly does not apply to the big new electronics markets or data transmission. At present the world telecommunications industry is characterized by a fast-advancing privatization (Schiller 1983).

Unbounded hatred against everything from the United States of America permeates the work of Armand Mattelart (cf. e.g. the foreword in Mattelart 1982). One of his research projects reveals Donald Duck, too, as a cultural imperialist. Along the lines of Rosa Luxemburg, Mattelart (1982, 3) asserts

Donald Duck as a cultural imperialist.

that history is made up of two necessities in struggle: the necessity that calls for continuous capitalist accumulation, and that of the response to this mounting oppression – the necessity of revolution. In "Multinational Corporations and the Control of Culture," Mattelart investigates the evolution of what he considers to be currently the fastest-growing of capitalism's economic sectors, the electronic-based multinationals involved in communications and the media. These multis, the author continues, are responsible for the ideological apparatus of imperialism. The internationalization of production means also the internationalization of cultural merchandise. The producers of mass culture are described (1982, 4) as "destined to become the universal culture which encourages the expansion of Empire, and by the same stroke contributes to the enslavement of each country's national consciousness." The consequence: "the economic profitability of such a process is doubled by its ideological profitability." Cultural imperialism, it is asserted, becomes explainable only when the

relationship of the respective local bourgeoisie with the North American Empire is kept in mind." (1982, 231): "National culture, in the era of the multinationals, has to guarantee the reproduction of the dependence of these bourgeoisies on the United States at the same time as that of their own hegemony as the ruling class in a particular nation; that is to say, (national culture) has to continue to sanctify their position as an 'interior bourgeoisie.'"

The imputation of purposeful, co-ordinated actions of a homogeneous U.S. military-commercial complex with the goal of world rule is made exclusively by neo-Marxist authors. They use a very vague terminology and proceed from the notion that history is a history of class warfare. Moreover, these authors force concrete historical processes into a mold cast by adopting a popularized Marxistic interpretation of events. (For example, the term "class" is always used without definition.) Actually, situations that are characterized as media imperialism come into existence in developing countries as a rule by way of the market mechanism – not thanks to some conspiracy or other.

Mass media are present in developing countries before those countries' other potential for production, their infrastructure, comes anywhere near the level in industrialized countries. For instance, television arrives in a country of the Third World before the country has facilities for adequate production of programs (cf. Ch. 7.5). Seen from that angle, a definition by Wang and Dissanayake (1982, 4) is quite applicable: "Cultural imperialism can be viewed as a lack of co-ordination between the hardware growth and the software growth of media, i.e., ability in providing content for them." Media imperialism is defined by Boyd-Barrett (1977, 117) similarly, as "the process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one country are singly or together subject to substantial pressure from the media interest of any other country or countries without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country so affected."

A distinction among four dimensions of media imperialism is proposed by Lee (1980, 68):

- Television program exportation to foreign countries.
- Foreign ownership and control of media outlets.
- Transfer of the metropolitan broadcasting norms and institutionalization of media commercialism at the expense of the "public interest."
- Invasion of capitalistic world-views and infringement upon indigenous way of life in the recipient nations.

The limitation of the concept "media imperialism" to television is, however, too restricted. At any event, the discussion cannot exclude film, radio and print media. How then is one to determine possible alterations of a country's

national character?" Inkeles and Levinson (1969, 428) define it as "characteristics that are common or standardized in a given society." They refer further to "relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns that are modal among the adult members of the society." Going by this definition, which presupposes no unimodal distribution of personality characteristics, psychology is regarded as a science adequate to the researching of national characters. The sociology of communication does not yet have available empirically supported findings as to how the modal personality structure of a developing country has been altered through the introduction of mass media or through the distribution of specific content.

7.2 Linguistic-Philosophical Foundations – or the "Cultural Imperialism" Discussion of the German Romantic Age

You can trace the current discussion of cultural imperialism back, as far as Germany is concerned, to the 18th and early 19th century. Doing this will lead you to two main lines of argumentation:

- The protective-tariff theses of Friedrich List (cf. Ch. 6.2). They lead the emphasis away from purely economic factors and turn it toward socio-cultural aspects of economic life.

- The theoretical linguistic arguments of the German Romantic Age, stemming from the thinking of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) about keeping the German language free of foreign influences – with the desire thus to preserve or restore the cultural indentity of the German people. The antirationalistic German Romantic Age, directed against the preceding Age of Enlightenment, was closely linked with a brightly flaming enthusiasm about the concept of fatherland, which called for (against Napoleon) political liberation.

One of the determinant theoretical fundaments for German nationalism was laid by Johann Gottfried Herder in 1771 in his Treatise on the Origin of Language. Language, said Herder – and here he was in diametrical opposition to the age's ruling doctrine – is not a creation of God; in each case of a national or regional tongue it is the expression of a special way of thinking – which in turn has been shaped by the differing life-experiences and national characters of various peoples. A similar philosophy of language is put forward by August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767–1845) in the Lectures on Belles-Lettres

and Art (1801–1804). We shall not here return (cf. Ch. 2.2) to the argumentation of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), whose philosophy of language anticipated the linguistic theory of relativity. Beyond doubt Humboldt was the more important theorist of language; but Herder directly influenced the German Romantic Age.

Language for Herder is an instrument that came into existence at the moment when the human being sought to express perceptions and feelings. Language and speech is something that lives; and language is of key significance for the identity of the human being. Language, Herder tells us, links things and events with the feelings that they evoke. At the same time Herder sees speech as the determinant indication of the existence of a nation. The presence of a language of a people's own justifies the claim to a sovereign state of their own. For a people to speak a foreign language is equivalent to destruction of their own culture. If a people give up their mother tongue and have forgotten their own original characteristics, they are doomed to lead an artificial life. A people that surrender their language in favor of the language of another people lose their essential quality of being, and can no longer preserve their own characteristics. Herder launches sharp polemics against the tendency of some of his German contemporaries to seek to imitate the French language and culture.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), the philosopher of the German Romantic Age, in 1807/08 delivered, in Berlin, his Speeches to the German Nation – addressing a political unity that at the time did not exist at all. Fichte's thesis is that the mere taking over or the co-existence of foreign words can itself undermine a people's political morale. Foreign words are used, Fichte asserts, without the users' being clear about their exact connotations. This can lead to severe confusion. Fichte gives as three examples the words that in English are usually rendered as "humanity," "popularity," and "liberality." He points out that in German the respective *Menschlichkeit Leutseligkeit,* and *Edelmut* can have quite other meanings than the English "equivalents." (On this point standard modern German-English dictionaries would seem to support Fichte. While Wildhagen and Héracourt translate *Menschlichkeit* as "humanity," they note that in German the word can also mean "human nature." Again, *Leutseligkeit* for "popularity" is also inexact: *Leutseligkeit* can connote "affability", "cordiality" – neither quite the same as "popularity" – and also "condescension." Fichte's third example, for the English "liberality" *Edelmut,* has among its dictionary definitions the near equivalent "generosity," but also the somewhat pompous "noble-mindedness" and – sometimes connotative of condescension – "magnanimity.") By contrast, Fichte continues, a people that speak their original language are in a position to safeguard their uniquenesses. For Fichte there is only one conclusion: The language must be kept free of foreign influences. For if the ability to speak one's own tongue is lost, a people is doomed to decline.

In Germany, fruitful soil was ready for the arguments of Herder and Fichte.

For at that time there were two political goals that could be served by such a philosophy of language:

- The creation of a unified German nation-state, putting an end to the German pattern of small states.

- The defense against a cultural superimposition by France.

The latter purpose – protectionism against cultural imports from France – is observable precisely in conjunction with the German wars of liberation, in the course of which many German writers exhibited a boundless hatred of everything French. (This phenomenon certainly reflected a kind a reactive behavior: German writers of the day did not enjoy very high social esteem. The German aristocrat spoke French and embellished his environment with French authors; a prime example is the relationship between Frederick the

". . . anyone who would have his daughter learn French would entice her to prostitution . . ."

Great and Voltaire.) Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769–1860) mocks the efforts of the Germans to take over French culture. He calls for a political crusade against the French. "*Turnvater*" Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778–1852) even asserts that anyone who would have his daughter learn French would entice her to prostitution.

These few examples of German Francophobia at the start of the 19th century indicate many parallels with the current discussion of cultural imperialism. The goal in that earlier time was typically nationalistic: The motivation was to liberate the people from alien influence, and thus to attain a regeneration of the nation. Comparably, today's discussion of cultural imperialism also nearly always has nationalistic (or anti-colonial) elements. The discussion concentrates on the foreign, the damaging influence of which must be countered. The autochthonous culture purists regard foreign cultures as a kind of illness that would corrode the identity of their own nation. The authors who do battle with cultural imperialism often do not take into consideration that there are many empirical evidences of the occurrence of a cross-fertilization of cultures. For example, in the ancient Mediterranean world it was precisely such civilizations as Greece and Rome that, open to foreign influences, were themselves the most dynamic and vital cultures.

7.3 Early Forms of Reaction to Cultural Superimposition

The aspect of cultural imperialism, or of the more narrowly constructed media imperialism, it seems apparent, up to now has not been of particular interest for theorists of mass communication. (Cf. Kunczik 1984; McQuail 1983.) This lack of great interest is remarkable. For after all analysis of the influencing of cultural values by the mass media has a long tradition in sociological research and it is also a key component of current discussion within communication science. One is reminded again of the discussion about the cultivation theory of George Gerbner (and Gross 1976). According to it, television is the central cultural arm of the American society.

Other than is the case with mass-communication research, the theme of cultural imperialism has a sharply profiled tradition in sociology, ethnology, social anthropology and other cultural sciences. The colonial expansion of European states was usually accompanied by missionary efforts to proliferate Christian religion and European civilization. What went on was a kind of benevolent tutelage of the – regarded as inferior – "native" populations (cf. in particular: Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden"). The direct consequences of the colonial expansion ranged from genocide through the wiping out of large segments of a population to the subtle, unintended destruction of traditional cultures. (As to genocide: for example, the population of Tasmania was completely extinguished. The population of the Belgian Congo, about 20 million, was cut in half within 15 years. The fate of the Indians of North and South America is well-known.)

Even the introduction of a new tool can mean that old handicrafts become superfluous. European values and European technology, as a rule, have been superimposed on the primarily village life in a barter economy. The accompanying introduction of European educational systems at least in principle represents a threat to the respective indigeneous culture. Cultural transformation often means the loss of traditional ties; possibly a change in personality; and in certain circumstances a feeling of inability to measure up to European standards, with resultant anxiety (cf. e.g. Staewen and Schönberg 1970). A "mazeway theory" suited for the analysis of cultural superimposition is presented by Anthony F. Wallace (1956). He coins the concept of "revitalization." The mazeway theory emphasises the cognitive aspect of culture. A culture functions as long as the content of different mazeways is predictable and relatively equivalent. Thus the stability of people's behavior in terms of what other people expect those actions to be, what we can call mutual predictability of behavior, is regarded as more important for the functioning of social systems than is the common basis of the actors' motivations.

The following statement by Wallace can be interpreted as an analysis of a situation of cultural superimposition: "Whenever an individual who is under chronic, psychologically measurable stress receives repeated information that his mazeway does not lead to action which reduces the level of stress, he must choose between maintaining his present mazeway, and tolerating stress, or changing the mazeway, in an attempt to reduce stress." On the collective level a way out is sought that permits the establishment of a satisfactory culture. In Wallace's terminology, certain conditions of readiness come into existence. In the case of a serious threat to the culture, massive negative symptoms emerge, indicating that the culture is internally distorted. These symptoms can include "alcoholism, extreme passivity and indolence . . . intragroup violence, disregard of kinship and sexual mores, irresponsibility in puplic officials, states of depression and self-reproach and probably a variety of psychosomatic and neurotic disorders." (1956, 269.)

In such situations, the chances for the success of collective efforts to restore cultural identity are especially favorable. Prophets appear. They promise a better life if only their advice is taken. Examples of such revitalization movements are numerous. They range from the religious creed of North American prairie Indians – which found its end in the notorious massacre at Wounded Knee – to the Cargo Cults in Melanesia (cf. e.g. Mühlmann 1964, 321 ff.; Smith 1973, 81 ff.; deVos and Hippler 1969, 372 ff.; Wilkinson 1974, 62 ff.). These cult movements represent, according to Worseley (1957, 24 f.), desperate searchings for more and more effective ways of understanding and modifying a confused environment. The desperate nature of such a search for identity is described particularly impressively by Vittorio Lanternari (The Religion of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults, New York 1956).

According to this work, all prophecies involve the conception of a conversion of the world: The white man and his civilization will be expelled, and the traditional, legitimate civilization will regain its place.

Wilhelm Mühlmann (1964, 333) also refers to cultural contacts with Western civilization as leading to crises: "The failure intellectually to come to terms with a given current situation, not transparent as to its conjunctions, is an important prerequisite for the emergence of eschatological hopes and

"The failure intellectually to come to terms with a given current situation is an important prerequisite for the emergence of eschatological hopes and aspirations."

aspirations." Emancipatory movements in colonially ruled societies are characterized as nativistic and are interpreted as predecessors of nationalism (cf. Mühlmann 1961; 1964), inasmuch as they represent an attempt at

liberation from colonial dependencies and at finding a new self-expression. Contemporary nativistic movements are termed, in essence, chiliastic, in that there is a collective readiness for a new start in order to obtain or realize a yearned-for paradisical condition of happiness on earth (cf. Mühlmann 1984, 325).

On a psychoanalytical basis, Franz Fanon (1967, 57) reasons that the oppressed of the Third World hate both their oppressors and themselves – for they judge themselves by the same criteria as those by which they are judged by their European oppressors, and accordingly the victims of oppression themselves categorize themselves as inferior. In turn, such a situation provides fertile soil for nativistic religious groups or revolutionary nationalist movements, which each in its own way promises to restore the traditional state of affairs.

7.4 Style of a Regime and the Use of Mass Media

The mass-communications system to be found in a specific developing country has been shaped by political decisions of the elite. Pool (1963) remarks that with reference to mass media each developing country has four decisions to make:

- How much of the national product shall be invested in the mass media?
- Are the media to be organized as public corporations or as private enterprises?
- To what extent should the media be controlled (i.e., censored)?
- How high should the media's cultural level be?

Non-Communist countries, as Pool sees it, invest a considerable part of their national product in education, so as to combat illiteracy, but invest less in the media sector. For in those countries the authorities believe mass media have no or only a slight effect; preference goes to modernization, as thus being more attainable, by way of a "slower" educational process. By contrast, the author sees Communist countries as investing considerable funds in both sectors – education and mass media. This is because it is assumed that mass media in combination with interpersonal communication can accelerate social change. The potential effect of mass media, which are able both to transmit

information and to channel attention to selected themes is doubtless intensified by an infrastructure that includes interpersonal communication. "The practice in non-Communist countries," writes Ithiel de Sola Pool (1963, 234), "is for development plans to provide large amounts for the education of children and the eradication of illiteracy but relatively small amounts for other communications investment. The practice in Communist countries also is to spend heavily for literacy and education, but in addition to support expensive programs of exhortation addressed to adults. They invest much in the press, movies, loud-speaker systems, etc."

Why do West-leaning developing countries tend to disregard the mass media as an instrument of the development process? One of the possible reasons could be what has been told in Western universities to students coming from these countries – individuals who later have had the determinant policy-making positions in their homelands: They were

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confronted by the thesis that the media are to a large extent ineffectual. Thus, as late as in 1969, in the "Handbook of Social Psychology," McGuire contends that one can obviously assume that mass media have no effect at all. This law of minimal effects, according to which the most important effect of the mass media consists of a reinforcement of the status quo, is the basis of the Western mass-communications policy, according to Roberts and Bachen (1981).

And the transfer of the policy to developing countries? The possibility is not to be excluded that countries of the Third World in many cases have in fact taken over this media policy, which is based on a very restricted, individualistic concept of effect; although at the same time the modernization theorists were emphasizing the importance of the mass media. However, it should be noted that for some years now within the science of communications a revival has been underway of the thesis that mass media exert powerful influences on the way people perceive, think about and act in the world.

The mass media, especially radio and television, that can distribute information fast also to parts of a populace that cannot read or write play an important role in the creation of a national identity. Thus in Brazil a clear relationship between isolation from the national communication system and acceptance of political messages contrary to the national culture is postulated by Lane (1969). This indicates that the mass media should provide nation-wide interpretations and evaluations of significant events and persons. It can

be assumed that mass media in developing countries are nationalistic and oriented toward the urban elite, according to Frey (1973, 379 f.). Like Deutsch (1969), he sees the process of political development as being linked with the establishment of a national identity. It is also true, Klapper (1960) observes, that in situations of pronounced social change, in which traditional ties and values are destroyed, the influence of the mass media is particularly marked.

In ideal cases the media make a determinant contribution of the creation of a nation-state. If "nation" is defined as an aggregation of individuals sharing a conscious identity and loyalty, and if "state" is defined as a bureaucratic administrative unit extending over an identifiable geographic area and monopolizing legitimate forces of violence, then there is existence of a nation-state when sentiments and culture overlap with such an administrative unit (cf. Olzak 1983, 358). Most developing countries, especially former colonies with their arbitrarily drawn borders, are not such nation-states. Although the development of national identities is almost unanimously positively evaluated in the sociological literature, a qualifying word is in order: Such a process of becoming a nation, in countries with considerable cultural heterogeneity, is linked with a threatening or extinguishing of old, local cultures. That is, you get a process of internal colonialism.

Even when the mass media are under state control, Katz and Wedell (1978) point out, we still always find a central conflict between the carrying out of modernization methods on the one hand and, on the other hand, the creation of national identities. If development is seen – again, considerably simplifying – as a three-stage process, in the first phase the mass media have the function of disseminating symbols and information promoting national identity. If modernization processes are then introduced, integrative progress that may have been made meanwhile will be endangered, since the potential for new conflicts will emerge (for example, old vs. new elites, loss of authority by the older generation, etc.). Possibly during modernization radical restratifications of the society have occurred. For instance, new tribes or ethnic groups may have taken over the leadership. In such cases, the function of national integration will again have priority for the mass media. Here a recourse that offers itself is the construction of an artificial profile of the

"An illusion of a threat – from imperialists, Communists or domestic enemies."

enemy, the creation of an illusion of a threat – from imperialists, Communists of domestic enemies; since threat from outside increases readiness to subject oneself to authoritarian leadership and to set aside domestic quarrels.

"All states that have recently gained independence are faced with two

interrelated problems," writes Seymour Lipset (1963, 90), "legitimating the use of power and establishing national identity."

Here there is the definite possibility with the help of the mass media to offer new assistance in orientation, and to implement new values that can serve as ideological guidance. However, it must be certain that the traditional interpersonal channels of communication can also be included.

Developing countries find themselves almost constantly in a crisis situation. A large part of the populace is striving to better its living conditions. Plans for this are worked out, moreover. But because of the inadequate technical training of the working force, the absence of a strong state, insufficient capital coverage, external, uncontrollable economic influences (oscillations of raw-materials prices, oil-price explosion), and often, too, a lack of understanding of macro-economic conjunctions, abortive developments occur regularly. In such situations group goals – such as improving the conditions of life for the masses – are given precedence over individual goals; and, moreover, there is no consensus as to how these goals are to be arrived at. Accordingly, there is a need for authoritarian leadership that can cope with these disharmonies and issue clear instructions. In other words, the situation favors the emergence of charismatic leaders. Charismatic leadership or domination Max Weber separates from other forms of domination, namely, legal domination by statute and traditional domination via faith in the sacredness of institutions in existence through time immemorial and the ruling authorities. Charisma is no gift in the sense of being a specific personal quality, but is, rather, from the angle of the followers of the leader, an affective yielding, conditioned by the specific historic situation. Charisma is a faith that is projected on a leader-figure, as if this leader were endowed with charisma. Because of the constant

"In case of a failure the charismatic leader quickly becomes a scapegoat."

pressure for confirmation, the charismatic rule is extraordinarily labile. In case of a failure the leader quickly becomes a scapegoat. A particular difficulty in charismatic leadership is the question of a successor: What happens when a charismatic leader dies?

A "proven" procedure for maintaining a situation favorable to an authoritarian or charismatic leadership is the above-mentioned creation of a profile of the (presumed) enemy. That device fosters a tendency to suppress internal conflicts; and the feeling of togetherness is intensified. Franz Fanon (1968) argues almost in the same vein, but without referring to the role of the media, that in most cases the national bourgeoisie over the course of time will betray the goals of the national liberation movements. Then when there is the

inevitable economic crisis, the hunt for scapegoats is on. (For example, Asian shopkeepers have been singled out as saboteurs of economic growth.)

But can't the artificial creation of a threat court some dangers? One such eventuality is that at the moment when the "peril" is no longer perceived as such, particularistic goals will be followed once more, with all the more intensity – a turn that can gravely endanger a social system. For within a closed communications system it is relatively simple with the help of the mass media to construct a profile on the enemy; but when once credibility has been lost, it is very hard to make effective use of the media again for this or that campaign. Then the use of the media to champion new purposes may even be counter-productive; may boomerang. This danger aside, charismatic leaders, who often are perceived as endowed with pseudo-religious characteristics, can serve as objects of national identification. Loyalty to the nation can in some cases be built up in the form of devotion to the charismatic person (cf. Smith 1973, 99 ff.). For personal loyalty reflects the traditional life-style. The national hero can become an object to identify with – something that the abstract concept "nation" cannot. In new nations such a charismatic leader can be an entirely necessary phenomenon. In such circumstances the leader functions as a symbol, representing the feeling of unity and keeping the public conscious of it (cf. Lipset 1964). Through a coherent communications policy that brings in not only the mass media, but and especially the traditional communications systems as well (for instance, not overlooking traditional folk arts such as folk drama, ballads, story-telling), one can establish a link with a person which then also might be used to mobilize the populace for national tasks.

A personality cult generally is also accompanied by such flanking measures as portraying the leader on coins, banknotes, postage stamps, the erection of monuments, and so on. Nor need this practice, seen from the perspective of

"Personality cults can represent a political necessity."

the West, automatically be condemned. Personality cults can represent a political necessity, with, however, the danger of misuse extremely great (cf. Ch. 2.1). This may well be the case especially if Lucian Pye (1965, 22) should be right with his diagnosis: that in developing countries there is a widespread uncritical and childlike trust in the rulers and in all forms of higher authority.

Modernization is generally linked with the establishment of nation-states, in which especially since the Second World War wars of liberation and/or struggles for national self-determination have been on the increase. A catalogue of criteria for identifying democratic political systems, developed by Baumgart (1981), is used in a summation made by Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1982). (Baumgart 1981 distinguishes seven characteristics of democratic systems: representative rule, universal suffrage, political participation, a high

degree of individual autonomy, equal rights and privileges, a diffuse power base, and temporary control of constitutional government through elections.) Kourvetaris and Dobratz conclude that only a handful of nations can be genuinely characterized as democratic systems. On the situation in developing countries the authors (1982, 308) write: "Military elites alone or in collaboration with civilian bureaucratic elites have become the rulers of authoritarian civil-military regimes in many countries of the Third World."

Moreover, most of the researchers have meanwhile abandoned the view which had been held within the context of modernization theories: that the development of democratic political systems is merely a matter of time. "More and more researchers believe," write Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1982, 309), "that political democracy is a luxury that can't be afforded by less-developed countries. It is an obstacle to economic development." The more than 100 states that have become independent since the end of World War II and the countries of Latin America have not been able at all to couple successful modernization with the development of parliamentary democracy.

"Is political democracy a luxury 'that can't be afforded by less-developed countries'?"

Within this conjunction it is relevant to mention a variant of the optimistic modernization theories: It ascribes to the military a determinant role in modernization. This thesis was preceded by another postulating that populist one-party systems with charismatic leaders would have the capacity to undertake successful modernization. Why should the military be successful, after having usually stages a coup to succeed an ineffective charismatic leader? The rationale of the thesis is that the military can be regarded as the most modern institution in a country of the Third World. Then too, the process of military socialization, which after all begins as a disciplinary process within a total organization, is suited for opening up recruits coming from a traditional milieu to modern values. (The recruit on entering the military becomes a member of a total organization – that is, an organization with its working and living spheres cut off for a longer period from the rest of the environment. Many persons lead a formally regulated life under identical circumstances.) Erving Goffman (1961) uses the term mortification process to characterize the restructuring of the recruit's personality in the first phase of military training. The military is less susceptible to corruption, the supposition continues, than are civilian bureaucrats. The military, as representative of the new, progressive bourgeois middle class, is in a position to carry out social reforms and to promote nationalism. After an adequate level of economic development has been reached, evolution toward democracy is then held to be possible.

Nationalism is a "destructive excess of national sentiment," writes Karl W. Deutsch (1966) in "Nationalism and Social Communication." He adds: this excess "is in turn the product of the cultural assimilation through communications demanded by a modern market economy and industrialism. Trade, specialization and industry together induce a state of physical and psychic mobility, replete with tensions and insecurity characteristic of uprooted persons." In such situations the mass media's potential influence is

"People can be mobilized relatively easily for important national tasks."

the greatest; that is, people can be mobilized relatively easily for important national tasks. According to Deutsch, a public is created that strives for both individual success and collective belonging. These needs can only be satisfied by putting trust in the nation. So the course ahead is to overcome the presence of diffuse distrust that is posited by Pye (1965, 22), a distrust which seems to impede seriously the creation of the kinds of public organizations essential for national development. Doubtless there are close interrelationships between trust and distrust, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the quality of the communications system. A communications system considered lacking in credibility will not be able to establish trust.

Social mobilization generally means a rise in the frequency of the taking up of impersonal contacts; increased consumption of media; increased mobility and more intensive participation in political or quasi-political processes. Mobilization signifies in particular the extent to which a developing country's political elite is prepared to intervene in the value orientations of their constituencies. Regimes in undergoing mobilization tend to make more political use of such modernizing institutions as mass media and schools.

Mobilization is also called for by Wilbur Schramm (cf. Ch. 3.5) within a UNESCO study. For one thing, it refers to the importance of the delay of gratification – that is, a readiness must be acquired to work more and longer, and at the same time to wait longer for the reward. On the other hand, attention is called to the significance of nationalism: Individuals should aspire to national strength and greatness. In this situation, mass media can be used purposefully to create new foci of collective national identity. At the same time, the media can disseminate an image of the future that the elite aspire to. What is more, communications and educational systems are easier to set up than it is to raise the capital for the introduction of modern technology. However, the significance of the mass media for the mobilization of the masses has not been paid much attention in the literature (cf. Marx and Wood 1975, 384 ff.).

Gunnar Myrdal (1970, Ch. 7) draws what he considers to be the determinant distinction among developing countries: Are they to be classified as "hard" or "soft"? As for weak – "soft" – countries, they in particular face the problem of corruption; and how they deal with it can make or break them. In weak states, too, there are major deficiencies not only in the legislation, but in its observance and enforcement. There is extensive disregard of the ordinances and instructions of the authorities (at all administrative levels). There are secret agreements between officials and powerful persons and groups, whose conduct ought actually to be not tolerated or even fostered, but controlled. The corruption growing wild at all levels of society means that the entire political, legal and administrative system operates counter to the interests of the impoverished masses of the population. The remedy? Rigorous, state-controlled measures against the upper strata of a society; that along with land reform.

By contrast with the "soft" states, the "hard" countries are usually closed societies, and they often use nationalism to mobilize the masses. A particular feature of "hard" states – mobilizing regimes – is that they are in a position to minimize possible disadvantageous consequences of contact with Western ideas; that is, to keep energies that are needed for fulfilling nationally significant tasks from being otherwise absorbed. But the thesis that strong states can protect home industry from negative effects brought on by the capitalistic world economy, and use state controls to promote this industry's growth (e.g. Rubinson 1976) has by no means remained unchallenged. Thus Weede (1981) states that according to the results of his study, such a control-oriented state is more likely to slow down economic growth. On the other hand, Bendix (1967, 332) maintains that in follower societies (and this was so also during the industrialization of Europe, which from the start was in the nature of a political imperative) the government has always played a decisive role. This conclusion is drawn: In developing countries, too, there must be a strong government for there to be successful industrialization. (On this theme, cf. Bornschier 1980) Meyer and others (1975, 235) predict: "If the goal of economic development dominates most societies, those that are the last to initiate development will employ state power must fully."

To what extent have the mass media influenced economic growth? The answer (in this case in regard to films) is sought by Delacroix and Ragin (1978) with the help of a regression analysis. The authors measure growth as change in the gross national product per capita from 1950 to 1970. All told, 49 countries or colonies were included in the investigation. All the countries or colonies surveyed had a per-capita GNP in 1950 of less than 600 U.S. dollars. The countries were differentiated as countries with mobilizing regimes (N = 16) and countries with non-mobilizing regimes (N = 33). To measure the exposure of the general population to the cinema, the authors used per-capita movie attendance in about 1953 and in 1965. Since the films reflected not only Western but also indigenous values, the share of film imports from the United States was taken into consideration (for example, in South Korea 95%,

Jamaica 88%, Angola 74% and Sierra Leone 70% of all films shown were American):

Exposure to U.S. films = (attendance per capita) x (% U.S. films)

What then is the social significance of movie-watching in these relatively poor countries, where the cinema is a relatively inexpensive modernizing institution? The high proportion of U.S. films means that traditionally oriented individuals are being massively confronted with Western values. As a second modernizing institution, the authors consider the influence of the school (secondary-school enrollment as a proportion of secondary-school-age population circa 1953 and in 1965).

"The school generally is a favourable influence on economic development, while the cinema tends more to be a hindrance."

The authors arrive at the conclusion that the school generally has a favourable influence on economic development, while the cinema tends more to be a hindrance; the intensity of the relationship being, however, dependent on the political context. In the case of mobilizing regimes, the influence of the school is particularly pronounced. Under non-mobilizing regimes, the negative effect of the movies – that is, of the films of Western origin – is particularly clear. Simple exposure to the cinema (per-capita attendance) seems to have no effect on economic growth, but exposure to specifically Western-made films appears to impede economic growth considerably.

Given these findings, the cinema can no longer be regarded as automatically propitious of economic development. Instead, values seem to be transmitted which are incompatible with the social ethos that must accompany the program of national development. On the basis of this investigation of the effects of movies at least, the thesis of modernization theorists that mass media are institutions favourable to modernization cannot be confirmed. The cinema-modernized urban population, so the authors even assume, is the most likely to be tempted by emigration, and the most capable of engaging in excessive consumption. The authors also assume that to a large extent the mobilizing regimes can compensate the negative influence of films from the West. Delacroix and Ragin (1978, 147) summarize: "The principal obstacle to self-generated development is not the traditionalist orientation of either masses or elites, as mainstream modernization theory seems to imply. Instead, the main obstacle is the inadequacy of modern attitudes as means to

modernist ends, among which economic development looms large." For the development of countries of the Third World, it is not the establishment of modernizing institutions that is of central importance, the authors conclude; rather, a central part of the modernization process consists of "the selection of proper weapons from an arsenal that includes 'traditional' ideologies (for example, the cult of the emperor), modern ones (for example, Marxist-Leninist), as well as many syncretic ones (for example, Arab socialism)." All traditional cultures, so runs the authors' thesis, contain elements that can be used in the construction of a mobilizing ideology.

At this point a sizeable anti-democratic component enters the discussion. Simultaneously the assumption is implied that developing countries are incapable of maintaining a democratic political system: one that foresees regular, constitutionally guaranteed changes of government, and that permits the populace, by means of a choice among various candidates for a political office to influence important decisions. The people of a developing country are unable, it is implied, to perceive their own social situation and to take corresponding action. Instead, it is asserted, the populace must be manipulated via a mobilizing ideology and "forced to their happiness."

Here we find authors who will not have to experience the consequences of their theorizing making recommendations over the heads of the people involved – in total disregard of many developing countries' long tradition of democratic institutions.

7.5 Cultural Imperialism in the Entertainment Sector

On the global film market, the superpower status of the Americans has been so pronounced that "by the 1920s Hollywood accounted for some 80% of all film screenings throughout the world." (Boyd-Barrett 1977, 122; cf. especially Guback 1969; 1974.) As for television, the fact that the distribution of TV programs is also a one-way street is documented by, among others, Nordenstreng and Varis (1974, cf. also Dizard 1966). An over-all picture of the extent of importation of television programs in 57 selected countries of the Third World made by Chin-Chuan Lee (1980, 77) is provided by table 7.1.

Table 7.1: Proportion of Imported Foreign TV Programs by Third World Nations (n = 57)

Area	< 20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	Total
South America		Argentina	Colombia Paraguay	Venezuela Brazil	Peru Bolivia Uruguay	Ecuador Chile Panama		11
Central America			Mexico		Dominican Republic	Trinidad/ Tobago Jamaica Puerto Rico	Barbados Costa Rica Guatemala Nicaragua Bermuda	10
Eastern & Southern Asia	India Taiwan	Pakistan Indonesia	Korea	Hong Kong Malaysia Philippines Thailand	Singapore			10
Middle East	Syria	Turkey	Iran Egypt	Kuwait Saudi Arabia Jordan Israel	Iraq Lebanon Cyprus Yemen		Qatar Dubai	14
Africa	Ghana Tunisia Uganda		Ethiopia Sudan	Algeria Nigeria	Kenya	Maritius Zambia Senegal	Madagascar	12
Total	6	4	8	12	10	9	8	57

SOURCE: Lee (1980, 77)

Of these 57 countries, 47 imported at least 40% of their TV programs; 27% of the countries imported at least 60% of their population's television fare. An aspect that may be relevant in assaying possible effects: As a rule, the TV imports are transmitted during prime time.

Since these figures are impressive, it is important to realize that there is another side to the story. The building-up of an indigenous television system on economically sound foundations is often possible via the starting help

Building-up an indigenous television system.

afforded by the importation often at only nominal prices of American productions. If, for example, a developing country were to introduce television on a non-commercial basis, the costs would be considerable, especially for program production. But at the same time a market exists on which films and television programs produced in the industrialized countries (especially the United States) are offered at – if you compare the charge with the cost of a recipient country's substituting its own productions – dumping prices. Thus in most cases the commercial and non-commercial television stations and networks seize on this offer of inexpensive imports.

Consider the price comparison: If, say for example, an hour of television on the BBC costs around $ 30,000 (U.S.), and for developing countries merely $ 1,000 is figured on as hourly production costs, then, figuring on six hours of transmission a day, this would involve costs to the developing country of around $ 2,160,000 (U.S.) a year. A sum that for this purpose most developing countries do not have. These costs of $ 1,000 seem indeed realistic. In the Philippines, for example, the costs of an hour of home-produced television are between $ 800 (U.S.) and $ 2,400 (cf. Mercado and Buck 1981) – with the quality of the product not very high. By contrast, American TV series were being offered in Southeast Asia in 1980 for such prices as these: in Korea, $ 130–150; in Thai, $ 150–200 (per one half-hour; cf. Mercado and Buck 1980). Along with this offering of entertainment, at the same time political and cultural attitudes and values are imported – and this occasions various authors to speak of cultural invasion, cultural leveling, cultural imperialism, or "picture-tube imperialism" (Wells 1972).

Will such alleged cultural imperialism via TV hinder the creation of a national identity in developing countries? That it could is feared by Schiller (1969). Referring to Friedrich List, he calls for "cultural protectionism," which, like the trade protectionism of an earlier era, is said to have a educational function. Schiller calls for cultural protectionism: Only once the culture is "ripe" will it be time to take up free "cultural trade" with foreign countries.

The largest exporter of programs is the United States. Lee (1980, 177) calculates that the U.S. export is about three times as large as that of the next three largest exporting countries (U.K., France, the Federal Republic of Germany) combined. The structure of the content of the globally distributed American television entertainment is familiar. The viewer sees a masculine world, in which an individualistic ideology along the lines of the motto "It's all up to you; life gives you what you put into it" holds sway. The actions on the TV screen either take place in a fabulously affluent milieu of the "upper crust," or – and this is more usual – the "lives" of the television actors and actresses here, too, unfold within an elevated middle-class environment – and an affluence prevails that is inconceivable to most potential recipients in developing countries. These U.S. television exports usually do not indicate to the viewer that behind a lot of money is often a lot of work. In fact, the working world occupies only a subordinate position in American television transmissions. Instead, U.S. TV entertainment emphasizes success or non-success in attaining personal goals (such as affluence, power, prestige). And the degree to which an individual succeeds in such pursuits is represented as being largely up to him or her, with the use of illegitimate means – for example, violence – often condoned. In general these media imports from America do not show how collective action can transform social structures, or how situations of social injustice can be rectified.

Television is the most educative force in existence, Schiller maintains. In view of the worldwide dissemination of American television series, the author

Is television "the most educative force in existence?"

(1970, 151) fears a cultural absorption of the developing countries into the modern capitalistic world system – a process amounting to a conquest of hearts and minds. The products of the culture industry, Schiller continues, would in an extremely effective way promote and develop popular support for the values, or at least the artifacts, of the world capitalistic economic system.

What is to be said of this argument? One thing to be kept in mind is that as of now only a small percentage of residents of the developing countries are being reached by television. But there is a criticism more basic than this: Schiller makes the error of drawing conclusions directly from the TV content as to merely assumed effects. Yet identical television content can be perceived completely differently by different categories of recipients, and so can have effects that vary with the recipient. This is certain: The way a dependency theorist looks at a U.S. television program is not the way the same program is used by recipients in developing countries. We still lack empirical studies on the effects of television in individual developing countries. So the basis for a decision for or against the introduction of television is to a considerable extent lacking (although in practice, to be sure, most of the world has already

decided for television). Nor is there as yet adequate data for weighing the pros and cons of an isolationist media policy.

Then is the opening of a country to new media to be viewed negatively? Such a response, particularly if merely an automatic one, is definitely not called for. Thus Amungugama (1981a, 266) observes that the introduction of television in Sri Lanka has brought about an improvement of the quality of life of a wide segment of the country's population. "Some communicators tend to decry the spread of new technologies and popular culture areas. Many of them have no experience of village life," Amunugama writes, "and have no idea of the tremendous need for information and entertainment in rural areas. Traditional forms of rural organization and entertainment are (on the decline), and there is a demand for mass media to fill the gap."

Nevertheless, the warnings to the Third World about imported television dominate the sociological literature. For example, Lévi-Strauss (1983, 15) contemplates a difference he finds between the situations in the Europe of some time ago and the world today. He reasons that it was the relatively slow-paced communications facilities which made it possible for Europe of the 17th and 18th century to combine being true to its own identity with remaining open to influences from beyond Europe's shores. This equilibrium has been upset by today's speed in transport and communications. About this change from the slower old days to the speeded-up, Lévi-Strauss is glum: Every culture is being flooded with products of another culture – translated paperback books, art reproductions, a constant flow of mobile exhibitions. As Lévi-Strauss sees it, all this is tiring. It dulls the taste, reduces effort to a minimum, and confuses the brain. You could almost say that the arriving news is so comprehensive and fast that no culture, as far as creativity and renewal are concerned, can keep pace with this tempo. This new hyper-communication, the author continues, against which no counter-action is feasible, may be a pathological characteristic of modern societies. At the

"Societies have endured so many cross-breedings over the years that clear distinctions can no longer be drawn."

least, civilizations today tend to languish. Societies have endured so many cross-breedings over the years that clear distinctions among the various cultures, as in the past, can no longer be drawn. But the contention by Sunwoo Nam (1983) that as entertainment is spoiling youth the decline and fall of Western civilization may be all but inevitable is plain and simple, trivial culture pessimism (or wishful thinking).

7.6 Possible Distortions in the Economic Sector

Should a country open itself to new mass media or not? The answer is to be found within the country's over-all political, economic and social environment. Thus the introduction of television is usually linked with emphasis on short-range consumeristic purposes, and, coupled with that, a short-range ensuring of the loyalty of the masses. Generally the introduction of television means a markedly altered balance of trade, because the entire hardware involved with TV has to be imported. Another development is in the other economic direction: The coming of television to a country brings in its train an infrastructure of media-service firms (sales, repair) – in which people learn modern techniques. Precisely authors who lean toward consumption-oriented models of development (cf. Ch. 3) uphold the thesis that the advertising for consumer goods is a good thing. For it will start a self-sustaining spiral of expanding industrial production and expanding consumption, which are reciprocally stimulating. In other words, the conditions will be created for attaining the last stage of economic development as Walt Rostow (1960) portrays it – namely, high mass consumption. In this sense, Ithiel de Sola Pool (1966, 208) writes: "Advertising in itself may also be a powerful instrument of development. It is a way of facilitating the distribution of commodities, broadening the market, and making people aware of possibilities with which they would not otherwise be familiar."

A counter-argument comes from champions of a deferred-gratification model of development. These authors protest that the advertising publicizes exactly categories of goods that neither correspond to most of the people's basic needs nor the trade in which will raise the productivity of a majority of the population: Advertising via commercially organized mass media, the multinational enterprises seek to broaden the market for such products as cigarettes, soft drinks, cosmetics, home appliances and patent medicines. In countries of the Third World, advertising messages account for a greater part of the transmission time of radio and television than they do in Western countries, so Hamelink (1983b, 13) informs us. In some Latin American republics the proportion of these "commercials" is over 25% of the transmission time. Hamelink provides the following summary in table form:

Percentage of Air Time for Advertising

Countries	Radio	Television
Western	5.8	4.9
Socialist (Eastern Europe)	0.9	2.2
Third World	19.8	11.8

But this aspect ought not to be overlooked: Television stations in developing countries finance themselves to a considerable extent with advertising revenue. Accordingly, the ban on advertising on Indonesian television – which had been meeting its budget to almost 75% with advertising earnings – surely meant a financial catastrophe of television in that country.

Alan Wells (1972) differentiates in his study on the effects of U.S. television programs in Latin America between consumerism – the increase in consumption of the material culture of the developed countries – and producerism – the increased mobilization of a society's population to work, and to work more productively in the non-consumerist sector of the economy. Proceeding from this dichotomy, Wells (1972, 52 ff., 195) distinguishes among four individual development types:

Consumerism desires		Producerism Orientation: High	Producerism Orientation: Low
	High	1. Hedonistic	2. Parasitic
	Low	3. Ascetic developmental	4. Traditional

For Wells, consumerism, the replication of developed countries' life-styles in the modern sectors of undeveloped countries, is the bête noire of development. The primary way in which this transfer of the consumer tastes of the Western industrialized part of the world to the Third World occurs is via television. Wells (1972, 83) supposes that the images transmitted by mass media can foster among the affluent elite a "parasitic" consumerism. The well-to-do, he conjectures, participate in the "consumption culture" of industrialized countries, and neglect investments. Entrepreneurship is an indication of marginality. (In cultures that favor entrepreneurship, Lipset [1967] maintains, the innovators are drawn from the mainstream and they become cultural heroes. Where society is tradition conscious innovation is deviance; and the marginals adopt the role of the entrepreneur.) While it is easy to transfer new styles of consumption via mass media, it is not, however, so simple to transfer to another culture a system of values that holds entrepreneurship in high esteem. This stricture applies to the affluent of a developing country. Meanwhile, so Wells, the broad mass of the less well-to-do are confronted on television with life-styles that, given their economic situation, they cannot attain to. That is: Matters come to a revolution of stimulated demands.

The parasitic development type, in which modern goods are strongly desired, but the work ethic conducive to mass goods production is absent, is a

category to which Wells assigns not only modern elites and peasant migrants to urban centers, but also the Latin American labor-unionists. For: "The labor movement in Latin America is not revolutionary in the ascetic Marxist sense. Instead, the unions together with the masses in general are pushing for the earliest possible enjoyment of bourgeois material comforts." (1972, 59.) This phenomenon, Wells continues, is reflected in high importation of consumer goods, which in turn inhibits economic development and has a sectorally distorting influence. However, the arguments of this author are more of a speculative character; at least, they are not unequivocally backed

"Fight off the cultural invasion, while rediscovering or inventing a new indigenous culture?"

up. Nevertheless, Wells (1972, 149) asserts that the Government of a developing country must fight off the cultural invasion, while rediscovering or inventing a new indigenous culture.

Wells (1972, 58 f.) imputes the existence of a demonstration effect, and evaluates its effect as unrestrictedly negative. There is a constant pressure for mass-consumption goods, a demand that easily outstrips productive capacity and work orientations. The fact is that the thesis of a negative demonstration effect has no longer been upheld in politico-economic doctrine.

In his book "Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior" (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1949) James S. Duesenberry develops the theme that the demonstration of higher consumption patterns by one's neighbor will increase one's desire for additional consumption with the result that a smaller portion of income will be saved. This interpersonal demonstration effect Ragnar Nurkse had already transferred to the international level in 1952 and 1953. He maintains that particularly through the new mass media (radio, film) and more intensive traffic in news the consumer models of the rich Western industrialized countries had been disseminated worldwide. This international demonstration effect, he continues, leads in underdeveloped countries to increased consumption. So the vicious circle of poverty cannot be broken; for that, tendencies to save and the corresponding accumulation of capital remain too slight. In addition, there are more or less chronic balance-of-payments deficits.

By contrast, an argument counter to the thesis that the demonstration effect has only negative effects is offered by, in particular, Alpha C. Chiang (1959). He analyzes the demonstration effect in a dual economy. Negative effects in the urban sector of the economy are uncontested. But in the country's

hinterland, marked positive effects of an inter-regional demonstration effect are seen. This is because the demonstration effect can be advantageous to the introduction and distribution of simple commodities produced domestically. The investment possibilities brought about in this way are propitious to growth, as are the increased tendency to save and the readiness to work occasioned by the awareness of new needs and wants. But import restrictions will have to be imposed in order to prevent surplus demand for imported goods.

Wells' thesis of a demonstration effect with pressure for consumption and attendant negative effects is challenged, however, by the results of a study carried out in the North Venezuelan city of Barquisimeto by Martin, Chaffee and Izcaray (1979). They find no evidence of a media-induced orientation toward consumption. This even though the Venezuelan mass-media system is largely patterned after the U.S. model – that is, it is privately owned and relies heavily on advertising. In 1974 the authors questioned a sample of the adult residents of Barquisimeto (population then around 300,000). The survey was stratified according to neighborhood to represent the full range of socio-economic conditions in the city. Martin, Chaffee and Izcaray were unable to find any significant evidence for a correlation between exposure to mass-media entertainment and a consumerist orientation: "Our index of pro-consumption attitudes . . . exhibits correlations ranging only from $r = -.04$ to $r = +.04$ with self-reported frequency of viewing of various types of radio and television entertainment programs."

Recently an effort was made to analyze the cultural effects of television advertising in Mexico. The investigator, Sinclair (1982), puts priority on the question of taste transfer – that is, the channeling of needs into demand for transnational consumer products. Nearly 70% of all audio-visual advertising is bought by transnational clients. The investigation of a randomly selected sampling of television commercials ($N = 100$) revealed that the most frequently advertised goods were food and drink products, items for cleaning, beauty and hygiene, and liquor, including beer. Sinclair reports that over half the commercials were directed toward a mass market (middle and lower socio-economic strata) and the rest were restricted to the market of the middle and upper-middle strata. Differential audience responses to television advertising were studied by means of a questionnaire administered to contrasted social groups that represented Mexico's fundamentally dichotomous social structure. A group of 47 middle to upper-middle class young adults of both sexes represented the "integrated" and 59 young men, *campesinos* from all over Mexico, represented the "marginalized" class of Mexican society. The marginalized group has a low level of education and limited experience of advertised goods. Its members are living under subsistence conditions in villages. Sinclair finds that audience members respond differentially to advertising messages. The integrated group was more receptive to foreign influence in their general cultural orientation and more familiar with the specific brand names of transnational products. They were the more frequent

users of those products, but were also more critically detached and analytical in their attitudes toward television commercials. The marginalized group tended to take advertising in good faith, but many modified their realistic apprehension of their own conditions and subsistence needs. In an analysis of available data on consumer goods industries and changes in patterns of consumption attributable to transnational marketing, Sinclair concludes that

Where advertising can play a crucial role.

advertising plays a crucial role in concentrating consumer industries under transnational control and in incorporating the masses as consumers, however intermittent their participation and ambiguous their ideological commitment may be.

Although the data by no means clearly support the above assertion, the fact does remain that the huge size of the potential markets in developing countries will attract intensive transnational investments and the concomitant market activities in order to achieve taste transfer. What is still lacking within this conjunction is, once again, illuminating empirical research.

8. The Position of Developing Countries in the International Flow of News

8.1 Analyzing the International Flow of News: The Unsatisfactory State of Research

Within the frame of mass-communication research, analysis of the structure of international communications flows, which here is regarded as a part of communicator research, has up to now received little attention. Communicators are defined as all those organizations or persons who participate in the production of mass-medial content, and in doing so can influence the quality of the contents or their distribution. The relative insignificance of the topic of international communications flows for the sociological research can be shown by a few examples. The "Handbook of Communications" (Chicago 1973) has only two contributions that touch – marginally – on this theme. One is "Communications Systems," by Ithiel de Sola Pool; the other is "International and World Public Opinion," by W. Phillip Davison. In the index of this more than 1,000-page standard work, there is only one reference to the subject of communications flows (under "international news service"). A second example: In "Handbook of Intercultural Communication" (Beverly Hills and London 1979), the matter of international communications is merely touched upon (K. Kyoon Hur, "International Communication and Its Media. A Cross-National Study"). A third example of the literature's neglect of international communications flow is in the already-mentioned summary article on the sociology of mass communication by Holz and Wright (1979) in the "Annual Review of Sociology." The theme is not treated.

From these few examples one can conclude that here there is a long-neglected research area. This impression is intensified as one considers a review essay in the "American Journal of Sociology," 1982, of more recent U.S. research into the sociology of communicators. In this review the question is gone into: Who decides what news is worth reporting and what news is not? The reviewer (Johnstone 1982, 1174) presents three possible answers to the question of how news is selected:

- Evaluations by journalists who are gathering the news determine the selection of the news.

- Processes of "gate-keeping" within the editorial staffs are determinant. The

term "gate-keepers" indicates the positions within a mass medium in which decisions can be taken as to the use, non-use or modification of a communications unit (e.g. a news item).

- In the final analysis, external factors such as political or economic power are responsible for the way news is selected.

The structure of international news flows as a possibly determinant factor in the selection of news is not gone into in the reviewed studies. This disregard of the theme of international communications flows in the more recent research is, by the way, in peculiar contrast with the fact that Bruce L. Smith and Chitra M. Smith (1956) for the period 1943–1955 alone can enumerate more than 2,500 contributions on the theme of international communication.

Here we encounter a paradox: On the one hand, politicians regard the theme of international news flows as more topical than ever before. On the other hand, by contrast, sociology has made at best only beginnings of analysis of this theme – if one excepts for the time being the (still to be discussed) theory of structural imperialism. In regard to the effects of international news flows, too, theses not rooted in empirical findings are being advanced. The implication that supposed effects are already proven is particularly unfounded inasmuch as up to now there have been only a very few investigations of how international news reaches recipients in the countries of the Third World (cf. e.g. McNelly 1979; Schramm 1980).

Is there a kind of cultural superimposition going on in the developing countries; or is the current situation in this respect just about all that could be wished for? There are authors on both sides of this issue. At least theoretically, nearly every individual is in a position to acquire comprehensive information, so W. Phillips Davison (1973, 876) asserts, on every relevant

"At least theoretically,
nearly every individual is in a position
to acquire comprehensive information
. . . that is, unless . . ."

event or theme in which he is interested – if he is ready to make the necessary effort. Then Davison adds: that is, unless poverty, illiteracy, or the political circumstances keep a person from access to the media. In other words: "that is, unless" you belong to the absolute majority of mankind for whom there is indeed no access to free information. This "unless" is euphemistically paraphrased by Davison (1973, 876) with: "Frequently, however, the effort required is a major one, especially in the case of persons living in developing countries."

The importance of mass media in giving rise to the conceptions or, better, the stereotyped notions that people or nations have about other people or nations has long since been analyzed, and has been backed up, as well with empirical findings. Here we shall not, however, go into older investigations of news flow – studies that, because of social, political and technological change meanwhile, do not tell us very much and that are mainly of academic historical interest. Nor do we need here to undertake a history of news agencies (cf. e.g. Höhne, 1977). But it is relevant to recall an experiment by Annis and Meier (1934): American students were handed differently "slanted" editorials about a Prime Minister of Australia. According to which editorial they had read, the students reacted with positive or negative attitudes toward the individual who had shortly before been unknown to them.

8.2 International Communication as Interrelationships: A Network of Transactions

The world, or call it the international system, can be seen as a large and complex network of communications. To attain this vast perspective, you need to avoid considering the international communications flows of the mass media (the transport of news, entertainment, and so on) in isolation. Instead, you will wish to link this communications flow with other transactional flows. To acquire a global view, you would consider, for example, commercial relationships (such as investments); and all exchanges of persons (among them, tourists, students, scientists, business people, migrants). Nor would you overlook other types of communication: among them, letter-writing, telephone calls, books, etc. (Cf. e.g. Hur 1979.) So broad an approach would also consider the fact that a large number of events on the international level have, despite their physical externalities, primarily a symbolic character – as communication. A prime example of this dual characteristic – physical reality, communicative function – is a visit of state. (Cf. e.g. McClelland 1968.) Such an all-embracing view of the world as a vast, complex inter-action also considers the influence of evolving structures of international communications on inter-governmental relations. For "these media have broken into the traditionally exclusive sphere of diplomacy, and have themselves become an instrument of international conciliation, mediation – or also of conflict." (Koschwitz 1971, 4.)

Empirical evidence for a modification of "classical" diplomacy through international communication is found in Davison (1974; 1974a; 1975), who questioned diplomats (N = 34) and foreign correspondents (N = 26) for a study. The correspondents were so-called diplomatic correspondents – that is, journalists who by definition regularly write on international affairs, often taking part in international conferences and reporting on them. Such journalists are granted sufficient time for thorough research; their output is recognized by members of the diplomatic network. (Davison [1975, 139] uses the term "the foreign affairs community.") This "recognition" of the correspondents is reflected in the interviews; and the work of the diplomats involves a high media consumption (cf. Davison 1974a).

The number of journalists who meet the criteria of "diplomatic correspondent," the author estimates for North America and Western Europe at between 50 and 200. Between correspondents and diplomats, it is shown, there are almost symbiotic relations, not at all onesided. True, primarily the journalists are out to do their jobs – channeling a continuing flow of useful information to their communications networks. But the diplomatic correspondents, thanks to the information that comes to them from all sides, are also an important source of information for the diplomats. This situation is illustrated by Davison (1975, 141), quoting a U.S. State Department staff member: "They (the correspondents) can give you more information than you can give them. Their job is to know everybody; and some of them keep excellent files." In that way the relationship informant – journalist as is applies to these elite journalists is clearly distinguishable from the usually existing journalist – informant relations. In the latter, more customary, association, the informant has the upper hand. For while the newsman or woman is dependent on keeping up a flow of information, the informant can break off the relationship if the published or broadcast product doesn't come up to his expectations.

While usual journalistic practice is an understanding that information is being exchanged for publicity, in the case of the diplomatic correspondents it appears that often information is being traded for information. These prestigious foreign-affairs correspondents are obviously important cogs in the wheels of diplomacy. The correspondents are made use of not only as sources of information, but also, under some circumstances, to carry on communication with another country. For instance: Davison reports that a correspondent reporting on an international conference was fed the information that one shouldn't be overly impressed by the polemics of the official conference oratory; for the negotiations themselves were progressing well. (For additional examples of the use of mass media as supplementary diplomatic channels, cf. i.a. Davison 1974b; Abshire 1978; Bullion 1983; Cohen 1963; Etzion 1967, 1969; Jervis 1970; Kepplinger 1983; Lang 1982.)

Because the correspondents go out of their way to do nothing that might vex their diplomatic sources of information – unless for some reason a

journalist is willing to risk upsetting a highly labile relationship – in many cases an almost confidential co-operation develops; one that also includes the journalist's keeping some information to himself. For example, the talks between representatives of the two states in Germany were known to correspondents long before the news of them was made public – and a premature publication could have broken off the negotiations. The existence of a "diplomatic reporting network" is affirmed by Davison (1975) on the basis of his study: "A network of mutual dependencies draws diplomats and correspondents into an elite community of foreign-affairs specialists."

It can be assumed that governments are interested in persuasive communication within the frame of foreign-policy goals; and that journalists, too, are made use of to alter the image of a country or its policy. Surely the

"Journalists are sometimes made use of to alter the image of a country or its policy."

most notable recent example of such "public diplomacy" is the foreign-policy style of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: a mix of classical diplomacy and modern media technique. A deliberate "making the most of media effect in the international sphere to serve domestic political purposes" is also significant. Examples are the media publicity provided for U.S. President Nixon's China visit and President Carter's world voyage. Another aspect of the implications of international media activity is that officials of one country may feel that their sovereignty is being infringed upon by another country's media. An example is Canada's campaign against Time magazine because Ottawa considered itself constantly undermined in its foreign-policy conduct by the magazine's articles (cf. Beattie 1977). Developing countries are always lodging comparable complaints. For instance, Malaysian statesmen protested that a setback in foreign investment in their country could be traced to allegedly onesided reporting about Malaysia (especially about supposed guerrilla activities) in the world press. Again, the Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries have admonished that reporting on countries of the Third World was not doing justice to the realities (Sobhan 1981).

Kepplinger (1983, 61) concludes that the mass media, originally located outside the political system, have taken over a place within the political system. "The media have become a political force that no longer only reacts, but also essentially acts, and – since the media, as an autonomous force, define the extent of the politically possible – indirectly co-governs." On the significance of the mass media in political life, Patricia Karl (1982, 144) writes: "The media are increasingly a part of the process (if not the entire process) in the communication between governments and publics about international politics." One aspect of this new situation is that governments can come under pressure from what is already on media record. Thus in the event of a potential or actual conflict, negotiated solutions could become more difficult if it seemed that such a new, conciliatory approach might – because of an

earlier, media-expressed hard line – involve a loss of face. To quote Patricia Karl (1982, 152) again: "In an age of media diplomacy, statecraft may have become the hostage – if not the victim – of stagecraft. Only the media have a first-strike capability on both national and international levels." The mass

"Only the media have a first-strike capability . . ."

media, by serving in the diplomatic sphere as a source of international information, can contribute to international orientation; for example, by establishing a common fund of knowledge that enables or facilitates negotiations. But as to the quality of this common basis of information, the developing countries believe that their positions – because of the current structure of the global information system – are not receiving due attention.

Moreover, the broad view we are taking here implies that information derived from the mass media, along with information coming via other channels (diplomacy, secret services, personal contacts), can be the basis for government decisions (cf. e.g. Bullion 1983; Davison 1974). This could pose a problem. Consider that the mass media often transmit a distorted picture of the environment of this or that society. Then it follows that there could be considerable negative consequences for a system, were the society's elite to base their view of the environment primarily on the picture conveyed by the mass media. A case in point is the Federal Republic of Germany. Schulz (1976, 121) argues that one can hardly expect on the basis of the distorted information structure (which he ascertains through content-analysis) "that the cognitive map of the population assumes the dimensions that would be necessary given the increasing global interdependence of political and economic interests."

If you look on the world as a global system, then the individual nations and states can be regarded as social systems interacting with one another. In turn, these systems can be classified according to their communicative openness of their closed communicative situation.

- Openness involves the extent of exchange taking place over the borders of the system – that is, the extent of a system's diverse outputs and inputs.

- By contrast, a communicative isolation (control of communications, monopoly of information, etc.) make the system more and more rigid.

If the recipients are exposed only to controlled information, then they are going to be without knowledge about changes in the politico-economic-social environment or even about alternative ways of life. On the other hand, if a communications system becomes increasingly open, this tendency can risk the danger of an increasing distance among the elements of the society. Communicative isolation can also occur without official censorship. Thus

Robinson (1967) estimates that about one-third of the people of the United States are totally sealed off from information about world affairs. In general, it appears that a large majority of the population is completely uninterested in international events, contrasted with a small circle of the well-informed (cf. Davison 1965, 91 ff.). A similar finding is made by Bose (1964) in one of the few studies to have been made in India. Only 8% of the newspaper readers he questioned said they were interested in foreign news. Again, in an Italian village it was ascertained that foreign news was read only when the country concerned "isn't too far away" (cf. McLean and Pinna 1958).

8.3 Public Opinion and World Opinion

Actually, what is public opinion? There are many, in part incompatible definitions. Yet despite the terminological vagueness, the concept "public opinion" lives on in the literature of communication science. "The persistence with which the expression is held onto," Noelle-Neumann and Schulz (1971, 210) writes, "while at the same time all definitions are considered unsatisfactory, actually can only mean: The concept 'public opinion' corresponds to a reality; but a definition of the concept that mirrors this reality has yet to be outlined." And how does public opinion differ from individual opinion? Pool (1973, 780) maintains that public opinion can mean any of three things:

- that the opinions referred to are publicly expressed,
- or that the opinions referred to are about public affairs,
- or that the opinion is held by the general public instead of some small groups.

But "to have an opinion about something" is not the same as "to know something about something." Eight different definitions are presented by Silbermann (1982). They include public opinion as a manifestation of collective attitudes and representations; as an instrument of social control – that is, as a stabilizing and integrating factor in the society; as an expression of will and an ethical judgement; and as the sum of all relevant individual opinions – that is, as a cross-section of a people's range of opinions. All the definitions have two dimensions in common: the direction being taken by and the intensity of public opinion.

"By public opinion," writes Berelson (1960, 528), "is meant people's responses (that is, approval, disapproval, or indifference) to controversial political and social issues of general attention, such as international relations,

domestic policy, election candidates, ethnic relations." The definition above is based on the attention value of specific themes. That is, the question is not asked: Why are certain themes of public interest, or not? And precisely this aspect, the "why," is what counts the most. Koszyk and Pruys (1976, 246) reason that public opinion is always the product of individual opinions, which must always be formed before public opinion is formed. Public opinion is not understood as being a sharply profiled, static or reliably measurable entity. Instead, it is regarded as a social process tied in each case to specific objects, temporal circumstances, and persons.

Public opinion, in the view of the German publicist Hagemann, exists when many persons think the same way about a certain topic and are aware of this shared view. The knowledge that there is a consensus of opinion usually comes from public statements, including statements publicized by mass media. The statements disseminated by mass media have at least two functions:

- For one thing, these mass-media pronouncements enable the groups taking part in the political process, and/or elitest circles, to communicate with each other; that is, the mass media create a focused public opinion.

- Then too, the mass media by selecting events, editorials, columns and other expressions of opinion categorized as newsworthy present themes that can be the object of public discussion. Regarding this form of opinion-shaping, which in the sociological literature is discussed under the term agenda-setting, Trenaman and McQuail (1961) remark: "The evidence strongly suggests that people think about what they are told . . . but at no level do they think what they are told." The present stand in regard to the concept of agenda-setting McQuail (1983, 197) sums up with: "Recent assessments tend to leave agenda-setting with the status of a plausible but unproven idea."

The term "public opinion" is by no means tied to the existence of mass media. Speier (1950) points out that widespread pronouncements on public affairs have been an element in European/North American social milieus since the French Revolution. In "Of the First Principles of Government," David Hume writes – this in 1741 – "Nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their ruler. When we inquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that as force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular."

One can trace the history of the term "public opinion" (but we shall not do this here) via Rousseau, Locke, Machiavelli and others back to the ancient Greeks (cf. e.g. Dehler 1973; Noelle-Neumann and Schulz 1971; Sola Pool 1973). Noelle (1966) observes that today public opinion is regarded almost exclusively in its "political" function as a "correlate of rule." This, she adds, is an impermissible abridgement of the original term. Formerly, the term emphasized the two-way effectiveness of public opinion – that is, also or primarily its effect on the individual as a member of society (in the sense of the concept of social control).

Properly, one speaks of public opinion only when the persons making political decisions are more or less ready to consider broadly shared public attitudes on certain topics in their process of decision. In regard to the interaction between politics and public opinion in modern pluralistic societies, Pool (1973, 813) remarks: ". . . the public opinion to which the representative has to listen is usually not the public opinion that is already there, but (it is instead) feared reactions to what might occur in future circumstances." The question is considered by Amitai Etzioni (1969, 575 f.) in connection with foreign policy: "The data so far seem largely to support those who take a 'downward flow' position, suggesting that various elites and interest groups shape the public view and make the societal decisions . . . and to go against the notion that the public at large participates effectively in national decision-making in general and foreign-policy matters in particular."

This "downward flow position" implies that public opinion can be manipulated "from above"; that the matter of manipulation is inseparably linked with the discussion of public opinion.

Through dissemination via mass communication, individual topics take on "prestige"; that is, they become timely. Which criteria determine selection of such topics? Some authors have compiled lists with criteria by which themes are selected: for instance, the overriding priority of certain values (peace); crises or crisis symptoms; the status of a communicator; symptoms of political success; news of events. The selection of certain topics means at the same time the suppression of others. Themes and content that question the legitimacy of a system or that propagate the establishment of a system based on another value-structure have only a less-than-average change of being selected for use by the media. In general, in view of the media's integration within the respective pattern of rule, preference goes to "safe" themes that do not endanger the rulership. Another aspect here is that possibly disadvantaged "lower" segments of the populace mostly do not have the know-how, the material and the organizational means to present their concerns as timely, and therefore of public interest.

In conjunction with the creating of public opinion through mass media, some authors consider the theme of possible manipulation to be non-existent. Schramm (1961, 25) argues that a democracy is not endangered as long as the

mass media are permitted to exercise free criticism and to report freely, along with being allowed to represent alternative political standpoints. By contrast, other authors fear that mass communication stands in the way of democracy.

Mass media: help in, or hindrance to, democracy?

They argue that the way in which the mass media present societal and political events does not convert the politically uninterested, but, rather, it reinforces their apolitical attitude toward public affairs.

These critics regret a tendency to simply transmit the facts, without interpretive comment or criticism. The authors lament a failure of the media to explain the context of matters. Without questioning the correctness of such critical observation of the media, we can ask how this interpretive comment could be formulated so as to satisfy all sides. "Other-directed information-collectors" is the phrase used to refer to persons who regard information about the political situation as a consumer product which the "information-collectors" can "buy" – but have no influence on. Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948, 457 f.) use the term "narcotizing dysfunction" to describe how a knowledge of a current event can be confused with "doing something about it." They write: "The interested and informed citizen can congratulate himself on his lofty state of interest and information; and neglect to see that he has abstained from decision and action."

Not only the term "public opinion": Also the word "manipulation" is notably nebulous. This very vagueness is what has made the term a red flag that can stir up negative emotions, it is true, but that hardly helps to make matters clearer. But Baran (1971, 178 f.; footnote 11) considers that the concept "opinion-manipulation" is being used increasingly in place of the concept "ideology," so that "opinion-manipulation" has become a significant category in the social sciences. At any rate, Marxist authors' use of the term "manipulation" is quite unequivocal; for them it means the rulership technique of the bourgeoisie in the "imperialist" system. Through manipulation, the Marxists maintain, the thinking and attitudes of the mass of the populace – against their objectively construed interests – are bent to accommodate the reactionary interests. It is quite otherwise with Communist agitation and propaganda: They aim at enlightening people on over-all societal interrelationships.

Manipulation via mass communication eludes a formal definition, the German sociologist Geissler (1973) concludes after surveying the sociological literature. But most definitions indicate that manipulative influencing, with or without a direct intention of the manipulator, takes place against the always normatively established "real" interests, and without the knowledge of the manipulated. Geissler postulates on the individual level a possible influencing

of the unconscious; on the level of the aggregate, a prevention of the development of the appropriate class-consciousness. Because the individual's range of experience is necessarily limited, so that he is dependent on "second-hand information" (Arnold Gehlen, 1957, 49), information conveyed by the mass media becomes his own reality. Right here the danger of manipulation is ever-present. For example, with clever camera direction, film cuts, and so on,

"It is possible to construct a unique kind of reality for the television viewer."

it is possible to construct a unique kind of reality for the television viewer. The term "pseudo-events" was coined by Boorstin (1961) to refer to happenings or news occasions the portrayal of which is purposely contrived so as to convey a quite specific impression (cf. supporting examples, such as the return of U.S. General MacArthur from Korea, which was played up on TV as an overwhelming reception, in Lang and Lang [1960]).

The deliberately distorted or falsified reportage of events is relatively easy to classify as manipulation. However, usually manipulation does not occur through falsification but through silence. The possibilities for manipulating range from silence via concealment of sources to deliberate falsification and presenting faked evidence. Among the manipulative techniques is the use of words that – are in general use – are vague – have an intense, widespread "emotional significance" (Badura 1971, 43); that is, words like "manipulation," "imperialism," "reform." Words whose descriptive function the user, without altering the positive or negative emotional connotations of the word itself, can bend to suit his purposes. (On "persuasive definition," cf. Badura 1971, 43 ff.; Gehlen 1975.)

The discussion of public opinion up to now has referred to opinion within a given society. Occasionally a writer has asserted that in developing countries there is no public opinion. This argument runs that in modern societies public opinion has evolved gradually, in conjunction with the development of modern mass media and democratic forms of political organization (e.g. Pool 1970). Such a position gains support in findings made by Lerner (1958) in connection with his study "The Passing of Traditional Society." Asked about matters of public interest, many interviewees say they're not competent to answer. ("I'm a common man – I can't think about such things.")

There is a question still more controversial than whether public opinion exists in a certain society at all and, if so, what it is: Does world public opinion exist? If so, what is it like? Occasionally one reads in the social-science literature that international public opinion is becoming increasingly significant in international affairs. But other authors disagree. Some doubt that world public opinion even exists.

In order to develop world public opinion that would be important in political life, Davison (1973, 874) suggests that three requirements must be satisfied:

- "People in several countries must give their attention to a given issue;
- they must have sufficient means of interacting so that common and mutually reinforcing attitudes can form;
- and there must be some mechanism through which shared attitudes can be transmitted into action."

As of now, though, these prerequisites are not yet at hand. So any vision of the world as a "global village" has to be postponed for who knows how long. However, there is a certain consensus about the influences that bear on selection by the world's leading newspapers of their top stories (on this, cf. Davison 1973, 874 ff.). In this process, certain private organizations (thus: Amnesty International, Greenpeace) and international agencies (e.g. the United Nations Organization and its subsidiaries) are quite important indeed. There are also certain media (Time, Newsweek, etc.) that function as international opinion leaders of pace-setting media.

The assumption that there is a politically influential international public opinion is arguable – chiefly because there is not a political authority that this global opinion, if it existed, could aim to reach. Nonetheless, there have meanwhile been many efforts to create an international public opinion (through the use of mass media, the appointment of committees, and so on) for putting pressure on Governments to attain narrowly defined goals (for example, the release of political prisoners; a ban on killing seals). From the broader view, however, up to now the matter of world public opinion as an object of research has been more a subject of speculation than of actual empirical investigation.

8.4 News Agencies in the Political Limelight

The discussion of the construction of a new world informational order has centered on issues that spin off from the collection and distribution of news by the large transnational news agencies. We can, with Dofivat, define news agencies as enterprises that use high-speed channels to collect news at central points, evaluate it and pass it on to subscribers.

The news agencies are the nerves – better, the canals – of the international communications system. The volume of information moved through these canals is decreased at every gate or lock that the flow must pass. The volume of the flow is greatest at the source: In every country, more newsworthy events take place than the mass media of these countries can disseminate. But these local media nevertheless still distribute more news than the news agencies can take over and then, for their part, disseminate internationally. Once again, the news that is transmitted by the agencies to their customers (newspapers, radio, television) is considerably more voluminous than the customers can use. In other words, at each "gate" up to now there has been a sorting out and selection – a reduction – of the information evaluated as worth letting flow onward to the next lock in the system. Finally, the subscribers to the news agencies disseminate much more news, still, than the recipients – the last gate; the ultimate consumers of the products of mass communication – will make use of.

The individual news agencies can be considered sub-systems of the world communication system. They interact with their respective environments. The agencies are interested in the establishment of maintenance of satisfactory exchange relations with their respective environment. This they have succeeded in doing once they have arranged for a continuous input of information that can be sold to the clients. Individual news agencies can have a monopoly within a certain region if – as for example at the start of the 20th century – the world is partitioned into spheres of influence in which each agency, without running into competition in its sphere, can gather, select and spread the news and its interpretation. Such monopolistic spheres made up the pattern in much of the world during the First World War. Partly because of the cutting of German underseas cables, it was possible to crowd Germany out of the international communications flow. In that period, American readers obtained their war reports almost exclusively from sources within the sphere of the Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia) of the Triple Entente (cf. Forster 1935), and especially from the British-based Reuters agency. What influence this flow of onesided information had on the decision of the United States ultimately to enter the war against Germany is a matter of conjecture.

Especially since the conference of nonaligned countries in Colombo in 1976 the structure of the world news system has been a lively political theme. The countries of the Third World and/or the block of nonaligned nations have

tried to remedy what they charge is their disadvantaging in the international flow of communication. These efforts have led, particularly within the U.N. and UNESCO, to a number of initiatives and decisions. (Cf. i.a. Berwanger 1980; Bielenstein 1979; Gunter 1978; Keune 1981; Signitzer 1980; Weyl 1981.) Within the global discussion of this issue there are three general conceptions:

- The Western position. The West is for a "free flow of information" and freedom of the press.

- The Eastern/Communist conception. It calls for a state- or party-controlled media system.

- The stand – still harder to put in capsule form than the two positions summarized above – of the non-aligned block and/or countries of the Third World. These states urge a new world order of information that would pay more attention to their interests.

Political negotiations resulted in UNESCO's acceptance on October 24, 1980, by acclamation of resolution DR 8, as the basis for the new global informational system.

This new world order is to be shaped by the resolution's 11 guidelines (cf. Hüsch 1980/81; Keune 1982):

1. Doing away with inequality (between developing and industrialized countries) that characterizes the current situation.

2. Exclusion of the negative effect of certain monopolies, public or private, and of an excessive concentration.

3. Removal of internal and external obstacles to a free flow of news; a better balance in the dissemination of information and ideas.

4. More sources and channels for disseminating information.

5. Freedom of the press and information.

6. Freedom of journalists and all others in communicative activities; freedom is inseparable from responsibility.

7. Improvement of capacities in developing countries; meaning assistance with equipment, training, infrastructure, and other technical communications facilities.

8. Genuine determination on the side of developed countries to help developing countries.

9. Respect for cultural identity, and for the right of every country to inform the world public of its interests, its strivings, and its social and cultural values.

10. Respect for the right of all peoples to take part in the international exchange of information on the basis of equality, justice, fairness, and mutual advantage.

11. Respect for the right of the public to grant social groups and individuals access to sources of information and to take part in the process of communication.

This purely political declaration offers postulates that still need to be spelled out, given content, implemented. In particular, point 6, combining "freedom" and "responsibility" – a guideline that seeks to marry the Western democratic concept of individual freedom with the Communist emphasis on

An attempt to marry the Western democratic concept of individual freedom with the Communist emphasis on responsibility to the state.

responsibility to the state – is potentially explosive. At issue is the free flow of information Article 19 of the Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has a right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions . . . and to seek, receive and impact information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." The free flow of information has become a center of criticism especially in connection with the now-modish general criticism of "U.S. imperialism," as the root of all evil. Yet it is entirely possible that this criticism of the free flow of global information in some cases is really an attempted distraction from a country's domestic difficulties. In this connection, Hüsch (1980/81) quotes the president of the Press Foundation of Asia, Mochtar Lubis of Indonesia. Lubis says some countries of the Third World are demanding a new world informational system only in order to suppress worldwide critical reporting on their undemocratic Governments. This whole discussion of a new global informational order by social scientists and policy-makers is proceeding along the lines of linear development models. The MacBride Commission states (1980, 131): "The right to communicate is an extension of the continuing advance toward liberty and democracy."

The attitude that the free flow of information is an economic or an ideological instrument of capitalism is held by authors who see disequilibrium not only in the news flow, but also in what they call cultural imperialism, as

well as in the conflict between national sovereignty and dependency. The following forms of the "imbalanced news flow" can, along the lines developed by Sobhan (1981, 70), be distinguished: (1) between developed and developing countries, insofar as the information flow is governed by the existence of appropriate infrastructures, (2) between countries with different political and socio-economic systems, (3) between developed countries belonging to the same political system; particularly between smaller and larger countries, (4) among Third World countries themselves, (5) between political news and news of the social, economic and cultural life of countries trying to cope with the problems of underdevelopment, (6) between what is conventionally called "good" and "bad" news – that is, news of catastrophes, failures, conflicts, setbacks, follies and excesses; and, finally, (7) between topical news of current events and information dealing in greater depth with issues important in the daily lives of people and nations. This list calls for a supplement: There is also disequilibrium in the unequal reporting from the agricultural and the urban sectors of a society.

The free flow of information is for Herbert I. Schiller (1968) merely a one-way street from North to South. This onesided orientation is, however, he tells us, inevitable within a capitalistic media system based on private enterprise: "The circulation of images and information is determined by the strength of the market position of the supplier in relation to the consumer." For Herbert I. Schiller, again, it is a myth that communication among groups of countries, of whatever sort, necessarily will have a positive and beneficial effect on global human problems. Far from it. Instead, according to Schiller, one should ask whether what the well-off countries would have to say in such communication would have any significance and usefulness at all for penniless lands. He continues: It is mistaken to assume that international cummunication automatically leads to better international understanding. And equally irrelevant, so Schiller, to suppose that the reportage by foreign correspondents on a global level is a functional equivalent of the local section of the daily newspaper. And it is said to be fatuous to imagine that international information results in supranational integration (a suggestion of, for example, Amitai Etzioni).

Herbert I. Schiller urges that the developing countries free themselves from the international news agencies.

What would Schiller do about the sad situation he depicts? He urges that the developing countries free themselves from the international news agencies. For the Third World, co-operation with the developed capitalistic countries is also not to be recommended. For this relationship would only

increase existing dependencies, and would perpetuate the penetration of peripheral countries by core countries. This being the way things are to Schiller, he proposes that the state should take over responsibility in the media sector. The Government must protect its citizens from cultural aggression, and prevent the culturally weaker society from being absorbed by the capitalistic world system with its emphasis on materialism. Instead of taking that international and capitalistic route, a country should use its media to foster a shaping of national identity, to mobilize the masses, and to modernize the society.

Among the critics of a free flow of information is Cees Hamelink (1978), who argues: 1. The "free flow of information" is a societal myth to legitimize the interest of the politically and economically powerful participants in the global communication flow. 2. Today's free flow of information among nations confirms their economic and cultural dependencies. 3. A new conception of the free flow of information would need to emphasize the freedom of a country to determine its communication and cultural policies for itself. Yet neither Hamelink nor Schiller comes even near answering the big

The big question:
Who decides when
the flow of information is balanced,
the content fair?

question here: Who decides when the flow of information is balanced, the content fair? Such a decision will, however, always be subjective, prescriptive: normative. Even if you call for the equal representation of every region of the world in the flow of information, it remains unclear what "equal" is. For one thing, no one would argue that all the world's regions produce the same number of equally newsworthy events.

Here we shall be going along with the approach that a free flow of information in the news sphere (not in the entertainment sector) is desirable, and that it should be improved. Unfortunately not all the media specialists and other sociologists who come out in favor of free traffic in information do so on the solid foundation of social-science analysis of the situation. Instead, these authors seem to be motivated mostly by no more than wishful thinking. Thus some structure-functionalistic theorists simply assume that there is an evolutionary pressure toward the development of democratic societies, accompanied by an evolutionary pressure for the free international flow of information (e.g. Johnson 1967; Ch. 5.3). These writers, without facts to back up this assertion, attribute to the mass media a determinant role in the slowly unfolding genesis of a global society. Moreover, they think of the societies of the West as being more or less the final destination of social evolution. This final station reached, as they see it, the world will then experience international communication among equal partners. And such a state of

affairs will – so say these theorists – foster tendencies toward supranational integration and empathy with other cultures.

This form of speculation runs all the way to a vision – comparable to a concept by Marshall McLuhan (1968) – of cosmopolitan communication in a global village of Western style. Comparably explicit speculations about the international communications flow of the future are found in an article by Gauhar. Although he traces cultural imperialism – which he asserts is empirically evident – to uneven developments in the media system – especially in technology – he sees the main source of the communicative disequilibrium in the absence of a liberal press tradition in the developing countries. "Developing countries," Gauhar (1979, 74) asserts, "must have a free press. Without that they will remain incoherent, inarticulate and constantly exposed to alien cultural domination."

8.5 The Current Situation on the Information Market

The existing situation in regard to international communications flow is far from offering individual countries a chance for (however we may define the concept) equal opportunities in communication. The five largest news agencies dominate the global flow of information. These agencies are the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, Agence France-Presse and TASS. Among these agencies, by far the least amount of dependable information is available about the U.S.S.R.-based TASS. Only very few investigations of its functioning have been published. "The Soviet point of view, which dominates this world service (TASS)," Kruglak (1962, 146) writes, "is that the U.S. is worth mentioning only when its acts coincide with those of the U.S.S.R." (Cf. Kruglak 1962; Lendvai 1981.)

The world supply of business news, as Boyd-Barrett (1977, 129) points out, is dominated by Reuters Economic Services and the Associated Press subsidiary AP-Dow Jones. As for the distribution of television news, here too the situation is clear. Three "news film agencies," upitn, visnews (U.K.) and CBS News, rule the market. Keune (1981a, 5) reports that these agencies produce and distribute some 50% of the news films disseminated in Western Europe, and that the trio's products dominate the North-South flow of news films. In fact, practically the entire internationally circulating television-news material (as was pointed out by Tapio Varis as early as in 1974) comes from organizations that are based in the Anglo-American language area. By its own

report, Visnews in 1975 was reaching, via its 193 media customers, nearly 99% of all the television viewers in the world. The client TV stations are offered 12 to 15 minutes of international news by satellite daily (cf. Tunstall 1977, 23).

Here, an illuminating rule of thumb: The "poorer" a television station on the list of customers is, the more it is likely to take over the entire agency news offering. The typical television newscast in most countries of the world contains material from Visnews. For if the news program is to include film material from abroad, there are no attractively priced alternatives to the Anglo-American offering (Tunstall 1977, 49). Another aspect: The material disseminated by the British-based Visnews or the U.S.-based upitn is of better technical and professional quality than locally produced material. Moreover, Tunstall (1979, 218) observes that among journalists the big agencies' offerings are rated as politically non-partisan. A TV station can also subscribe to agency-prepared news reports that include only the photography and accompanying sound, leaving the commentary to the station's own local journalists.

It is estimated that the big agencies dominate about 80% of the global news market (e.g. Fernández 1981; Huth 1980/81; Meier and Schanne 1979). News from developing countries is frequently estimated at coming to between 10% and 30% of the total (cf. Masmoudi 1979). (But also: Consider the findings reported in Chapter 8.7.)

This situation would seem to be to the clear disadvantage of countries of the Third World. On the other hand, this negative verdict is usually based on obsolescent data. Moreover, one enters the controversy with only seemingly accurate arguments if one asserts that the four large Western news agencies disseminate 70 or 80% of all the information distributed in the world. For how is the quantification "all the information . . . in the world" determined? (Cf. Schulz 1983.)

Still and all, the MacBride Commission estimates that countries of the Third World get some 80% of their news from London, New York and Paris. In practice, that circumstance can work out like this: News about or from, say, Ghana goes to London before it is routed to Ghana's African neighbor Nigeria; and the news has been selected by Western journalists (Reddi 1981). Another example: Malaysia, a near-neighbor of Vietnam, received its news of the Vietnam War from London and New York (cf. e.g. Pool 1973, 12 f.). Again: Bangladesh was still, in April 1981, getting more information about India from Reuters than from the Indian news agency, with which Bangladesh has a news-exchange agreement. Finally, an example from the field of television news: Television stations in French-speaking West Africa receive daily a news transmission from Paris via satellite for re-transmission. Only about 10% of this telecast is news-film footage from Africa itself (cf. Keune 1981a, 96).

The lack of a horizontal communications flow among Third World countries – especially if one considers that the agencies select the news according to the standards of consumers in industrialized countries – can have serious consequences for developing countries. The existing pattern of news flow can mean that information which is of importance to a developing country – innovations, experiences – is rated by its Western journalistic processors as not newsworthy enough to pass on, so it never sees the light of day.

The image of the Third World that the agencies disseminate over-emphasizes internal conflicts of crisies, armed struggles, and so on, while largely disregarding social matters and cultural affairs. (Cf. e.g. Charles i.a. 1979; Lent 1977.) A somewhat dated study by Hester (1971) indicates that

"The image of the Third World that the agencies disseminate overemphasizes internal conflicts or crises, armed struggles, and so on, while largely disregarding social matters and cultural affairs."

Associated Press news material involves industrialized countries to 70%, developing countries 30%. The items that come from developing countries are mainly in the categories military and defense (50%), domestic politics (20%), international affairs (20%). At the time of the survey, practically no attention was being paid to social problems, cultural events and educational developments. Similar finds are made by Weaver and Wilhoit (1981). They compare news reports from developing countries (N = 197) and industrialized nations (N = 139) that were circulated by AP and UPI in the spring of 1979. The authors conclude that this news selection depicts the Third World as primarily a crisis area. Foreign policy, the military, domestic conflicts dominate the picture. Two examples:

- Domestic conflicts of crises were the theme of 14% of the news items from industrialized countries, but 47% of the reports from Third World countries.

- In regard to news items about threatened or actual armed conflicts, the corresponding percentages were 11% and 42%. Moreover, Riffe and Shaw, who in their study failed to detect a quantitative disregard of Third World events, found marked difference in topic emphasis between Third World and First World news treatment. Published news items about the Third World were more likely to deal with conflict or upheaval than were published accounts from countries of the First and Second Worlds. However, this doesn't prove that there really is distorted reporting. For the

extent of the stories about crises and conflicts can reflect the fact that in developing countries relatively more crises and conflicts naturally do occur.

One of the consequences of the dominance of the transnational news agencies is that, in Latin America for example, 80% of the foreign news comes from AP and UPI (cf. e.g. Beltran, 1980; McNelly 1979; Meier and Schanne 1979). The fact that the Third World reports relatively little about

"The Third World reports relatively little about itself."

itself can be illustrated by the situation in Africa. Ugboajah (1980) finds that merely around 16% of the over-all foreign correspondence in Nigerian daily newspapers is news about Africa. (But in this matter we shall be considering some research results on pages to follow.)

In Southeast Asia, Schramm (1980) finds a comparable situation. More than 75% of the published news about the Third World comes from the transnational agencies, although information is also offered by local and regional agencies. Why this preponderance of made-in-the-West reports? One may suppose that the gate-keeper – here a staff member of the subscribing paper, radio or television station – gives preference to the transnational agencies as being better, faster, more professional. This preference would be evidenced for the hypothesis, still to be investigated empirically, that gate-keepers of the communications flow in developing countries define news or information by standards analogous to criteria in the industrialized countries (cf. Ch. 8.7). The editorial-staff practices of the main television stations in Sweden, Ireland and Nigeria are investigated by Golding and Elliot (1979). With the important role of the news agencies in mind, they conclude that these agencies have brought about a "global uniformity of news definition." The authoritativeness of the agencies clearly influences the selection and processing of international information generally.

Then is it true that Western news agencies have an international monopoly? In recent years this assertion has been contested. One factor in a possibly changing situation is the developments, political and technological, of the just-past years. Today there are various alternative news sources. The local gate-keeper potentially exercises a key control function as to the use of the news (cf. e.g. Boyd-Barrett 1981). Then too, the multinational agencies have intensively regionalized their services, and, besides, they are strongly dependent on the national news agencies. So regionalizing means both market differentiation and a measure aiming at the long-range ensuring of news sources. To illustrate: Reuters first aided national news agencies in building up their respective news-gathering facilities in some countries of Africa. Later Reuters became dependent for its procurement of news on just these African national news services. "The single most important news source for agency

correspondents," Boyd-Barrett (1980, 96) tells us, "appears to be the press media of the country or countries covered by the respective (news agency) bureaus." So the global agencies are partly in the business of relaying national journalistic definitions of news on an international level. Be that as it may, one needs to remember that the criteria behind the national definition of news were derived from the big international news services in the first place. So in the news selection we have – leaving open whether it is actually a vicious circle – a self-intensifying circular process.

An indication that the large African newspapers are in no sense the defenseless consumers of world news that they receive from extra-African sources comes from Skurnik (1981). On the contrary: Newspapers that subscribe to the regional services of the two big American agencies, AP and UPI, have no problem about getting reportage from an African perspective, and therefore no difficulty about transmitting a positive Africa-oriented image. In fact, fully 65% to 90% of all foreign news in the surveyed newspapers comes from the Third World; only 5% is about the United States.

The accusation that the big news agencies are waging cultural imperialism needs re-investigation. This necessity is suggested by, for example, the results of an analysis of the contents of the offering of the Big Four news agencies during six days in April 1979. "The most important category of news on all the wires studied," Boyd-Barrett (1981) reports, "was news concerning the world region to which each particular wire was directed." The proportion of Third World news in the offerings of the international news-agency files is found to be 50% to 70%. Even the foreign news channeled through U.S. domestic wires contained more items from the developing countries than from the "developed" ones. But there is at least theoretically a possibility that the figures above are misleading: in that developing countries may be getting primarily information which for them, in relation to their pressing economic and social problems, is relatively unimportant. Such an excess of information could under some circumstances lead to increased errors, a longer time needed to react to environmental changes, and more stress on the part of those making the decisions. By contrast with this possible overdose of non-

"Third World media are often not being served with important experiences from other developing countries."

essential information, Third World media are often not being served with important experiences from other developing countries (for example, the development of a new, simple irrigation technique), because these stories are considered by this or that editor or other gate-keeper as "non-news."

What of the finding that the foreign correspondence of mass media in developing countries is largely dominated by the international news agencies?

This conclusion, too, is by no means viewed negatively by all authors. In the context of modernization theories, rather, the following interpretation is also possible: The mass media, through the information they disseminate, result in the forming of a public receptive to more-than-local – perhaps international – news (cf. e.g. Abu-Lughod 1963). Thus in traditional societies, the mass media widen people's horizons. Perspectives are no longer limited to local matters. There occurs what sociologists term anticipatory socialization: a mobile sensibility preceding actual mobility. This form of news distribution in certain circumstances fosters a situation that the theorists of modernization see as a prerequisite for a transition from traditional to modern society: the training of modern personalities – of persons in a position to adjust to new demands that involve more than experiences already gained. Daniel Lerner (1958) argues, accordingly, that the development of such modern, mobile personalities is generally fostered by mass media. But here too, the empirical findings as yet do not compel us to this conclusion.

Although the big transnational agencies have been granted access as news-gatherers to almost all the countries of the earth, the criteria by which the news is selected in the Third World may be inadequate, since standards of selection are derived from an entirely other socio-cultural environment. Then too, the big international news agencies have budgets that are larger than those of some developing countries. These international agencies beyond doubt exercise an important gate-keeping function. Meanwhile countries of the Third World – even though most of them meanwhile have acquired their own national news agencies (cf. Fernández 1981) – have only very limited possibilities of depicting their own situation or of influencing the reportage about their own land. From this aspect, the efforts of various developing countries to influence the news through censorship or the selection of correspondents could be said to be a rational strategy. Moreover, the respective national news agencies are usually assigned the dual role of distributor and censor (Nasser 1983, 56). A just as significant fact – one that is, however, largely disregarded in the discussion – is that the agencies report only scantily on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Communist/Socialist areas elsewhere – that is, the countries of the Second World (cf. Boyd-Barrett 1980).

The following circumstance has been empirically confirmed: In selecting world news items, agencies use criteria comparable to the ones they apply to news selection in the national or local fields (cf. e.g. Galtung and Ruge 1965). States higher up on the scale (superpowers) and states that are geographically or culturally "closer" are more likely to be reported on, and have better prospects of being reported on in a positive way, than states lower in rank (developing countries). Another feature of the handling of the news by agencies is the dramatization of personalities to "report" on political processes. Again, considerable attention goes to short-lived phenomena such as accidents and coups. The agencies, working as they do largely for media with recurring daily deadlines, pay much less attention to long-term social

processes or problems than to sensational items (cf. e.g. Bürki 1977; Charles i.a. 1979; Glass 1979). The news selection appears to be dependent, particularly, on economic considerations. The more intensive the trade relations – that is, the more important a country of the Third World is as commercial partner of an industrialized nation – the more full is the reporting on that country (cf. Charles i.a. 1979; Dorsch 1975; Rosengren 1977; Lent 1979). Many studies bear out that the pressure of the market on privately organized Western media to give preference to conflict-ridden themes is partly responsible for the pattern of news-handling described above (cf. Nnaemeka and Richstad 1981, 100). Along with the economic role, political significance and historically founded cultural proximity play major roles in the selection of information. "The many worlds of the world press" is the formulation used by Gerbner and Marvanyi (1977) as a result of their content analysis. Deutsch (1966) demonstrates, within the context of a study of the status of West European integration, that in the event of politically controversial themes newspapers obviously pay the most heed to the views of their own country. What often follows is not international communication, but a "national monologue." The presentation of international affairs in U.S. newspapers and magazines, Lent (1977) shows empirically, is from the perspective of American interests. (On this, cf. also Semmel 1976.)

Noteworthy within this conjunction is the "Foreign Images Study" carried out on assignment from UNESCO by the International Association for Mass Communication Research (cf. Sreberny-Mohammadi 1980). This investigation was made in the spring and summer of 1979. The research covered 29 countries. The time sample was two weeks. One of the most striking things to emerge from the analysis of the data was the identification of a particular pattern of attention to different types of news, a pattern that seems to be present in virtually all the media systems studied, no matter what their differences in other respects. The selection of the same foci in international news reporting appears to have become almost universal, in terms of both topics and actors. News in most media systems seems to be defined as the exceptional event – which makes coups and catastrophes, whenever they occur, newsworthy. Another universal finding is the prime importance of regionalism. In all the national media systems studied, much attention was given to events occurring within, and actors belonging to, the geographical region in which the country was situated. Ume-Nwagbo (1982) finds (in his study of "Foreign News Flow in Africa") a discernible level of regional parochialism, almost to the total exclusion of all extra-regional news.

Da Costa (1980, 8) describes the criteria for the selection of news by news agencies and communication media in African countries as follows: Priority is given to the dissemination of international news items that are reassuring from a political point of view, are compatible with imperatives of national policy and come from a country with which close relations are maintained for one reason or another. The results of the "Foreign Image Study" show furthermore that the Western news agencies are the second most important source of

international news, coming after the national agency of a medium's own correspondent. This research shows, too, that TASS was hardly mentioned as news source, and the growing number of alternative sources, such as Non-Aligned News Pool, Depth News, IPS, etc., were never prominent. (Nasser [1983, 57] characterizes the Non-Aligned News Agency: "The flow of news passes to governments rather than to the press, and keeps politicians aware of what is happening in other parts of the world.") Sreberny-Mohammadi i.a. (1980, 119) argue that there is obviously a wide gap between the practices which might generally be thought to be associated with the new information order on the one hand, and what, on the other hand, is actually happening at present. This tends to be the case even in those countries that would claim to be in favor of a new international information and Communication order (NICO). The accusation that the Western news agencies' regional services disregard the Third World is considered by Winfried Schulz (1983) to be unfounded. But his findings suggest that a qualitative disadvantaging of the Third World may be occurring. Perhaps the situation is that media of the Third World, within the frame established by the global agencies, can present their own perspective only as "secondary gate-keepers."

Agencies prefer to gather the news where a continuous flow of information is indicated. So favored sources of news are the elite. These persons are major producers of information. The concentration on elitists results in political events' being shown principally through the actions of influential individuals. Then too, the currently established way of news-gathering is not calculated to foster a deeper-going analysis of social processes. "Western correspondents who jet in and out of Asian capitals," remarks Qureshi (1981), "have little time to delve deeper into Asian affairs . . ." The fact that the agencies are dependent on a continuing input of what their customers regard as newsworthy information has this result among others: The reporting about developing countries has an urban-elitist bias; this is so even when agencies supply news that comes from the Third World itself. That there is only quantitatively insignificant reporting from rural areas is documented in an investigation conducted by Sobhan (1981). He finds in an analysis of five Dacca newspapers that only 7 to 11% of the published news is from agricultural regions. Similarly, Bishop (1975) demonstrates that Reuters' and AFP's reporting from Africa practically ignores the rural sections. In view of this obviously one sided reportage, it would be interesting to look into what effects this onesidedness has had or could have on the possible contributions of the mass media to the creation of national identities. The labels "nationalistic" and "oriented toward the urban elite" can, by virtue of the content-analytical studies, be applied at least to the developing countries' newspapers and television (Frey 1973, 366, 384).

In a study "Asian News Values," Chopra (1980, 35) concludes that the Asian press is very much city-oriented, not only in its circulation but in its concerns – which are slanted toward the biases of the urban population, especially the biases of the urban middle classes. Agricultural coverage is

mostly from the viewpoint of the urban consumer, and to some extent from the viewpoint of the urban supplier. The problems of the producer in his own habitat receive much less attention. One can only speculate as to the share this kind of reporting has in the evident neglect of the farming sector, and the consequent agricultural crisis in the developing lands.

The above-mentioned neglect of long-term social and other processes can, however – even in industrialized countries – lead to a kind of "structural consciousness gap." For it clearly isn't possible to store anything in the "memory" of the system that the international agencies consider non-newsworthy. Another problem: Since information from or about the Third World is supplied almost exclusively by the transnational agencies, the "truth content" – the credibility – of the news items is usually not verifiable. This drawback could, in case other intelligence channels – diplomacy, the secret service – were to fall short as well – lead to extreme errors in sizing up a given situation. We can see this contingency in the overthrowal of the Shah of Iran. (Cf. Ch. 4.1.)

Then again, media clients of the big agencies usually disseminate the wire-service items without thorough examination and/or modification of them. Kristen (1972) found that Austrian newspapers were using agency reports with, at most, the insertion of words here and there. An input-output analysis shows that the agency texts are taken over in their entirety or in part condensed. The wording is changed usually only because of scarcity of space – an abridgement, in other words, less as a matter of independent editorial judgement than for merely technical reasons. Kristen (1972, 113) summarizes by concluding "that the agencies don't only to a considerable degree influence or even determine the working sphere, but also do the same regarding the form of the work and, in the end, even the supposedly autonomous editorial activity of the journalists." Be that as it may, the news-agency services are, if only for financial reasons, irreplaceable. For a medium to maintain its own foreign correspondents would be much more expensive than to meet the fees of the news agency. Newspapers of less than international format have only

"Possibly less than two dozen newspapers around the world could make a reasonable claim to independence in their international news coverage."

the choice between dispensing with news from abroad or using the agency material. "Possibly less than two dozen newspapers around the world," Boyd-Barrett (1980, 15) says, summarizing the situation, "could make a reasonable claim to independence in the gathering of a comprehensive international news file."

The news material provided to most of the media world by the huge international agencies is only part of the story. The agencies also supply interpretive articles, summaries, and editorial commentary. (Cf. also Golding and Elliott 1979.) In this function, the news agencies appear to have more influence (certainly in the case of newspapers of less than world format that do not maintain their own foreign correspondents) on the news selection than the editors have. The agencies exert a pressure toward standardization on editorial staffs, who usually take over the wire service's commentary items without alteration. When it comes to material on international affairs, the agencies largely take over the editorial function. There is rarely a chance at the media end to check on the agency's editorial offerings from abroad. The farther a newspaper or other outlet is from an event, the more it has to depend on institutionalized coverage and comment. The medium's having to do this courts the danger of vulnerability to purposely or unintentionally filtered or distorted information.

A classic example of deliberate, targeted distortion of information – made possible because of inability to check – is at hand: Biafra's propaganda strategy during the Nigerian civil war. (In this operation, however, the international news agencies did not figure.) Gernot Zieser (1971) documents how Biafra commissioned the advertising agency "Markpress" to uphold the would-be African breakaway state's interests. The agency worked out a propaganda campaign designed to appeal to European and general Western stereotyped reactions. (One such appeal: "genocide of the Christian population.") Effective bids for identification were made, by using such words as Christian – refugee – hunger – blockade. Zieser shows that this propaganda strategy, precisely because the "information" was not verifiable, was reflected in the reportage by German mass media.

This is the way the current map of the international flow of news looks: The course is a one-way street from North to South. The centers in the North (New York, Paris, London) are directly linked. But the peripheral centers in the South are linked only indirectly: They can get in touch with each other only via the centers in the North. So there is the danger of chronic misunderstandings, brought on by the communications structure, between "North" and "South." At the same time, it has been established empirically that because of the way the news is gathered the reportage is distorted and

The liberation movements are typically castigated as "trouble-makers."

onesided. The neutrality (which means here independence of Governments) that is often made much of by the agencies is actually equivalent to a severely stereotyped reporting. Sobhan (1981) tells us that this stereotyped journalism applies especially to information about the liberation movements. They are typically castigated as "trouble-makers."

8.6 The Theory of Structural Imperialism

As we have seen, the stream of world news and information still flows in one direction: to the periphery. Centers – metropolises – are the capitalistic societies. Peripheries – largely developing countries – are the former colonies or quasi-colonies, today's capitalistic developing countries. (Cf. Senghaas 1977, 13 f.; cf. Ch. 6.) Without unduly straining the possibility of generalizing socio-psychological findings so as to apply them to macro-sociological processes, in this context the investigations of the effects of different communication structures on group performance can be at least in part significant. (Cf. e.g. Collins and Raven 1969.) The results of this study in one way are unequivocal: The more central the position in a communications network (that is, the more possibilities of contact there are), the more satisfied is the occupant of the position.

The international communications structure could change relatively fast because of technological (for instance, better utilization of satellites) or political (for example, the establishing of news agencies or news pools; new tariff measures) developments. But as of now the situation in regard to distribution of information can be described as follows:

The so-called centers or metropolises are closely linked in a kind of full structure, which means that every link in the chain is "central." Attached to the individual centers (this is so of London, Paris and New York; as noted above, because of paucity of data, Moscow's media relationships are here not considered) are the "peripheral" countries – in a communication network that can be represented as a wheel. In Leavitt's (1958) experiments, the wheel was the structure that was notable for pronouncedly bad group morale – with the exception of the central position in the hub. Because of its central location, this position is distinguished by a high degree of satisfaction.

If participation and apathy are understood to be self-reinforcing processes (cf. Moore and Feldman, 1960, 64), then this communication structure signifies that the peripheries, structurally speaking, tend to continuing passivity. For the peripheries, given such a position in the international communication structure, there is no interest in maintaining this structure.

This thesis does not assert that the entire population of a developing country has an interest in the situation; most of the people will surely not yet have heard anything about the problems of international communication. It is simply asserted that those who belong to the respective political and economic elites are aware of and can consider themselves excluded from world communication. But if the world is seen as a self-integrating social system, then there is a call to take care that the members of the system also feel themselves as belonging to it; for otherwise system-destroying forms of social transformation are quite probable (cf. Verba 1965, 529).

The communication structure depicted in illustration 8.1 also makes clear a further aspect. Public opinion in the international sphere – by this is meant consensus in the public opinion of two or more states – is made by the agencies in and from the view of the center nations. The agencies, through their news selection, determine the themes for the so-called world public that are categorized as politically and/or socially controversial, thus coming to general attention.

The structure of the communications network has a marked affinity – at least as far as the descriptive aspects go – with the feudal center-periphery structure (cf. ill. 8.1) worked out by Johan Galtung (1971) within the context of the theory of structural imperialism. For this author, structural imperialism is a dominance relationship between collectives, as, for instance, states, regarded as mutually reinforcing convertability of imperialism. Five forms of imperialism are distinguished: economic, political, military, cultural, and communicative imperialism. Galtung (1971) declares: "If economic, political and military imperialism seem so dominant today, this may be an artifact due to our training that emphasizes those factors rather than communication and cultural factors."

Ill. 8.1 Structure of the Current World Flow of News
(A Feudal Center-Periphery Structure [Galtung])



Communications imperialism refers to the means or the infrastructure of communication. Cultural imperialism refers to the contents of communication (by mass media, books, educational programs, technical-assistance services). Galtung differentiates between the world in the center and the periphery, two spheres that he sees as being in a domination-dependency relationship. (Cf. ill. 8.2 in Ch. 8.7.) He postulates that the global news streams flow according to these structural characteristics. This is an aspect of imperialism concordance: If you have a "high" standing in economic imperialism, you will also rate "high" in other categories of imperialism. Thus Becker (1979, 15) asserts: "The international information structures are the product of and a factor in the global economic structures." Yet this a thesis that can easily be shown to be – in this simple form – untenable. Take Japan. In spite of its great economic potential, it has little influence on the flow of news. Take, again, Great Britain. Its influence on the news flows (Reuters, visnews) is, in relation to the U.K.'s present-day economic potential, disproportionately great. These and other examples argue against so oversimplified a concept.

On the other hand, although many an objection can be made to Galtung's theory, the concept of structural, or communicative, or cultural imperialism can be retained in the international discussion, provided one remains aware of its normative character. Then why is the dichotomy of center-periphery too simple a construct to be entirely useful? For one thing, because the theory imputes a harmony of interests in the relations among the nations of the center. For another, the thesis implies as fact a disharmony of interests in the relations between center and periphery. New technological (satellite communication) or political (Third World News Pool) developments, as we have seen, can improve the horizontal communications flow among the peripheral countries. The world is in no sense as homogeneous or as dichotomous as Galtung portrays it. He sees a form of structural imperialism at work whenever there is a difference between the potential and the actual – that is, when people or nations are influenced to the end that their actual self-

Contrasting what men and nations do with what they could be doing.

realization falls short of their potential. This provocative definition, contrasting what men and nations do with what they could be doing, has certain weaknesses. Alone by reason of weakness involving technical aspects of research, it isn't possible to identify all determinants of the "actual," to say nothing of then making the theoretical model operational. The difficulties that emerge in determining the "potentials" are still greater. A separation of short from long-range potentials is not even attempted. Then too: Even if it were to prove possible empirically and analytically to comprehend what is "actual," it would still be possible only under restricting conditions, on the basis of

knowledge of all variables and their interdependencies with the aid of extrapolation, to make operational a frame (or point) of reference in such a way that a determination of a structural potential for imperialism would be possible for a specific space-time co-ordinate. The "potential" can be ascertained only on the basis of a statical prognosis in the sense that the variable constellation as well as the interdependence among the variables is assumed as "constant." Galtung's argumentation starts from the assumption that there is an unequivocally definable distribution-theoretical optimum; if it were realized structural imperialism would no longer exist. Thus an *optimum optimorum* is assumed as the point of reference in a social-welfare function at

"The highest attainable junction of social justice for the global system."

which all potentials are actualized. This point would represent the highest attainable junction of social justice for the global system. But the determination as to when such an ideal situation has been attained, and as to the extent of structural imperialism that exists, always remains a normative, political decision (cf. Samuelson 1955).

What is the practical significance of these theoretical considerations? For the North-South flow of information the theoretical analysis above means that there are two possibilities of achieving (however it is to operate or to be defined) a more balanced information flow:

- The existing North-to-South information flows can be reduced.

- Or South-North communications can be improved.

The first alternative would amount to destruction of or at least an interference with existing communications channels, which in turn would limit the system's learning potential. So the second alternative, improving communications in the other direction, is definitely preferable. In conjunction with international communication in the news field (this argument doesn't apply to traffic in entertainment – films and television programs, for example – for it can be maintained that to restrict the free flow of such commodities makes sense), a case is made for the retention or improvement of the free flow of information, with an improvement of South-North communications being accompanied by an improvement, also, of South-South communications.

The ideal situation – something not about to be attained in the predictable future – would be the construction of a full structure in the communications sphere – one in which all the positions would be equally central. As for the argument that the information flow should be cut down, what then about negatively privileged groups of individuals: people who with diminished information from abroad might not become aware that they are being

deprived of privileges enjoyed by people elsewhere? In other words: Structures of rule that do not respect human dignity might continue to exist.

In general, Galtung is an exception among dependency theorists. They see the structural defects of the peripheral economies and societies as a result of these areas' position in the global capitalist economic system. With Galtung international communication is at least considered in the form of communicative and/or cultural imperialism (Galtung's concept of a feudal communications structure). From the point of view of theorists of dependency it can be argued that the situation of the international news flow (and also the situation on the market for television entertainment) can be interpreted as a consequence of the international division of labor, in the sense that the peripheral countries, given the structural prerequisites, are not able to provide local equivalents for Western cultural products. Besides the above variant of structural distortion of the peripheral economy, one could also, from the viewpoint of dependency theory, reason: These imported communicative products are also destabilizing autonomous political activity

"Are the populations of the Third World being prepared for their absorption into the Western 'consumer culture'?"

(by crowding out possibilities of articulating, via locally created media products, a country's own interests). Consistently, one could also maintain that in this way the populations of the Third World are being prepared for their absorption into the Western "consumer culture."

Another, one-way street on the North-South media map, besides the domination of North-based news agencies, is in the sphere of radio. Transmitters of the industrialized countries – British Broadcasting Corporation, Voice of America, Radio Moscow, Deutsche Welle – dominate this part of the communication scene. Most of the newspapers and magazines of international format have their editorial headquarters in the U.S., Great Britain and France.

We can draw certain conclusions here even without aspiring to design or construct a "news-media system that reports as comprehensively and objectively as possible about the countries of the Third World." Short of doing this, we can still determine that an "improvement" of the current information flow is only going to be possible if the major customers (the mass media of the centers or metropolises) show greater interest in having such improved information. As long as the gate-keepers in the center (and – this is important, too – also in the periphery) develop no other professional ethos in regard to the quality and quantity of reportage on countries of the Third World, there be very little outlook for success in practical efforts to improve

the South-to-North flow of information. For the agencies must, in order to survive, exchange their news commodity for money; which of course means offering the product in the form desired by the customers.

8.7 The Bridgehead Thesis: The Transfer of Professional and Institutional Models

Wilbur Schramm (1964, 36), whose thinking, as mentioned above, has determinantly influenced the media policy of many developing countries, asserts: "A developing country cannot choose to import the mechanical side of modern civilization while retaining old social institutions that are inconsistent with industry." "Modernization," says Lucian Pye (1963, 68), "involves the emergence of a professional class of communicators." They will generate a media professionalism that fosters "an objective, analytical and non-partisan view of politics." (1963, 79.) In other words, a development is foreseen toward a journalism that is widespread in the Anglo-American area. Yet Pye (1963, 79) is quite sceptical of his own theory, as he writes: "Journalists in most of the new states tend to be so underpaid that they can hardly feel that they represent an independent force capable of criticizing and judging those holding political power. In many of the new countries the journalistic profession has little opportunity for independent development because the most rewarding careers with the mass media tend to be with essentially propaganda agencies for either the government itself or for the dominating political party or movement. Under these conditions writers and communicators may be able to play a constructive role in facilitating the nation-building process but they cannot assume the lead in training the citizenry to appreciate the virtues and the possibilities of non-partisan, and hence essentially constitutional, institutions."

Not to be underestimated is the influence of authors like Wilbur Schramm, Lucian W. Pye, Daniel Lerner and Ithiel de Sola Pool, who were all at first adherents of the modernization theory, and who uphold the thesis that the flow of communications determines the direction and the pace of dynamic social development (Pye 1963, 4). This influence has been particularly evident in the media policy of UNESCO. Bitingly, Jeremy Tunstall (1977, 208 f.) remarks: "Daniel Lerner, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Wilbur Schramm in the 1960s became a sort of traveling circus – jetting back and forth across the world, advising first this Asian Government and then that U.S. federal agency." Undoubtedly media professionalism in the Anglo-American sense, as a professional orientation, was transferred to clients along with the

technology transfer. The rise of journalism in the underdeveloped countries is, so the thesis of Passin (1963, 97 f.), almost exclusively the result of Western influence, since journalism in the sense of a continuing attempt to reach a public audience is largely a Western idea.

Two mechanism in particular operate in the transfer to the Third World of Western models of the journalistic profession:

- the take-over of institutional models – that is, specific forms of the organization of mass media – with an implied additional thesis: that the activity in certain organizational frames specifically shapes the personality: and
- the dissemination of the Western approach to journalism through educational and training programs.

As for the specific forms taken over in the sphere of radio and television, three types of Western media organization serve as models the world over:

- The American commercialized private-enterprise system, aiming via entertainment for an audience maximum.

- The British public-authority system, in which TV and radio have the function of a public service, linked with the concept of freedom of the press.

- The French model, with a system of centralized government control.

Is an apparently uncritical acceptance of European and North American models of media production wise for much of the rest of the world? Hasn't this importation of foreign models led to a striving to attain what may be for large areas of the Third World unneccessary goals? One such dubious aim in

Is there "a striving to attain what may be for large areas of the Third World unnecessary goals?"

a developing country is to try to achieve around-the-clock radio/television programming – which, especially with television, fosters dependence on imports to fill the transmission time. Another doubtful goal may be an emphasis on constantly up-to-the-hour news, an attitude that hinders the production of information based on careful research and on an awareness of the context of the situation that is being dealt with. Nor is it necessarily recommendable for the importers of Western media to orient themselves by the mass audiences. Doing so can encourage a preference for apolitical, culturally undemanding entertainment content. One might also ask: In countries with high rates of illiteracy, little advertising, and inadequate transportation, is the optimal printed media the newspaper that appears every

"Does it make sense to introduce television to a developing country in which the yearly income of, say, a farmer, isn't enough to buy a television set?"

day? Finally, the question is justified: Does it make sense to introduce television to a developing country in which the yearly income of, say, a farmer, isn't enough to buy a television set?

From the system-theoretical perspective (cf. Ch. 1.4), the primary goal of a mass-communication sub-system embedded in a certain socio-cultural environment is dependent on these two considerations:

- the communication sub-system's relation with the given environment; and
- factors of a structural type within the sub-system, including the values held – that is, including the professional ethos of the communicator.

It is assumed that between the sub-system's internal characteristics and the expectations of the media presented by the environment there has to be a certain concurrence – so that there can be effective interaction with the environment. In more operational language, the selection of news and other material from country to country is strongly dependent on a country's political and economic interests. As Siebert (Siebert i.a. 1963, 1) writes: ". . . the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates." So the objective and neutral form of reporting can be interpreted as a form of accommodation to the environment. So seen, the "objective" reportage is a strategy to ward off potential pressure from whichever elite or interest group might feel its interests were being moved in upon by the media coverage. There is more than one way for a medium to demonstrate objectivity. Important, of course, is use of credible sources of information. But another generally followed procedure is to quote, or otherwise give as nearly as possible 50–50 attention to, proponents and opponents in handling a controversial issue.

Comparably, the way the news is selected or the shaping of specific professional models in developing countries can be interpreted as a form of accommodation to the environment. (For example, professional competence as a development journalist, or a socially responsible promoter of development processes.) Differences in the socio-cultural environment lead to different professional roles for journalists, and thereby to differing criteria in news selection. This thesis from system theory is championed by Alex Edelstein. He argues that Western models of professionalism are not adequate to define the image of the journalist in developing countries. He

reasons that in the Third World the mass media have other functions than the mass media have in industrialized countries. In the Third World the media have the jobs of mobilizing the masses, educating, shaping a sense of national identity, and related assignments. Naturally this thesis still needs

"In the Third World the mass media have other functions than the mass media have in industrialized countries."

differentiation regarding a country's development status, its political tradition and so on. Edelstein (1982, 104) asserts: "Professionalism is a culture-laden concept that cannot be applied usefully to the Third World journalist."

The term "profession" applies when an occupation (1) requires a highly specialized knowledge, acquired during a long training, (2) access to the calling is controlled with members of the profession bound to a certain code of conduct, and (3) a formal career organization exists, representing the interests of the professional fraternity with the "outside world." Professionalism aims to safeguard or improve earnings, retirement pensions, and attendant benefits, along with the profession's prestige and authority. If expert knowledge, autonomy and the existence of a clientele are criteria for the definition of a job as a profession, then journalism is hardly – also in Western industrialized countries – to be termed a profession in the classic (doctor, lawyer) connotation of the word. In particular, journalism lacks a clientele that seeks out the journalist for specialized information.

Boyd-Barrett (1982, 181 ff.; cf. also Lent 1978) states that experiments with freedom of the press – that is, independent commentary on any chosen social and political issue by press, radio and television along with less control and more variety of opinion – have generally soon ceased in developing countries. This has happened even though (or because) it was with the help of an anti-colonial press that many of the political leaders of the new independent states came to power (Martin and Chaudhary 1983a, 16). In the colonial era the press often had greater freedom than it has had under the post-colonial regimes. That is to say, the winning of political independence has often been linked with an increasing restriction of press freedom.

In Africa, as an example, the course of press develoment has been otherwise (Edelstein 1982, 97) than the development in the West, closely tied in as the latter has been with the implementation of individual freedom and rights. For in the Third World, press development did not stem from efforts to achieve individual liberty, but, rather, to gain national liberation from colonial rule. To be sure, the principle of press freedom is anchored in the Constitutions of most developing countries, but in general this affirmation has remained mere lip-service (cf. Habte 1983; Rampal 1983; Vasquez 1983). Regardless of the ideology of a Third World nation, strong developmental efforts by ruling elites do not leave much room for a free and independent press in the Western

tradition (Sunwoo Nam 1983a, 312). Frequently direct action is undertaken against the mass media (especially the press). But more than this, the media may be punished for what they neglect to publish. There is a well-established argument that in societies where the state lacks established institutions and the majority of the people are illiterate – and loyal, predominantly, to racial, religious or tribal groups – the concepts of a free press and investigative reporting are not suitable.

Applying this consideration to Africa, da Costa (1980, 7) writes: "The main concern of every Government is to avert the danger of any shock that might discredit national policies and give rise to troublesome reactions." So it

The Prime Minister of Singapore:
"Mass media must reinforce, not undermine."

amounts to this: There are no "watch-dog-media," but only "guided" media. Quoting the many-years-long Prime Minister of Singapore: "Mass media must reinforce, not undermine." (Tatarian 1978, 44.)

Can it be that often the labile political and economic situation of a developing country simply doesn't permit the existence of free reporting? At any rate, this argument is often advanced by the holders of state power. They will say: The main thing is to establish our national identity; to mobilize our people for co-operation in important development projects; and to foster a favorable social and emotional climate. What are we to think of this argument from the rulership? In my view, the reasoning is mostly designed to justify an undemocratic political rule.

As to freedom of the press, in the Western sense, for countries of the Third World: It is not true, as is often asserted, that such a media environment is recommended to developing countries only normatively. The recommendation also can be based on thoroughly empirical findings. What other than a free mass-media constellation is in a position, by uncovering it, to eradicate one of the principal evils that threaten an economically adequate development: corruption? Another plus for a free press in the Third World is that a controlled press usually is regarded as not credible; and, not being believed, how can it perform its assigned assisting role in the development process? "People know that the role of the governmental communication media," da Costa (1980, 14) tells us, "is to manipulate public opinion."

The setting of a made-in-the-West standard of press freedom in evaluating mass media in a developing country is a dubious approach. For, as we have seen above, media in the Third World usually have quite other functions to perform than mere informing: the proclamation of political decisions, mobilization of the public for priority tasks, help in creating a national identity, for example. How pointless it is to seek to compare Western media

functions with those of most of the Third World is remarked on by Alex Edelstein (1982, 97), using as an example the situation of journalism in Africa: "Most African cultures have great respect for authority, and it is considered disrespectful to challenge or gossip about ethnic or national leadership. Similarly, the blatant praise of leaders is rooted in traditional African values. Such terms of praise are a normal aspect of ordinary relations and an integral part of courteous ceremonial ritual. Since many Africans conceive of the press as an instrument of leadership, it is understandable that they shoulds accept effulgent praise. With respect of its role in education, the press in many African countries is under the direction of the minister of

"Radio is particularly useful for mass education in Africa because it capitalizes on that continent's great oral tradition."

information, where it is geared to such national needs as education and literacy. Radio is particularly useful for mass education because it capitalizes on Africa's great oral tradition and does not require literacy. *How, then might the African journalist be compared?"*

How do journalists of the Third World view their professional image? In publications discussing this question, Third World media persons often use the term "profession" as a kind of magic word. The tendency is to say that in the journalist's particular medium, the thing is to do a professional job, and then everything will be all right – with "professional" here usually meaning technical competency. In the literature, careers like editorial-staff member, editor, journalist, reporter are often included among the professions. In the journalistic branch itself, "profession" signifies (1) a status opposite to that of amateur, (2) qualification through training, and (3) a code of conduct that puts the recipients, as clientele, first. One can cetegorize journalism according to two different kinds of norms, as Breed (1955a) points out: technical norms (speedy news-getting, adeptness at writing and editing); and ethical norms (obligations to the recipients and to the journalistic calling; values like responsibility, nonpartisanship, carefulness, fairness, objectivity).

In regard to ethical norms, two categories of journalist can be distinguished. (On the following, cf. e.g. Donsbach 1982.) On the one hand are the newspersons who see themselves as neutrally distanced transmission stations, and who regard societal events with the greatest possible aloofness and withholding of emotion. On the other hand are the journalists who are out to enlighten, who get involved in issues, who commit themselves intensively in regard to civic matters, and who would define their mission as watch-dog of a society vis-à-vis whoever the rulers are. A summary of an investigation of U.S. journalists is presented by Johnstone (i.a. 1976, 120): "Despite the fact

that neutral and participant values tend to be antithetical . . . it can be concluded that most newsmen do in fact add patterns of beliefs which combine elements from each perspective."

Then there is the "path-finder" journalist. He selects and discusses avant-gardist ideas and themes. A fourth category of journalist is the educator. He has more information and is more fruitful in developing politically rational perceptions than most of the general public. In developing countries, the journalist as pedagogue can consider himself a factor in and co-responsible for development processes, and may in some circumstances also see himself as spokesman for a Government that he observes benevolently.

Not that a socially critical kind of journalism is absent from countries of the Third World. On the contrary. For example, in a study by Ugboajah (1978), 30 key media editors (from newspapers and radio) were asked: "Do you . . . believe that information about public affairs is of public interest and in the public interest?" All the editors answered affirmatively. Such findings should not, however, lead to the conclusion that in much of the Third World journalists actually can pursue objective and distanced reporting. It is one thing for Third World newspeople to be familiar with the norms of journalism in the West, and possibly even to wish that they, there in a developing country, could go by such norms. It is quite another cup of tea to have the chance to do this. Many an African journalist, for example, would like to work in line with the Western ideal of press freedom, but only exceptionally does an African newsman get that opportunity (cf. Wilcox 1975). It is easy to imagine that in time many such journalists develop an increasingly cynical attitude toward their career and to the Government policy. Insecurity as to their status is typical of journalists of the Third World. Thus da Costa (1980, 12) characterizes the African journalist: "He is often treated as if he were a civil servant, but without enjoying all the attendant advantage; and his salary is quite unrelated to the importance of the role he plays in society." Very often, journalists in developing countries have a second job so as to make ends meet (Day 1968).

What is, actually, "development journalism"? A combination of pedagogically oriented and politically/socially critically dedicated journalistic types reflects, in countries of the Third World, the still rather widespread unclarity about what this term means. Development journalism is characterized, according to Jamias (1977), by the following five formalistically defined criteria:

- purposefulness, i.e., goal-oriented;
- pragmatism, i.e. judged by its results;
- relevance (to the development of the country);
- mass orientation (by addressing common problems);
- scientific outlook: Development journalists need to be knowledgeable in the social sciences and at least one technical subject.

Typical of development journalism is that it is often conjured up as a kind of magic formula along the lines of the notion: "If we only had development journalism, all our problems could be solved." Yet of course the best development journalism is of little use if it is not linked with corresponding social-structural changes. (On development journalism, cf. e.g. Atwood i.a. 1982; Domatob and Hall 1983; Haule 1984a; Ogan 1982; Sussmann 1978.) By the way, Ume-Nwagbo (1982) fails in his content-analysis of African newspapers to find even marginal enthusiasm for positive-image content: developmental, social, cultural and educational news.

The training of media professionals is carried on, usually, in one of the three following forms:

- By media experts from industrialized countries – people who are active in media in the Third World.

- Through training courses and on-the-job learning in industrialized countries. (Here the objection is often made that the students would take over not only technical skills but also values and attitudes.)

- Through training courses that are carried out in training centers in the Third World (for example, AMIC in Singapore; CIESPAL in Quito; the International Press Institute). However, training courses that are conducted in developing countries themselves are not necessarily oriented to the needs of developing countries. Thus Woods and Ratne (1982) ascertain in an investigation of training programs for journalists in 70 institutions in Asia that no institution is doing training in the "development and planning areas." Moreover, even among journalists from developing countries the notion is widespread that "a journalist is born, not made": that journalism is to a considerable degree a talent, so that to practice it you need no special expert knowledge. Thus Balakrishnan (1982, 85) characterizes the situation in the radio sphere in Malaysia: "In the world of broadcasting, one often encounters the argument that formal training is not possible." In India and Latin America, too, there is great respect for "journalistic instinct" (Amunugama 1982; Matta 1980).

The nations of the center, in the terminology of the theory of structural imperialism (cf. Ch. 8.6), maintain bridgeheads in peripheral countries, with which a harmony of interests is meant to exist (cf. Ill. 8.2).

There is the possibility – which still needs, however, empirical investigation – that because of the taking over of Western models of the journalistic profession or of the self-image of the career journalist, Third World journalists could constitute such a bridgehead. Along these lines, Chaudhary (1974) ascertains a high degree of concurrence in news selection between Indian and American journalists. Such an agreement of the definition of information to be classified as newsworthy is doubtless sometimes still further

Illustration 8.2: The Structure of Imperialism (Galtung)



fostered in that journalists in developing countries are writing for a West-oriented elite.

In regard to Latin America, Matta (1979) shows that preference goes to material supplied by transnational news agencies even if other sources of information – local news agencies, for example – are available. Latin American elitist media, according to this study, undertake no independent processing of world news and news of continental import. Development-related news offered by the agencies is not used, Matta also demonstrates. Nor do Latin American media automatically regard events that certainly are of importance for their region as especially newsworthy. This assertion Matta documents by citing the reportage on Surinam's becoming independent on November 26, 1975: The winning of independence by the former Dutch Guiana, although you might think it would be top news for Surinam's South American neighbors, failed to appear on any front page among the analyzed newspapers. Nor did the Latin American editors send correspondents to the scene. Instead, to the extent that Surinam's independence was reported at all, the media printed background information that had been supplied by United

Press International. Along the same lines, Matta demontrates that a story circulated by AFP, AP and Prensa Latina about excess mercantilism and profit-seeking within the pharmaceutical industry was systematically ignored by Latin American papers. Matta concludes: "Thus the rejection of the information came from the newspapers themselves. They chose instead a story about Caroline Kennedy's photographs."

Moreover, the results of a study conducted in Southeast Asia indicate that the selection of news there seems to follow the same criteria as in industrialized countries. At any rate, the Southeast Asian gate-keepers give preference to items from the transnational agencies (Schramm 1980). Schramm and Atwood (1981) examined the local and national news content of 18 Asian daily newspapers during a week in December 1977. They also analyzed the content of the international news agencies' wire services delivered to Asian clients during the same week. In addition, a separate analysis was made of the foreign-news content of the dailies, with particular reference to what was selected from the international wires. This is the conclusion (1981, 165 ff.) reached by Schramm and Atwood: It is far too simple to approach the problem of news circulation by regarding the Asian media as the only aggrieved parties, and the international news agencies as the sole offenders. For: "The circulation of news in Third World Asia cannot be understood or assessed wholly in terms of the international news agencies or any other single element in the process." (1981, 165.) The thesis that the Western news-agency coverage of developed countries is strongly biased is refuted by the authors (1981, 169 f.): "It is simply not true that the transnational news agencies . . . devote only 20 to 30 percent of their news coverage to the developing countries. . . Nearly 50 percent of the Asian wires are devoted to devoloping countries. . . It is not even true that they contain little information related to development needs. . . Their development-news service could certainly be improved qualitatively; but quantitatively . . . they

"The Asian dailies are astonishingly uninterested in development news from outside their own countries."

come out pretty well." The performance of the international wire services is no worse than that of the Asian dailies, which are astonishingly uninterested, Schramm and Atwood report, in development news from outside their own countries.

One of the most significant findings of the study is the large amount of unused material from the news the wire services supply. Citing historical experiences, the authors conclude: "The Third World countries will probably never be satisfied with the quality of their own news coverage until they have

their own news agency," a thesis based on experiences in America. Cooper (1942, 12) characterizes the reportage about the United States in Europe around the turn of the century: ". . . Reuters decided what news was to be sent from America. It told the world about Indians on the warpath in the West, lynchings in the South, and bizarre crimes in the North. The charge, for decades, was that nothing creditable to America ever was sent."

If parts of the Third World eventually adopt as their model in media work objective, neutral, independent-of-the-Government reportage, this will be due to, along with the Western training courses, the influence in developing countries of pilot media such as the BBC, Time magazine, Newsweek, and others. But it is to be kept in mind that the format of neutral political reporting has one of its main supports in the American and the British two-party system. Reporting based on this system makes it possible to present the views of the two sides on political or other controversial issues as a kind of dichotomous "pro – contra." Thesis and antithesis of specific topical matters are juxtaposed, with no synthesis by the media following. Possible other positions are as a rule not developed in the Anglo-American media. Or, at least, it is easy for the media to omit them because, after all, the politically most influential or most powerful proponents have been considered, so that "objectivity" has been "guaranteed." With this Anglo-American approach to reporting, social and political problems that usually would call for, in view of their complexity, a careful and differentiated analysis in many cases are

So-called "neutral" political reporting.

reduced to simple pros and cons. The Anglo-American media, Tunstall (1977, 201 f.) writes, operate from an "as if basis" – as if it were possible to be value-neutral. This "two-sides style" finds additional support in a commercial aspect of value-neutrality: "This is the 'We'll do business with anyone' syndrome."

The objective, nonpartisan journalistic style was and is largely sponsored and set by the news agencies. The objectivity of the agencies has its origins, in part, in that the first clients of, for instance, Reuters and Havas were bankers and financiers. There had to be the assurance that no one would get hold of certain information first, as otherwise credibility would be endangered. Another historical aspect was an increasing use of news agencies by newspapers that got underway simultaneously with a decrease in onesided, distorted reporting by individual papers, as Shaw (1967), studying the U.S. media scene, documents. The agencies had to serve newspapers belonging to different political camps. In addition, the agencies' neutral style was emulated by some other journalists – which surely suited publishers in that the new neutrality brought in more money from advertisers.

Such findings as the above-reported conclusions about news selection are used by authors critical of capitalism to document the supposed nastiness of neo-colonialism. Thus the Swedish writer Stokke (1974) sees extremely neo-imperialistic circumstances in the cultural sphere especially, in that the dominant Power sponsors training courses for indigenous experts. The thrust of such reasoning always allows exposure of the omnipotently evil "imperialist foe." The condemnation is made regardless of how objectively good the social situation in the country in question may be. (A favorable social circumstance only "shows" how covertly the imperialists are asserting their power.) According to this logic the training of Third World journalists, or, along with assistance to the media, development aid generally, is a gigantic conspiracy of the neo-imperialists. Journalists of the Third World, this argumentation continues, are being subjected to a kind of intellectual and cultural rape. It is not only technical skills that are being conveyed: The "imperialists" are also transmitting values and attitudes that allegedly turn the journalists into willing

"How is modern communication to be possible in developing countries without correspondingly trained journalists and media technicians?"

lackeys – in other words, into an ideological bridgehead of the imperialists. Yet none of the critics of capitalism manages to propose how modern communication is to be possible in developing countries without correspondingly trained journalists and media technicians.

There is another consideration, too: Is the existence of a sector of the populace that has been trained abroad – even if this class is meant to serve as a kind of bridgehead – necessarily entirely a bad thing? (Cf. e.g. Shils 1963.) One needs to keep in mind that these people with foreign experience could function as a buffer against the over-zealous and impatient demands from quarters who harbor hostilities or other attitudes that are irrelevant to the tasks of modernization.

9. Conclusion: Consequences of Media Policy; The Outlook for the International Flow of Data

One of the most important results of the investigation made in these pages is surely that the research into the sociology of mass media can be shown to have many a gap. Beyond that general conclusion, it is a fact that most of the here quoted and discussed studies were conducted at a time in which the industrialized countries were still experiencing uninterrupted economic growth. So it is possible that the results obtained in that earlier period are no longer valid today. Another factor is the oil-price explosion. The effect to the OPEC price rises have indeed been felt not alone in the industrialized countries. Countries of the Third World were much harder hit, with resultant negative influences on the process of development.

In view of this circumstance, it is relatively easy to answer the question: For whom, why, and for whose benefit should research be undertaken? In no case will it be possible to conduct research from pure scientific interest alone; that is, the carrying on of research out of *solely* scientific interest – without regard for the social relevance of the subject matter. (Such an exclusively scientific orientation seems to dominate the awarding of the Nobel Prizes in the economic sciences. Individuals whose research results contribute absolutely nothing to the resolution of global economic problems appear to be favored candidates for the prize.)

The research that is needed should be in the tradition of the classic European empirical social study. It in turn had its origin in the effort to help the poor and the exploited, and to contribute to improving their living conditions. For example, the social *enquêtes* – those famed investigative commissions of an earlier day – played a considerable part in Europe's development of a social conscience, a feeling of responsibility for dis-

"Research on processes of social change in countries of the Third World must have practical relevance."

advantaged members of society. Research that aims to investigate the effect of mass media on processes of social change in countries of the Third World must

seek results that also have practical relevance – even if the key problem of who in the end decides what is and is not relevant is extraordinarily difficult to resolve. In any event, however, it should be asked in connection with the development and the possible later sponsorship of a research project in a country of the Third World who the potential beneficiary of the research results, once obtained, could be. A kind of cost-benefit analysis should always be conducted in deciding which projects are to be carried out.

In regard to the much-discussed issue of a new world information order, and, within that conjunction, particularly the free flow of information, on the basis of the discussed research results one can voice a clear affirmative for the free flow of information. Here the implied assumption is that a Government is interested in having well-informed and self-confident citizens who contribute their own views to the process of democratic opinion-forming, and who are interested in there being checks on Government: whether in the form of uncovering misuse of power, or the discovery of corruption. A free flow of information should not mean that a balance is struck in the existing situation by reducing the North-to-South information flow. On the contrary, the South-to-North information flow should be improved. (Only parenthetically let the deficient communication between East and West be mentioned here.) A further unfavorable aspect of a reduction in the flow of information is that there would need to be an institution that would decide which information was to be "reduced." At that point, "reduction" becomes synonymous with "censorship."

This line of thought leads logically to another recommendation: for improvement of communication South-to-South. But reservations exist in regard to an unhindered flow of mass-medial-distributed (TV and film) entertainment. Here there is a definite possibility, but one still to be proven empirically, that an unchecked flow of such entertainment material can have in part negative effects on the development process. What effects might there be?

- In the Third World such media content could give rise to demands that could not be satisfied.
- Again, a transfer of taste could occur, resulting in a preference for foreign consumer goods, a trend that can accompany the fostering of a basic attitude of consumerism.
- One could even speculate that in children who are confronted with a television world that must seem to them an Elysium, the wish would be awakened to go to such a paradise on earth – a state of mind that would further a tendency to emigrate. As for the possible transfer of taste, not every form of it is however, necessarily to be categorized as negative. Even the much-maligned advertising can fulfill a highly positive function in a developing country: the creation and stabilization of demand for consumer goods produced domestically.

Turning now to the use of specific mass media, we can see that surely radio will be the most important medium in developing countries in the foreseeable future, since it can reach a public that cannot read or write. Recommendable here is a grass-roots approach: emphasis on local radio stations that use the respective local idiom. Another recommendation is to train as journalists

"Surely radio will be the most important medium in developing countries in the foreseeable future."

individuals who are rooted in the respective local culture. Again, one should try to win the co-operation of the most prominent persons in a community – perhaps, where appropriate, offering them important-seeming positions. In this way integration within the local culture is assured. This means a gain in credibility as well as enhancing the prospects of access to channels of interpersonal communications.

One of the most important considerations in the use of mass media in processes of development is that of their credibility. This credibility is likeliest to be attained when the media appropriately fulfill the function of acting as a check on the Government. Otherwise, the mass media are regarded as propaganda instruments of the Government. When the mass media are considered believable, it is very likely that a country's intellectual elite will support the political system. By contrast, in the event of a media system considered to be non-credible, it is likely that intellectuals will withhold their support to the Government. Moreover, alternatives to the official sources of information will be sought. However, an important prerequisite for the fulfillment by the media of the check-on-the-Government function is making sure that journalists enjoy economic and legal security. The significance of journalists in the overturn of old, encrusted social structures is not to be underestimated. In a synopsis of the literature on the natural history of revolutions, Goldstone (1982, 189 ff.) tells us: "Prior to a great revolution, the bulk of the 'intellectuals' – journalists, poets, playwrights, essayists, teachers, members of the clergy, lawyers, and trained members of the bureaucracy – cease to support the regime, writing condemnations and demanding major reforms."

The media-policy discussion of the new global informational system has, along with the issue of the free flow of information and/or news, taken on a new dimension in recent years. This new aspect is the question of the international flow of data. Up to now this topic has been discussed mainly by the industrialized countries of the North. Conversely, in developing countries the issue has not yet received due attention.

From our current perspective, the central problem of the international data

flow is that with it multinational corporations can evade a country's national sovereignty. The problem raised by the increasing worldwide interdependence in the information sector is described by John Eger (1979,

"A current problem is that multinational corporations can evade a country's national sovereignty."

124 f.): "It means that the flight-reservation system of four different East European airlines, the loading and routing of Norwegian steamships, the shipment of Arabian oil from the Persian Gulf, the rates of production and shipment of Canadian auto parts, and a host of other routine activities around the world are all determined or greatly assisted by private inter- or intra-company communications networks or private computer services located in what for many of those customer nations is a foreign country."

The fact that the present system of international communication cannot be considered independently from the world economic system is shown, in particular, by Cees Hamelink (1977; 1983a). The issues raised by the possibility of creating a new world informational system involve more than only the flow of news or mass-medial entertainment. With advanced capitalism, Hamelink reasons, the informational economy links the basis of the exercise of power increasingly with the availability of informational resources, along with the corresponding infrastructure for processing the resources. The outstanding characteristic of the course being taken by the information industry is its transnationalization. According to Hamelink an intensely oligopolistic trans-national information industry with a strong need for capital exists along with a just as oligopolistically structured banking system with a strong need for information. Between these two key institutions, the information industry and banks, of advanced capitalism there is a convergence of interests. All information flows are essentially flows of data. Even the transfer of money is nothing other than a data transfer. Here,

Why the banks strongly resist a restriction of the free flow of information.

too, is the reason the banks strongly resist a restriction of the free flow of information. The banks will also pass on information, according to Hamelink, that in some circumstances is counter to the interests of a certain state. In practice, it isn't possible effectively to control the data flow, since the banks have, besides their encoding procedure, enough other channels available for evasion of governmental control.

The Eurodollar market provides an example of the constantly increasing

possibilities of evading national controls and/or national sovereignties. Accordingly, Hamelink (1983b) urges a policy of "cultural dissociation." Countries that are seeking independence and national sovereignty should do what they can to break off or weaken cultural and informational tie-ins with the multinational enterprises. That recommendation by Hamelink also applies to satellite communication – although in that area clear fallings-off in costs are noticeable – since here, too, there are informational, economic and political dependencies.

For developing countries the international data flow can pose the danger that the importation of modern data-processing installations creates new forms of dependence. There is the danger of a country's being, so to speak, without controls at the mercy of foreign-based multinational corporations in the realm of economic development. The Brazilian Ricardo Saur (1979, 138) gives this example of the dilemma outlined above: "Suppose a multinational company decides to take advantage of the available incentives (such as tax breaks) to build a plant in a developing country, a plant that turns out high-volume, high-technology, low-unit-price items for that country; products that must be computer-tested before shipment. If this computer is placed outside the host country's border, a mere interruption of the satellite link will halt production, and hence deprive the country of needed goods."

The arguments with which the issue of the international data flow is discussed are in principle the same that are used in the discussion of a new

In media policy,
"the torment of choice."

world information and communication order. On the one side, any form of control is rejected, with the reasoning that the damage caused by governmental restrictions outweights the benefits of imposing such controls. On the other side it is argued that control is urgently necessary since a free flow of data can only intensify existing inequalities.

In the field of trans-border data flow a total deregulation of information traffic is not to recommend. This domain is controlled by multinational corporations which, by their very nature, have little interest in fostering development cooperation. Nor do these corporations aim at supporting a development towards pluralism – and 'moreover' the organizational structures and processes within these corporations have not very much in common with democracy. Furthermore there is evidence that multinational corporations out of economic reasons are better off in developing countries which are characterized by high levels of income inequality. The few examples cited before also show that large capitalist firms have the capability to undermine national sovereignty. And, as experience has taught, the transnational corporations will be quicker and more flexible than the

controlling bureaucracies of the respective countries which will lag behind. The result will be that weak states will stay weak and that existing inequalities will be strengthened. Concerning trans-border data flow there is the very concrete danger that multinational corporations will become the dominant political and social institutions while the nation states be powerless.

In the interest of pluralism and development the following summary recommendations should be observed:

1. An unequivocal plea can be put in for a free media system within a nation state and a free flow of news on the international level.

2. Concerning the use of mass media entertainment produced in industrialized countries adequate minimum measures should be introduced to avoid harmful effects on economy, culture, social and political processes.

3. In dealing with problems of trans-border data flow nation states must be extremely scrupulous not to become too dependent on multinational corporations so that especially in situations of crises and conflicts national sovereignty will prove to be just an illusion. Attention should be payed to the fact that up to now trans-border data flow preponderantly takes place in an area not yet regulated by the nation states – a situation with very serious social, political and cultural implications especially for developing countries. One of the main tasks of the future will be – besides the embetterment of the international flow of news – the design and introduction of a policy which allows for benefitting from trans-border data flow without becoming dependent at the same time. Such a policy can only be effective if there is solidarity and cooperation on a national and international level.

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Abbreviations

AJS	American Journal of Sociology
Annals	The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
AP	American Psychologist
Archives	Archives Européennes de Sociologie
ARS	Annual Review of Sociology
ASR	American Sociological Review
ASQ	Administrative Science Quarterly
CS	Current Sociology
CSSH	Comparative Studies in Society and History
HR	Human Relations
IESS	International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
IZK	Internationale Zeitschrift für Kommunikationsforschung (Communications)
JASP	Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
JC	Journal of Communication
JPSP	Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
JQ	Journalism Quarterly
JSI	Journal of Social Issues
KZfSS	Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie
MA	Media Asia
MP	Media Perspektiven
POQ	Public Opinion Quarterly
PVS	Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift
RuF	Rundfunk und Fernsehen
SF	Social Forces
SI	Sociological Inquiry
SP	Social Problems
SW	Soziale Welt
ZfS	Zeitschrift für Soziologie